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ABSTRACT

The Auditor's Evaluation
Of Internal Accounting Control:
A Systems View of Professional Judgment
May 1981
Alfred John Nanni, Jr.
B.A., Syracuse University
M.S.B.A., University of Massachusetts
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Dr. Morton Backer

This study is an investigation into the judgment pro¬
cesses of experienced auditors during the evaluation of
internal accounting control.
tives.

The study has three objec¬

The first objective is to assess the reliability of

auditors as measurement instruments.

Auditors'

judgments

are examined in terms of consistency, consensus, and freedom
from bias.

The second objective of this study is an evalua¬

tion of a systems model of accounting control based on fea¬
tures of cybernetics and contingency theory.

This model is

tested as a positive model of auditor evaluation behavior.
The third objective is an exploration of the simple auditor
background variables that might mediate internal accounting
control judgments.
The study involved a controlled experiment in which expe¬
rienced auditors were asked to make judgments on the quality
of internal control in a series of hypothetical situations.
vi

These situations, or cases, resulted from the orthogonal
manipulation of four independent variables identified by the
systems model.
constraints,
tors,

The four variable classes are environmental

system boundary constraints,

and programmatic regulators.

feedback regula¬

Judgments were recorded

as ratings for each case on three dependent variable dimen¬
sions, one corresponding to each of the three broad objec¬
tives of internal accounting control: authorization,
accounting, and safeguarding of assets.
The first research objective was pursued through three
hypotheses whicn tested the assumption that auditors, acting
independently, have the traits of ideal experts.
the three hypotheses was supported.

None of

The auditors partici¬

pating in this study were found to have a mean test-retest
reliability of .715,

significantly less than the criterion

of .8 employed in the test.

The test for consensus indi¬

cated that tne cross-auditor reliaoility was significantly
less than the obtained test-retest reliability.

Finally,

the auditors were found to have reacted differently to each
of the manipulated indicators, suggesting tne presence of
bias in tne judgments.
The second research question was investigated through
thirteen hypotheses derived from the systems model.
two of these hypotheses were supported,
a whole,

All but

indicating that, as

the auditors acted as if their consensual judgment
Vll

model incorporated the cause-effect relationships identified
by the systems model.
No hypotheses were employed in the investigation support¬
ing the third research objective.

The statistical tests

were exploratory and completely £x post.

Nonetheless,

the

differences found among ratings of auditors grouped by back¬
ground classes seem to be consistent with relatively
straightforward explanations.
The value of the study is seen in four areas.

First,

it

may have immediate implications for the determination of
auditing policy.

SAS 30,

issued during the course of this

study, may place the auditor in an inherently risky situa¬
tion if the evidence from this study gives an accurate pic¬
ture of auditor control evaluation expertise.

Second,

the

results here may have near-term applications in the improve¬
ment of evaluation methods, especially by identifying poten¬
tial sources of judgment bias.

Third,

the systems model and

the information about it provided by the tests in this the¬
sis can provide a framework for a general model of internal
accounting control.

It is unlikely, however,

that signifi¬

cant advances in this area will accrue in the short term.
Finally, even in its current rudamentary form,

the systems

model developed in this thesis may nave value in terms of
attention direction in the design and evaluation of control
systems.
vm
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INTRODUCTION

Internal accounting control and its evaluation have,
recent years, become major issues in accounting.

in

The

sources of this heightened concern include:
1)

Prominent cases of management fraud;

2)

Requirements of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
of 1977 and related activity of the SEC;

3) Conclusions and recommendations of the AICPA's
Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities ([1978];
hereafter, CAR report); and
4)

Pressure from within the profession for the
development of more objective and/or precise
approaches to the evaluation of internal account¬
ing control in order to allow more efficient
audits.

Despite the intensified interest, however, we still have
little formalized knowledge about tne cause and effect rela¬
tionships oetween internal accounting control procedures and
resulting information accuracy, asset safeguarding, and
proper authorization of transactions.
The problem has been brought to a head by the CAR
report's recommendation that the auditor "... review and
test the entire accounting control system"

(p.

61)

in order

to:
1)

supply management with recommendations for the
correction of material weaknesses, and, eventu¬
ally,

1

2

2) publicly report on "... whether he agrees with
management's [reported] description of the compa¬
ny's accounting controls."
(p. 62)
In 1979,

the SEC proposed an amendment to Regulation S-K

which would essentially require these activities.
posed mandate was tabled in June,

This pro¬

1980, but the Commission

strongly recommended such auditor reporting on a voluntary
basis.

In the following month, the AICPA released Statement

on Auditing Standards Number 30,
Accounting Control."

"Reporting on Internal

This statement established the guide¬

lines for such voluntary reports'.
The normative accounting literature places considerable
emphasis on the auditor's use of expert "professional judg¬
ment"
least

in the evaluation of internal accounting control.
one financial analyst (an advisor to CAR)

At

seems to

feel that auditors currently have sufficient expertise to
provide useful and reliable information on the quality of
their client's internal accounting control to external
users.^ The results of empirical studies are mixed as to the
existence of that expertise, however, and a number of
authorities on the subject have called into question both
the usefulness and reliability of such auditor evaluation.

2

^Brown, Marilyn V.
"Auditors and Internal Controls:
An Analyst's View," CPA Journal [September, 1977], pp.
27-31.
Morris and Anderson
are prime examples.

[1976]

and Mautz and Sharaf

[1961]

3

Thus,

the first question this research is designed to

address is:
1) Can auditors be characterized as experts in the
area* of internal accounting control evaluation as
defined by the consistency, consensus, and lack
of bias in their judgments?
Regardless of the auditor's expertise,

there is reason to

believe that his performance can be improved through the
identification of:
a)

the underlying cause-effect relationships in
internal accounting control, and

b)

any sources of dysfunction in the auditor's judg¬
ment process.

Thus,

the other major research questions this study

investigates are:
2) Can a systems model of internal accounting con¬
trol capture the evaluation behavior of auditors
in a carefuly varied set of hypothetical situa¬
tions?
3) Which background and experience variables mediate
auditors' internal accounting control judgments?
The investigation of these two research questions is
founded upon the basic premise that any general similarities
across internal accounting control evaluations made indepen¬
dently by a group of auditors reflect an objective agreement
on cause-effect relationships.

A model that accounts for

such "implicit consensus" then becomes a positive model of
auditor internal accounting control evaluation and a

4

descriptive model of control cause-effect relationships.
Conversely, the variability of auditor responses to a single
control configuration reflects the level of uncertainty
about such cause-effect relationships that exists within
that auditor group.

Thus, the identification of grouping

factors that lead to large judgment variability is a first
step in the search for sources of dysfunction in the evalua¬
tion process.

This thesis presents the results of an experiment con¬
ducted to address the three research issues defined above.
The experiment required practicing auditors to rate the
effectiveness of the internal accounting control systems
described in a series of hypothetical situations.
The ratings produced by those auditors were examined from
several perspectives in order to:
1)

test hypotheses concerning judgment 'expertise,'

2)

test hypotheses drawn from a systems theory model
of control cause and effect, and

3)

explore the mediating effects of background
traits in the internal accounting control evalua¬
tion process.

The thesis is organized as follows.

Chapter I outlines

the recent history of the internal accounting control evalu¬
ation problem, discusses the motivation for this study, and
identifies the major thrust of the research.
Chapter II presents an outline of the process of internal

5

accounting control evaluation in the typical audit.
Included in this chapter are facts taken from the relevant
professional literature and facts gathered from a series of
informal interviews.

The interviewees in this series were

auditors from a variety of responsibility levels and were
employed by several of the largest national auditing firms.
Chapter III reviews prior research on internal accounting
control evaluation.

Implications for the present investiga¬

tion are drawn from these studies.

Also,

deserving examination (or re-examination)

several issues
are identified.

Chapter IV presents a systems theory-based model of
internal accounting control cause-effect relationships.

In

contrast to the evaluation approaches used by auditing
firms,

this model is not concerned with prescribing actions

for the auditor.

Rather,

it is aimed at identifying general

classes of internal accounting controls and the likely
effects of their individual and collective presence in an
accounting system.
Chapter V derives six propositions from normative audit¬
ing theory and the systems model.

It then presents the

hypotheses employed in the current study.
Chapter VI describes the organization and methodology
employed in the experiment.
Chapter VII outlines the basic results of the experiment,
including a screening of the data (for outliers, etc.) prior

6

to the actual testing of hypotheses.
Chapter VIII presents the tests of hypotheses related to
auditor judgment expertise.

Those tests indicate that audi¬

tors do not give the same judgments 'to a single set of cir¬
cumstances and that,

indeed, different auditors may perceive

the same facts differently.
Chapter IX examines the hypotheses drawn from the systems
model of internal accounting control.

In general,

the audi¬

tor’s behavior was in congruence with the model's
description of control cause-effect relationships.
Chapter X covers the post hoc review of effects related
to auditor background and expertise.

The findings indicate

that auditor responsibility and experience may affect inter¬
nal accounting control evaluation in predictable ways.
Finally, Chapter XI summarizes the outcome of the
research project and suggests some implications for future
research and practice.

CHAPTER

I

BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION

History of the Problem

The last several years have witnessed a resurgence of
interest in internal accounting control.

As indicated in

#

the introduction,

the sources of this renewed concern

include a number of factors, especially:
1)

Prominent cases of management fraud;

2) Requirements of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
of 1977 and related activity of the SEC;
3)

Conclusions and recommendations of the CAR
report; and

4)

Pressure from within the profession for the
development of more objective and/or precise
approaches to the evaluation of internal account¬
ing control in order to allow more efficient
audits.

These four topics are addressed below.

The implications

of these discussions are then developed into the study's
three major research questions.

The public's attention has been captured by events such
as the Equity Funding scandal,

illegal corporate payments

and influence buying, and control failures in the GAO.
These cases have underscored the fact that there is a great
potential for information- or accounting-system aouse in

7
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business and government.
regulators,

As a result, legislators,

and accounting practitioners have felt it neces¬

sary to make increased demands for the establishment and
monitoring of internal control systems.
These demands were first institutionalized by Congress in
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA).

This act

requires publicly held firms to "... devise and maintain a
system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide
reasonable assurances that..." transactions are executed in
an authorized manner,

that they are recorded in such a way

as to allow the preparation of financial statements,
only authorized individuals have access to assets,

that

and

that comparison of recorded assets to actual assets is
made at reasonable intervals.
Partially in response to that act,
CAR.

the AICPA founded the

The CAR report contains reactions to the above act and

to the SEC's corollary actions.

It includes a recommenda¬

tion that management report on its "... assessment of the
company's accounting system and controls over it..."
76).

(p.

It also recommends that the auditor's role in evaluat¬

ing internal accounting control be expanded from the current
practice of examining only those controls in the areas where
reliance during the audit is intended to investigating the
entire accounting control system.

This extended study would

be the source of the auditor's set of recommendations to

9

management for the correction of material weaknesses in the
system as well as the source of his opinion on the represen¬
tativeness of management's description of the system.
summary,

then,

In

the CAR report recommends that management and

the auditor each make extensive study of the internal
accounting control system, discuss their conclusions with
each other,

and report them to the public.

In the wake of the FCPA,

the SEC required that management

undertake a review of control systems in order to determine
what actions should be taken to ensure compliance with the
requirements of the act.
In 1979,

the SEC proposed an amendment to Regulation S-K

that would have mandated management statements on the qual¬
ity of internal accounting control and independent auditor
reports on those statements.

This proposal was formally

withdrawn through SEC Release No.
However,

34-16877 in June of 1980.

this release did not close the issue.

Rather,

it

included three major statements:
1)

The SEC strongly advised voluntary compliance
with the original proposal for management report¬
ing on internal control quality;

2) The SEC re-emphasized the importance of indepen¬
dent auditor involvement in the review; and
3) The SEC stated its intentions to monitor volun¬
tary activity as a prelude to formal reconsidera¬
tion of the entire issue in the Spring of 1982.
Meanwhile,

with the increasing sophistication of both the

10

techniques used by auditors and the accounting systems that
they audit,

the SEC and professional accounting advisory

bodies have put pressure on practitioners and researchers to
provide a more specific framework for the evaluation of
internal accounting control.

The second standard of audit

fieldwork requires the auditor to evaluate internal account¬
ing control as a way of determining how much reliance can be
placed on the accounting subsystem under study in planning
the extent of substantive testing.

Numerous articles have

appeared describing and analyzing methodologies to relate
internal accounting control evaluation to such extent-oftest decisions."*' Finally,

in SAS 30 the AICPA has formalized

the review of internal accounting control as a separate and
acceptable activity in itself.

Thus, guidelines now exist

for the rendering of an auditor opinion on a client's inter¬
nal accounting control system as determined through the reg¬
ular audit work (for management, regulating bodies, or spe¬
cial third parties only) or through a separate engagement
for such purposes

(required to support a general opinion).

If the auditor's

internal accounting control evaluation

This topic seems to have taken off in the early
1970's.
A skeletal chronology would include Aly & Duboff
[1971], Corless [1972], Joyce [1976], Morris & Anderson
[1976], and Mock & Turner [1978] on the empirical side and
Sorensen [1969], Tracy [1969], Smith [1972], and Elliot &
Rogers [1972] on the theoretical/methodological side.
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is going to be relied upon in devising the audit plan,

in

advising management, or in publicly attesting to manage¬
ment's assessment of accounting control,

it must first be

demonstrated that these judgments are relatively stable
across time and individuals.

In this sense,

the auditor

must be regarded as a measurement instrument, and,
such instrument, must be reliable.
question,
1)

then,

like any

Our first major research

is:

Can auditors be characterized as experts in the
area of internal accounting control evaluation as
defined by the consistency, consensus, and lack
of bias in their judgments?

Certainly,

if the auditor is not a reasonably expert

judge according to these criteria,

then an extension of the

responsibilities placed on him in internal accounting con¬
trol evaluation must De deemed inappropriate.

Whether or

not the auditor is an internal accounting control evaluation
expert,

the events,

pronouncements, and regulations cited

earlier indicate that the pressures on auditors to improve
the precision of

internal accounting control evaluation and

to set specific criteria for the evaluation task are likely
to continue,

if not increase.

reaching such goals, however,

As a necessary prelude to
we need to learn more about

the cause-effect relationships between the existence of cer¬
tain control-feature classes and the attainment of related
control objectives.
The most objective way of determining such relationships

12

would be direct study of actual control systems.
accounting control systems are open systems.

However,

Their opera¬

tions are affected by a wide variety of variables that cannot be controlled in a real-world environment.

2

Thus, direct

study of internal accounting control systems, besides
requiring a massive and expensive effort, could easily
result in uninterpretable data.

In order to make such study

more efficient, we should first try to find some indications
of where significant interactions between control systems
and their environments might occur.

We would also have to

develop a descriptive model to characterize,
manner,

in a general

the critical features of both accounting control

systems and their environments.
Thus, prior to extensive direct study of internal
accounting control systems, we must make some preliminary
observation and analysis.

Some of this work has already

been done and is reflected in the descriptive literature on
this subject.
necessity,
dence.

However,

such discussions have been, of

based only on introspection and anecdotal evi¬

Psychological studies of self-insight in complex

observation and judgment have found that man has a lessthan-ideal awareness of the factors and information that

2

Konrath [1971] discusses this open systems view of
control at some length.
This notion is discussed in depth
in this paper in Chapter IV.

13

contribute to his final judgment.

3

However, direct empirical

study of such judgment allows the extraction,

through sta¬

tistical techniques, of the implicit cues that guide the
judgment process.

Thus, positive models of internal

accounting control evaluation judgments may provide further
insight into the factors that affect the quality of internal
accounting control systems.
The best indications of how accounting control systems
interact with their environments and how well control proce¬
dures combine to produce control effectiveness,

therefore,

are probably those captured in the control decisions of
those people who are the most experienced in the field of
internal accounting control evaluation.

Since independent

auditors make up the largest group of such individuals,

it

is logical that a study of their judgments may yield some
insight into the cause-effect relationships in the area of
internal control.

Therefore,

our second major research

question is:
2)

Can a systems model of internal accounting con¬
trol capture the evaluation behavior of auditors
in a carefully varied set of hypothetical situa¬
tions?

If general areas of agreement can be found in auditor's
judgments,

then the scope of direct empirical study can be

^Reviews of such work can be found in Slovic & Lichten¬
stein [1971] , Swieringa, et al. [1978] , and Joyce [1976] .
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reduced to concentrate on the factors identified in those
areas and the relationships among them.

Such reduced scope

will not only increase the efficiency of direct investiga¬
tion,

but also it may eventually allow the study of internal

control through simulation and modeling.
Furthermore,

since internal accounting control evaluation

expertise has a direct effect on audit efficiency, the dis¬
covery of factors that mediate an auditor's evaluation is
also of importance.

Thus, the third research question for

this study is:
3) Which background and experience variables seem to
mediate auditors' internal accounting control
judgments?
Before we proceed to a review of the state of the art in
internal accounting control evaluation,

it will be helpful

to lay out some basic terminology and present a quick
description of the internal accounting control evaluation
process and how it fits into the typical audit.

Audit Procedure and Terminology^
The objective of an ordinary independent audit is an
evaluation of the fairness with which a set of financial
statements represents the events, transactions,
on which the statements are based,

given the criteria of

generally accepted accounting principles.

4

and balances

4

This definition is a paraphrase of the one prepared by

15

The principal inputs to the auditor's final opinion deci¬
sion are the results of substantive testing.

As the name

implies, substantive testing is an examination of the sub¬
stance on which the financial statements are based:
underlying transactions and balances.

actual

Substantive tests

include verification of transaction or balance details from
random samples and analytical review of significant ratios
and trends for reasonableness.
The auditor may,

indeed should, adjust the extent of such

substantive testing based on an assessment of the reliabil¬
ity of the accounting system.^ The system's reliability,
which may be thought of in terms of an error prooability
distribution,
system.

is mediated by the internal accounting control

Hence,

internal accounting control evaluation is a

major input to the design of the substantive testing plan.
Under current auditing procedures,

the auditor only eval-

the AICPA in section 110.01 of Volume I of its Professional
Standards.
See that section and the following paragraphs
for a more technical description of audit objectives and
evidence gathering.
5

This concept is embodied in the second standard of
audit fieldwork, which states:
There is to be a proper study and evaluation of
the existing internal control as a basis for reli¬
ance thereon and for determination of the resul¬
tant extent of the tests to which auditing proce¬
dures are to be restricted.
See section AU 150.02 of the AICPA's Professional Standards.
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uates those controls on which he intends to rely.6 The
presence of strong controls contributes to the auditor's
pool of evidence in support of the client's financial state¬
ments.

The more reliable, the accounting system is, the less

additional evidence is required to support the conclusion
that the financial statements are fair.
controls exist,

Thus, when strong

smaller detail samples can be taKen.

This process may be viewed in Bayesian terms.' The audi¬
tor's decision on the fairness of the financial statements
is based,
ments'

in

part, on a posterior estimate of the state¬

error rate.

This rate,

in turn,

is determined

through -Bayes' Theorem using a subjectively rated prior (the
output of

internal accounting control evaluation)

and an

objectively estimated error likelihood extrapolated from the
results of the sampling tests.
error rate and confidence level,
prior distribution,

Given a minimally acceptable
and based on the estimated

sample sizes can be determined to yield

g
The SEC has strongly recommended a voluntary program
under which the auditor would express an opinion on manage¬
ment's statement of the reliability of its accounting sys¬
tems.
In SAS 30, the AICPA has recognized that the render¬
ing of such an opinion would require the auditor to expand
the scope of his examination of controls.
7

The Bayesian view of substantive test adjustment has
been discussed heavily in the literature.
Its inclusion
here should not be construed as an advocacy of the position.
Rather, it should be viewed as a descriptive approach.
For
details on the Bayesian approach, see Sorensen [1969], Tracy
[1969], or Smith [1972].

17

the most efficient audit program.
Minimizing sample size is not a trivial objective.

With

the complexity and high volume of transactions that many
accounting systems must process, a difference in sample
sizes of only a few percentage points may translate into a
significant variation in audit time and expense.
The typical audit routine, with an emphasis on internal
control evaluation,

is flowcharted in Figure 1.

The left

side of the figure represents the internal accounting con¬
trol evaluation process.

This process can be characterized

as a four step approach, one step for each decision labeled
A, B, C, and D in Figure 1.
The first decision (step A)
controls.

According to Barber

is on the strength of general
[1974],

"General controls are

environmental in nature and span most or all of the applica¬
tions in an accounting system."
may be physical,

(p.

136)

General controls

social, or procedural in nature.

limit or motivate certain patterns of behavior.
cated in the flowchart,

They may
As

indi¬

their basic objective may be charac¬

terized as fostering compliance with the organization's
plans of operation, especially compliance with specific con¬
trols.

If the auditor finds that general controls are not

likely to foster compliance with established specific con¬
trols, he will exit the internal accounting control evalua¬
tion routine and proceed to plan an audit program that does

18

Devise audit pro¬
gram, placing
appropriate reli¬
ance on controls.
Perform substan¬
tive tests.

Can an opinion
be formed?

Revise audit pro¬
gram.

Give audit opinion.

Figure 1
Flowchart of Audit Process
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not place any reliance on internal control.

If his examina¬

tion of general controls leads him to believe that a serious
lack of control exists, he may opt to decline the audit
engagement.
If the auditor finds no compelling reason to preclude
reliance on internal control at this level, he then proceeds
to the second stop, which culminates in decision B on spe¬
cific controls.

Here the auditor identifies strengths and

weaknesses in the procedures and techniques employed to
maintain control in each accounting subsystem.

For example,

if the auditor intends to rely on inventory controls, he
will review that subsystem for control strengths and weak¬
nesses.

Here,

again,

if the evidence does not convince the

auditor that the documented controls are sufficient to allow
the audit program to place some reliance on the output of
the subsystem under study,

further examination is not under¬

taken.
It should be emphasized that this is the point at which
the actual reliability decision is made.

Later decisions

either feed back to this point or exit from the internal
accounting control evaluation routine.

Thus,

the auditor

should have a subjective rating of the reliability of the
subsystem just examined as he leaves this step.

However, he

may not yet have a notion of the amount of reliance the
audit program will place on that subsystem in terms of a
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sample size determination.
The preliminary plan of subsystem reliance is affected by
the third step, decision C in Figure 1.

Here the auditor

considers non-control factors that mediate the internal
accounting control evaluation - substantive testing rela¬
tionship.

For example,

if the auditor estimates that the

costs of compliance testing will exceed the savings due to
reduced substantive testing based on reliance on internal
accounting control, compliance testing will not be performed
and no reliance will be placed on internal accounting con¬
trol in that subsystem.

Furthermore, other factors, such as

audit risk or changes in the size of the client's opera¬
tions, may also affect the audit program and over-ride cong
trol considerations.
If the auditor does not decide to exit
internal accounting control evaluation for any of these rea¬
sons, he then proceeds to the final step, decision D on the
results of compliance testing.
Compliance testing is a verification task which investi¬
gates the status of documented specific controls.

If such

testing indicates that the documented controls are,
correctly functioning,

in fact,

then the reliability assessment made

by the auditor at decision 3 will be retained.

If, on the

o

A discussion of, and empirical support for,
can be found in Morris & Anderson [1976].

this claim
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other hand, documented controls are not in place,

the

auditor must return to decision B and re-rate the subsys¬
tem's reliability, given the controls that are in place.

The above discussion has been a rather gross rendering of
the actual process.

Although this description has addressed

the sequence of events and the major decision points in the
internal accounting control evaluation process,

it has said

little about how such decisions are made.
Auditors are involved in internal accounting control
evaluation on a regular basis, and major auditing firms
direct significant energy into developing formal evaluation
procedures.

In the public domain,

the professional account¬

ing literature contains many opinions and analyses related
to internal accounting control evaluation.

It is likely

that auditing theorists and auditing practitioners can pro¬
vide some basic insights into the logical considerations to
be made during internal accounting control evaluation.
Thus, we now turn to auditing literature and practitioners
with the goal of finding some generally accepted "truths"
about internal accounting control and its evaluation.

CHAPTER

I I

THE AUDITOR'S EVALUATION
OF INTERNAL ACCOUNTING CONTROL

This chapter presents a rather cursory scan of the pro¬
fessional literature that prescribes guidelines or identi¬
fies possible cues for the auditor to employ in the review
and evaluation of internal accounting control.

It also

introduces information about the standard methods for evalu¬
ation employed by several

'Big Eight' accounting firms.

The

literature is examined for important considerations at each
level in the evaluation sequence discussed in the last sec¬
tion of Chapter Is review of general controls, review of
specific controls, non-control considerations, and compli¬
ance testing.

The data on actual evaluation methods, gath¬

ered through a series of informal interviews,

indicates how

the internal accounting control evaluation logic is

'coded'

by different auditing firms.
The chapter,

itself, is divided into two major sections.

The first: section deals with the auditing literature.

The

second section summarizes the information accumulated during
the interviews.

The chapter closes with an overview of the

internal accounting control evaluation process and some
related implications for the study of the topic.
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The Auditing Literature

The review of general controls.
The AICPA's Special Advisory Committee on Internal
Accounting Control (SACIAC) calls general controls "the
internal accounting control environment."

[1979, p.

12]

SACIAC recognizes that general controls can either be real
or intangible, but does not seem to carry the distinction
any further.

An examination of the normative literature,

however, discloses that these two types of general control
are viewed quite differently.

Intangible controls seem to

require an overall evalution and are the basis for decision
A in Figure 1.

For example, SACIAC, which tends to empha¬

size the intangible general controls, comes to the following
conclusion:
The committee believes that an overall evaluation
of a company's internal accounting control envi¬
ronment is a necessary prelude to the-^evaluation
of control procedures and techniques.
[emphasis
added] (p. 12)
On the other hand,
[1971]

and Barber

[1974],

some authors, such as Konrath
indicate that real general con¬

trols should be examined individually so that relationships
between particular real general control factors and specific

Here the committee seems to be expressing an opinion
that the atmosphere in which control procedures and techni¬
ques (i.e., basicallly specific controls) operate is the
critical feature of general control.
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control procedures can be taken into account.
In the paragraphs below, each type of general control
is discussed separately.

The intangible aspect of the internal accounting con¬
trol environment may be termed the client firm's "social
structure."

Mautz & Snaraf

[1961]

discuss this notion in

terms of the "pressures that motivate people in the system."
(p.145)

This discussion is expanded by Mautz & Mini

and Carmichael

[1964]

[1970].

According to Arthur Andersen & Co
[1979], management's style,

goals,

the client's social structure.

[1978]

and SACIAC

and policies will affect

SACIAC also concludes that

accountability for performance and "... adherence to appro¬
priate standards for ethical benavior,
with applicable laws and regulations"

including compliance
(p.

13) maxe important

contributions to a strong internal accounting control envi¬
ronment.

SACIAC adds,

"Formalization of such matters is

conducive to an environment in which internal accounting
controls are likely to be understood and operate effi¬
ciently."

(p.13)

The overall evaluation of intangible general controls
is recommended, apparently, based on the opinion that a
client's social structure has a general effect on accounting
system reliability.

Carmichael

[1970]

and Mautz & Mini

[1964]

both imply that social structure is likely to ai I.'ect

the reliability of accounting information by encouraging or
discouraging compliance with controls at the specieic sub¬
system level.

It is also likely that the social structure

will affect the potential for collusive employee abuse of
tne system and what Elliot & Rogers

[1972]

have called the

potential for "management override of controls."
49-50)

Thus,

(pp.

evaluation of social structure can be thought

of as a preliminary estimate of the probability of finding a
lack of compliance with specific controls.
Obviously,

such social structure is difficult to

assess in any objective fashion.

This is probably why even

the sources cited above have little to say about how this
factor can be measured.

Some explicit surrogates for social

structure variaoles may be identified,

such as the formali¬

zation of ethical standards mentioned by SACIAC

[1979].

The

positional analysis approacn suggested by Swieringa i Carmi¬
chael

[1971] may also find application here.

Nonetheless,

most discussions of this kind of control advocate the use of
"professional judgment"

in the assessment of control

strength.

While intangible control is evaluated as a whole,

tne

literature indicates that real factors in the control envi¬
ronment may have unique effects cn the quality of ccntrol in
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individual subsystems.

A significant number of such factors

are identified in the literature.
direct and motivate employees.

Some of these factors

Depending on the emphasis of

each of these factors within the firm,

certain errors or

irregularities are more or less likely to pass, undetected,
into the accounting records.
includes formal reports,

The list of such factors

financial control structure, divi¬

sional or company objectives and plans, and established
reward structures.

These factors are also frequently iden¬

tified as contributing to intangible control.

Certain

other factors, however, are specifically discussed in terms
of the differential effects of their designs or structures.
These factors include the internal audit function,

EDP

applications,

and

aspects of organizational structure,

reporting or information objectives.
The significance of these real general controls

is

mediated by the state of the economy and the nature of the
firm and its industry.
emphasize this fact.

Both SACIAC

[1979]

and CAR [1978]

The CAR report concludes that "... an
«

understanding of a client's business and the industry of
which it is a part is critical to a proper audit."
According to Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co

(p.

[1978],

39)
the

presence of an internal audit function is important to gen¬
eral control because it can "... contribute significantly to
the control consciousness of the business."

(p.

7)

Perhaps
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more importantly, however, properly designed internal audit
operations may mitigate specific control weaknesses by moni¬
toring and correcting subsystem records and controls.
Barber [1974]

indicates that EDP considerations may

negate or enhance other control procedures in a client.
AICPA recognized this fact in SAS no.

3,

The

"The Effects of EDP

on the Auditor's Study and Evaluation of Internal Control."
For example,

because of the design of EDP systems, some

employees may have indirect access to assets via computer
application programs.

This access may defeat other separa¬

tion of duties controls.
SACIAC identifies organizational structure as an
important feature of the general control environment.

Dif¬

ferent organizational structures could have different
effects on specific control procedures and techniques.
example,

formal separation of duties

technique)

For

(a specific control

in certain areas maybe more important to adequate

control in a firm that is centralized than in one that is
decentralized.
Again tne professional literature has little to say
about how the actual evaluation of real general controls
to be made.

is

As in the case of intangible general controls,

professional judgment is recommended.

In summary, then, we have seen that general controls
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may be divided into real and intangible factors.

The

intangible factors have global effects on a firm's internal
control, and the authoritative literature prescribes a
global evaluation of them.

Real environmental control fac¬

tors can have differing effects on individual specific con¬
trols.

In order to discuss the appropriate method of evalu¬

ating real general controls, we must first proceed to a
discussion of specific controls.

The review of specific controls.
Specific controls are control factors that are specific
to a particular transaction cycle or functional accounting
suosystem.
or,

They are also often called procedural controls

especially in the EDP area, applications controls.
It is widely held in the literature that internal

accounting control evaluation should incorporate the identi¬
fication and assessment of specific controls against the
criteria of the achievement of specific control objectives.
Procedural controls and techniques are usually assessed in a
yes/no fashion in regard to their ability to adequately con¬
tribute to the achievement of those objectives.

The variety

of specific control procedures and techniques is practically
endless,

but categories such as separation of duties,

authorization,

inventory teams, reconciliations, batch and

ledger controls, standarized recording procedures, and
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transaction verification are frequently mentioned in the

.

.

.

auditing literature.

2

Arthur Andersen & Co

[1978]

list of control objectives.
wick, Mitchell & Co

[1978]

proposes an elaborate check¬

SACIAC

[1979]

and Peat, Mar¬

also discuss similar objectives

and give examples of how procedures and techniques may be
evaluated against them.

We will hold our discussion of such

multiple objectives until the second section of this chap¬
ter.
It is frequently emphasized, however,

that the final

evaluation of cycle or subsystem reliability must incorpo¬
rate the results of the review of general controls.

Appar¬

ently, both intangible and real controls are brought into
consideration.
[1978]

For example,

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co

states:
Strong general controls usually will enhance the
effectiveness of specific control procedures
related to individual transactions and, in some
instances, may tend to mitigate weaknesses in
specific control procedures.
On the other hand,
the absence of a strong control environment cre¬
ated by general controls may diminish the effec¬
tiveness of specific controls over transactions.
Therefore, in evaluating specific control proce¬
dures, the effect of general controls also should
be considered, (p. 15)

2

The practice of enumerating specific control proce¬
dures and techniques may be traced back through the profes¬
sional accounting literature as far as the report of the AIA
Committee on Internal Control.
Page 6 of that report con¬
tains a list similar to the one presented here.
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Warner indicates that this is true in EDP systems,

as

well.3

Non-control considerations.
After the evaluation at the specific control level,

the

auditor must determine if there are any non-control consid¬
erations that preclude testing for compliance with docu¬
mented specific controls.

Basically,

the auditor will not

perform compliance testing for one of two reasons:
1)

The cost to perform compliance tests exceeds the
expected savings due to reduced substantive test¬
ing based on reliance on control; or

2)

Reliance on internal control is deemed inappro¬
priate due to broad, non-control reasons.

Morris & Anderson

[1976]

discuss such non-control reasons

for not placing reliance on internal control.

They claim

that the major classes are inherent audit risk, change in
the size of business,
policy.

familiarity with the client, and firm

If the auditor determines that none of these situa¬

tions apply, he proceeds with compliance testing.

Compliance testing.
Although is is considered a part of the internal account¬
ing control evaluation process,

compliance testing is more

appropriately viewed as a verification of the evidence on

Warner [1967] summarizes the relationships between
internal control needs and EDP.
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which the evaluation at the specific control level is made.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co states that "...

the purpose

of compliance testing is to determine that control proce¬
dures are functioning as intended."

[1978, p.15]

That is,

compliance tests are made to ensure that the documented or
stated specific controls are actually achieving their objec¬
tives.
Compliance testing,

itself,

is much more objective than

the two evaluation steps discussed above.
tests are positive, no new "judgment"
pliance tests are negative,

If all compliance

is formed.

Where com¬

the auditor returns to the spe¬

cific control level and makes a new "judgment" based only on
the specific controls he now knows to be in place.
Having outlined some of the authoritative discussions of
the four internal accounting control evaluation steps intro¬
duced in the last section of Chapter I, we now summarize and
integrate those prescriptions.

Summary of the literature.
Our quick review of the normative literature has provided
us with two major benefits.

First,

it has expanded our

knowledge of the routine that the auditor goes through dur¬
ing the internal accounting control evaluation process.
Second,

it has yielded a list of factors and considerations

that should impact on the final evaluation of the quality of
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controls.

However, our review has not provided us with a

general model of control relationships to be applied during
the evaluation.

Indeed, much of the literature emphasizes

the fact that the auditor must rely on his "professional
judgment" in arriving at the final decision on the quality
of controls.

Even the most elaborate approaches discussed

in the literature (e.g., Arthur Andersen & Co
SACIAC

[1979]) are heuristic in nature.

[1978]

or

That is, they pro¬

vide a set of guidelines for the auditor's assistance in
utilizing his professional judgment.
It must not be concluded that the two benefits mentioned
above are insignificant, however.

They do,

in fact, provide

us with a firm base from which to start our research.

In

order to codify that base of information. Table 1 summarizes
the factors that, according to the professional literature,
affect the strength of internal control.

Furthermore,

Fig¬

ure 2 presents a more detailed flowchart of the evaluation
routine.
The complexity of the table serves to emphasize the
intricacy of the internal accounting control evaluation pro¬
cess.

Two features of Table 1 are worthy of special men¬

tion.

First, note that certain general control variables

(in the rightmost column) both contribute to the overall
assessment of intangible general control and are also exam¬
ined separately as real general controls.

Second,

note that
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Type of Control
Affected*

A.

Intangible
General
Control

Method of
Analysis Recommended

Overall Assessment
-Decision on likelihood
that employees will
comply with subsystem
controls

Examples Cited
in Literature
Social Structure
-Accountability for
Performance
-Ethics
-Formal Conduct Rules
-Motivation
-Management's Style,
_ Goals, & Policies
Formal Reports
Financial Controls

Real
General
Controls

Individual Assessment
-Consideration of hew
certain general control
features will affect
specific controls,
especially in view of
external states: econaiy
industry, and client’s
position in industry

Divis ional/Coirpany
Objectives & Plans
Reward Structures
Internal Audit
EDP Applications
Organizational Structure
Reporting/Information
Objectives

Specific
Controls

Individual Assessment
-Decision on whether
reliance can be placed
on documented controls
in particular subsystem
given general controls
and subsystem objectives

Separation of Duties
Authorization of
Transactions
Transaction Verification
Inventory Teams
Standardization of
Procedures

D.

Conpliance
Tests

Individual Assessment
-Verification of
Documented Controls

Direct Observation
and Tests

* Letters refer to decision steps labeled in Figures 1 and 2.

Table 1
Factors Affecting the Strength of Internal Control
Identified by the Professional Literature
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Obtain an understanding
of Economy, Industry, and
Firm.

Examine General Controls.

Are General Controls Likely
to Foster Compliance with
Specific Controls?

Examine Individual General
Controls Which are Likely
to Affect tne Value of
Certain Specific Controls.

Examine Specfic Controls:
Identify Objectives
Subsystem.
Identify Procedures
Techniques.

in
and

Are Specific Controls
Strong Enough to be
Relied on Given:
-Cycle and Subsystem
-Interaction of General
Control Items and
Individual Specific
Controls
-Overall Mitigating
Effect of General Controls

Any Reasons to Preclude
Compliance Tests?
-Audit Risk
-Cost/Benefit
-Already Tested
-Other

Perform Compliance Tests

Are Documented
in Place?

Controls

Figure 2
on
Flowchart of the Audit Process, with Detail
Internal Accounting Control Evaluation
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real general controls and specific subsystem or cycle con¬
trols interact in the decision on control reliability.
Before we proceed to a review of research studies of
internal accounting control evaluation,

it will be helpful

to examine some of the procedures used by major auditing
firms to assess control quality.

Auditing Practice

Reports such as those of SACIAC and CAR have addressed
internal accounting control evaluation from a conceptual
point of view.

Auditing firms, however, must take a more

pragmatic approach.

The demands of the audit and the coor¬

dination problems it entails require these firms to estab¬
lish standard policies and approaches.
The material in this section is the result of a series of
informal interviews conducted to gain information on the
kinds of methods major auditing firms apply to the evalua¬
tion task.

Discussions were held with auditors from five

"Big Eight"

firms.

These individuals represented a range of

experience from under two years to over twenty-five years of
auditing.
The most important results of the discussions with audi¬
tors related to the use of evaluation of objectives and the
approaches used to analyze the focal system's achievement of
them.

Each of these topics is covered oelow.
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Qbjectives.
The literature cited in the first part of this chapter
frequently mentioned the evaluation of systems against con¬
trol objectives.

In the case of SACIAC, the objectives were

discussed in broad terms.

In practice, however,

the stated

criterial objectives range from the most broad single objec¬
tive of system control strength to an elaborate "checklist"
of objectives.
Tne purpose of elaborating control objectives seems to be
to focus attention on areas where errors or irregularities
might be likely.

The recent trend has apparently been

towards the elaboration of multiple objectives, presumably
to keep pace with the growing complexity of accounting sys¬
tems .
Only one firm we visited employed what might be called a
"classical" approach to control evaluation.

The single

stated objective used by the firm was an overall assessment
of control strength.

Each of the other firms rated controls

against several objectives.
The impression left by the series of interviews was that
the most typical "state of the art" formulation was one
based on three to seven broad objectives using terminology
similar to SACIAC’s three broad objectives.

Typically,

these objectives were broken down further into sub-objec¬
tives,

cycle-related objectives, or criteria related to
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approaches to meeting the objectives.
ever,

In one firm, how¬

internal accounting control evaluation was accom¬

plished through a complex set of cross-referenced tables and
questionnaires.
One of the direct results of the use of multiple objec¬
tives appears to be the routinization of substantive test
planning.

Again a range of such standardization was found,

but it seems that several firms used their objectives as a
"template" to apply to each accounting subsystem of each
transaction cycle.

Superimposed upon each focal system,

the

objectives were typically translated into lists of specific
control procedures.

Evaluation of those procedures led more

or less directly to substantive test procedures.

Evaluation Approaches.
As stated above,

firms differed on their identification

of objectives and on the uses to which they put those objec¬
tives.

Another area of difference that became apparent dur¬

ing the interviews was the way in which duties relating to
internal accounting control evaluation were structured.
The variety of such approaches seemed to parallel the
specificity of objectives employed.

In fact,

the combina¬

tion of objectives and approaches marxed off each firm's
"philosophy" about internal accounting control evaluation.
Auditors at the firm which used the "classical" evalua-
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tion approach indicated that evaluation frequently involved
informal group discussion.

It v/as not unusual for these

auditors to call or meet their peers to discuss impressions
of a client's control system.
to encourage a collegial,

Generally, that firm seemed

judgmental approach to control

evaluation.
Other firms utilized a "team" approach to evaluation.
The teams, however,

seemed to be fairly structured as to

each memoer's area of concern and level of responsibility.
These firms also used evaluation models that were hierarchi¬
cal in nature.
The firm with the most structured and specific evaluation
model also employed the most structured evaluation approach.
Areas of responsibility were well defined and interaction
about judgments was infrequent.

To summarize,

then,

our discussions with auditors

revealed several facts about the evaluation of internal
accounting control.
1) Auditing firms utilize a range of evaluation
objectives from a single overall objective to a
list of many discrete ones; and
2) Auditing firms exhibit a range in terms of the
formality or standardization of their approaches
from informal and judgmental to formal, struc¬
tured, and programmed.
The material in this chapter has several implications for
the study of internal accounting control evaluation.

For
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example,

it

is logical

that

control evaluation should

a

study of

incorporate

general

and specific

control features,

above.

In addition,

it
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that
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evaluation
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internal
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control quality.
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relevant

results of

to be
on

results

these

consensus
based,

at
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Aly &

Duboff

collected
the

recommended

audit of

They

[1971],

found

of accounts
Corless

sizes
in a

[1972]

conducted a

study of

88

constructed

the subjects'

collected

rates
in

In

assessed

firm.

(10%

to 100%

(Ss)

two

control

strength.

prior probability distri¬

in a payroll

system utilizing

the questionnaire.

by different

case descriptions

He

among

auditors

reported

judg¬

that

the prior distri¬

for each

audit case."
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Weber

[1978]

auditors

to make
basic

showed

conducted

a controlled

each dealt with

a

single

tasks.

His

results with

error existing

in

experiment

case.

a variety of decisions within

ment of

the

respect

inventories,

Ss

in which

were

required

structure of

two

to consensus on judg¬
like

those above,

considerable variation across Ss.

These
all

retail

for

the application of

internal

"there was considerable variability

40

CPAs

a mailed questionnaire,

auditors with

different levels of

butions on error

(p.

small

158

to vary widely

to auditing.

each of

incorporating

butions

from

study,

receivable).

he presented

ments

receivable

recommendations

Bayesian statistics

He

test sample

accounts

the

in a mailed questionnaire

studies

share

two

important

trains.

involved a ininimun of manipulation of

quality.

In

fact,

manipulation at

only the Corless

all.

Thus,

these

study

First,

they

internal control
involved any

such

studies do not provide

any
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indication of why
these

the

low consensus was obtained.

investigations did

controls.

The Corless

on expected

error

other factors

studies

on

or by

involved

elicited

unfamiliarity with

not

typical

to the

The other studies gathered

judgments

relating

of

indicated

in Chapter

testing,

affected by
is

is due

Four

tell precisely

to

the evaluation of

Principal

vide

the

Studies

studies

have

control evaluation

basic model of

the

Ashton

[1974]

and Joyce

Turner

[1978]

and Reckers

that are

relevant nere

On

how much of

the

by

the
(Both

audit.)
the scope

I,

may be
Thus,

it

lack of con¬

internal

control.

Evaluation

Judgment

been centrally concerned with
judgments.'*'

Two of

research proposed

[1976].
&

to

internal control.

to

Four previous
accounting

as

factors otner than

impossible

sensus

which

judgments

in the experiments.

employed methodologies

audit

internal

which may have been mediated

cases

tasks

judgments

and Weber studies

levels,

in the

instruments and

not measure

Second,

However,

Taylor

[1979]

in

them pro¬
this paper:

the others,
deal with

Mock &
issues

as well.

The results of two more studies of internal accounting
control evaluation were published after the experiment
described in this thesis was completed.
Ashton & Kramer
[1980] and Ashton & Brown [1980] each replicated Ashton's
original [1974] experiment, using students and experienced
auditors as subjects, respectively.
The implications of
their results are integrated into the discussion in Chapters
VIII and XI.
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In a controlled experiment,

[1974]

the presence

employed by

a hypothetical air conditioner manufacturer.
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auditor Ss were

opinion of

the

six payroll

systematically

manipulated

The
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Ashton
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strength of

to give,

control

control procedures

in each
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in the described payroll

g
system.
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design.
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to strong"
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a
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as measured by
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rather high

(=1)

six point
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"adequate
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those employed

level of decision

test-retest reliability).

pairwise

higher

Individual

than

correlations
that reported

attributed

among

employed,

could generally

to the

be

Also,
the

in similar

auditor decision models

control procedures

in the judgments

could be

a

of control procedures was

two separation of duties variables.

effects

factorial

audit.

for each S

consensus,

through

to questions on a

internal

2

32 different cases.

"extremely weak"

by yes/no answers

Ashton's

for

a

showed

about half
accounted

the
for

Few significant

interaction of pairs of

control procedures.
Joyce
tors

[1976]

employed a

factorial design with

in a mailed questionnaire study.

As

five

in Ashton's

fac¬
exper-
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iment,

the manipulated variables were operationalized

as one
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firm,

two

of control procedures

in this case a
judgment of
auditor Ss

tire manufacturer.

control strength,
to formulate

accounts receivable,"
each of
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audit.
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however,
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the same

like Ashton,

complex design

73 auditor Ss

in each of

level of
he

found

an experimental

more
did

and

the
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a

case materials
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accounts receivable

significantly weighted main effect was due
of duties variable.

required his

a "summary audit program for

applications within the

reported a

Joyce

a

However,

Con¬

decisions
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under "strong" controls were much less variable than those
under the "fair" control condition.

Mock & Turner also spe¬

cifically addressed the issue of biases.

Their results

indicate that both halo and anchoring biases may be present
in such judgments, although results on the anchoring test
were hard to interpret due to design problems.
Reckers & Taylor
[1974]

[1979]

attempted to expand upon Ashton's

study through an experiment that used a few complex

cases rather than many relatively simple ones.

30 practic¬

ing auditors from 5 different firms were asked to rate five
cases on a 0-100 percent reliability scale.

The cases were

filled-out internal control questionnaires, each consisting
of 32 payroll-related items.

Background about the case

organization and its industry were provided, but Reckers &
Taylor did not elaborate on their content.

Due to the

design of tne experimental material, relationships between
factors and judgments could not be determined.

The authors

concentrated on measuring inter-subject consensus (which was
quite low) and the relationship between auditor experience
and consensus.

They also indicated that the more experi¬

enced subjects had a higher mean correlation than the less
experienced ones.

However, Ashton

[1979] demonstrated that

the difference between the group means was not significant.
The cue combinations tested in the Reckers & Taylor study
did not reflect any theory-driven or test-oriented patterns.
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Since many control items varied from one case to another,
the judgment effects of individual controls were confounded.
Having outlined these four studies,
ful to compare and constrast them.

it will now be help¬

However, due to the

ambiguity in the Reckers & Taylor results,

that study will

be omitted from the discussion.

Comparison of the Principal Studies
Major features of the three main experiments discussed in
the section above are summarized in Table 2.
A quick scan of that table should suffice to demonstrate
that there are a number of significant differences among the
studies.

Analysis of these differences with reference to

the discussions in Chapter II may throw some light on the
possible sources of the disparity in results.

Below, we

posit some plausible explanations for these inconsistencies
based on discussions of a) general controls, b) manipulated
variables,

and c)

the judgment task.

In our review of the normative literature, we found con¬
siderable emphasis placed on the importance of general con¬
trols and the control environment in the internal accounting
control evaluation process.

Specifically mentioned as fac¬

tors involved in tnis process were:

the nature of the firm

and industry, the control objectives in the tasx, and the
relation between the quality of general controls and spe-
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Feature

Ashton [1974]

Firn\/
Industry

Air Conditioner
Manufacturer

Tire
Manufacturer

Picture Frame
Supply Wholesaler

Payroll System

Accounts
Receivable

Revenue Cycle
(Sales to A/R)

Variable
Manipu¬
lated

Specific
Controls

Specific
Controls

Specific
Controls

Judgment
Type

Single Stage
(Strength)

Multi-stage
(Audit hrs. )

Multi-stage
(Audit sample)

*Consistency

High

High

*Consensus

High

Lew

Audit
Task

Joyce [1976]

Mock & Turner [1978]

Findings:

Low

Halo
?Anchoring

*Biases

*Most
Inportant
Factor(s)

Separation
of EUties

Separation
of Duties

*Inter¬
act ions

Few, Lew
weights

Few, Lew
weights

*Self
Insight

High

Moderate

*Mediating
Variables

No Firm Effect

Some Firm
Effect

Audit Experience
Commercial
Experience
Client Mix
Special Training
Office Location

Table 2
Summary of the Features of the Three Principal Prior Studies
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cific control strengths and weaknesses.

Note that all three

of these factors vary across the three studies.

Thus,

the

fact that consensus results vary among these studies may be
due to the variety of general controls and the control envi¬
ronment.

For example,

the fact that Ashton used payroll

controls, where, presumably, control relations are reason¬
ably well defined, may have been partially responsible for
the high degree of consensus he obtained.
All three of these studies were exploratory in nature and
none were hypothesis-driven.

The cues they employed seem to

have been selected on the basis of their assumed importance
in the examined accounting subsystem.

This may have been in

part responsible for the fact that only specific controls
were manipulated in each of these studies.

However,

such an

approach may have led to the apparent absence of configural
cue use, as well.

If interactions are to oe found,

it is

most likely that they would emerge only where the meanings of
the manipulated cues depend on the presence or absence of
other cues.

Thus,

the cues must be examined a priori before

expectations about configural cue use can be justified.
Finally, another source of variation between results may
have been the kind of judgment task involved.

While Ashton

had Ss make a single judgment on control strength, Joyce and
Mock & Turner required Ss to make audit plan decisions.
As we have pointed out previously, other factors besides
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quality of control will affect the ultimate audit plan.
fact,

In

in the Mock & Turner study Ss reported in post-experi¬

mental questionnaires that cost/benefit factors, audit risk
considerations, and other factors figured into their deci¬
sions.

Thus,

the lack of consensus in audit plan decisions

in the Joyce and Mock & Turner investigations could be the
additive effect of biases and errors in judgments other than
those concerning internal control strength.
Beyond this,

the fact that the audit plan decisions were,

of necessity, multi-stage may have affected the consistency
results.

In order to make audit plan decisions, Ss presuma¬

bly had to go through at least two steps.

First,

they had

to make decisions about the strength of internal controls.
Second,

they had to use the first decisions as input to

decisions about the extent of testing in the audit plan.
Thus,

their final decisions were a function of the internal

accounting control evaluations, not the individual cues
themselves.

In the psychological literature,

stage judgment is termed "cascaded inference."
Kelly and Petersen

[1973]

such multi2

Gettys,

indicate that in such cascaded

inference tasks, Ss tend to use a simple "best guess" strat-

2

See Slovic, Fischoff, & Lichtenstein [1977], p. 3 for
a quick overview of cascaded inference studies.
Funaro
[1977] compares a number of cascaded inference theories on
their ability to account for some empirical data.
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egy in going from one decision stage to the next.

That is,

they assume that their first judgment is correct and make
their second decision assuming that "fact."

Thus,

in a cas¬

caded inference task, one would expect that simple random
error would have an entropic effect,

increasing the variance

of judgments at each successive decision stage.

(We shall

have more to say about this in the section on selection of
variables.)

Thus, the low consensus obtained by Joyce and

Mock & Turner may be an artifact of the experimental task.

Conclusions and Implications
The variety of results in investigations of internal
accounting control evaluation make generalizations about the
process difficult.

However,

it appears plausible that the

variety of results may be partially due to the designs and
methodology of the experiments themselves.
facts,
1)

The following

at least, are clear:
No study has directly investigated the effects of
variations in general controls or the control
environment;

2) No study has attempted to find generalizaole
relationships based on a priori expectations; and
3)

In an attempt to enhance external validity by
enlarging the judgment task, two of the principal
studies may have sacrificed internal validity and
obtained muddled results.

The current study incorporated responses to these facts
into its design.

However, neither the kind of results that
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should be expected in a study dealing with these factors,
nor the clusters of variables that can be expected to elicit
the desired information is clear at this point.

In the next

chapter a systems model of internal control is developed in
order to provide some guidance for dealing with these prob¬
lems .

CHAPTER

I V

A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNAL ACCOUNTING CONTROL

Although the literature on internal accounting control
evaluation contains a plethora of guidelines, checklists,
and terminology, there still exists no unifying framework to
describe and analyze factors that affect internal control
from a general (i.e., context-free) point of view.

Cer¬

tainly, there are many ad hoc approaches to internal
accounting control evaluation, but they are unintegrated and
thus fail to identify general classes of controls

(as

4

opposed to specifically-named instances)
effects.

in terms of their

The result may be viewed as a problem of not see¬

ing the forest for the trees.
In order to give this study a general perspective from
which to view the auditor's evaluation of internal account¬
ing control,
such control.

this chapter develops a simple systems model of
The model outlined in this chapter will be

used not only to guide the selection of variables to be
examined in auditors'

judgments, but also to determine if a

systems approach to internal accounting control appears to
have validity insofar as its predictions match the overall
pattern of auditors'

judgments.

The idea of applying systems notions to internal account¬
ing control is not new.

For example,
52

Cushing

[1974]
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describes a mathematical model of internal accounting con¬
trol design and evaluation based on reliability theory from
systems engineering.
nar

Cushing

[1975], and Stratton

[1975], Ishikawa

[1979]

[1975], Bod¬

elaborate and modify this

approach.

Other quantitative approaches are exemplified by

Yu & Neter

[1973]

and Hamlen

[1980].

However,

the models

presented in each of these articles are prescriptive in
nature and primarily related to the analysis and design of
internal accounting control systems with components of known
reliability.

They are not concerned with conceptually

describing cause and effect relationships in control systems
or with characterizing the current evaluation process.
The descriptive tools that are developed in this chapter
take a different approach.

The discussion here is based on

systems concepts from cybernetic systems theory and organi¬
zational systems theory.

Konrath

[1971]

discussed internal

accounting control using cybernetics notions, but did not
attempt to develop a model based on those ideas.

In the sections below, the notion of reliability as an
oojective of internal accounting control is discussed first.
Next,

some stability and control ideas central to cybernet¬

ics system theory are covered.

Then descriptive parameters

from a systems-based organizational theory are introduced.
Finally,

these concepts are integrated into a general model
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of internal accounting control.

Information Reliability

The basic objectives of internal accounting control have
been frequently classified as authorization, accounting, and
asset safeguarding.^ Close examination of these objectives
discloses a common overall feature.

Each of the objectives

can be subsumed under the goal of assuring that all and only
information reflecting authorized transactions is produced
by the accounting system.

That is, the information must be

accurate and reliable.
Carmichael states that internal controls exist to ensure
that information is reliable

[1970, p.

235-6].

He also

claims that the accounting and safeguarding objectives can
be reduced to a goal of reliability.
ever,

Unfortunately, how¬

the term reliability means different things to differ¬

ent people.

The systems engineering definition of reliabil¬

ity used in the past theoretical work is not particularly
useful in dealing with the auditor's problem in evaluating
internal accounting control.

That notion describes a single

input-output relationship to be used in calculating the

■'‘The Special Advisory Committee on Internal Accounting
Control of tne aICPA [1979] reaffirms these standard objec¬
tive areas in its report, although at least one of the com¬
mittee's memDers question their current usefulness.
See
page 28 of che committee's report.
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overall likelihood of error in a configuration of smaller
units of known (or estimated) reliability.

Thus it is a

"bottom-up" concept which requires some knowledge of atomic
unit reliabilities in order to determine overall system
reliability.

However,

the auditor's problem is precisely

that such unit reliabilities are unknown.

In fact, deter¬

mining precise estimates of atomic unit reliabilities based
on the history of the unit's operations
of those operations)
stantive testing.

(or on the results

is essentially the same task as sub¬

The basic motivation for the auditor's

evaluation of internal accounting controls is that it allows
him to avoid doing unnecessary substantive testing.

Thus,

the engineer's concept of reliability is not an appropriate
overall goal for internal accounting control.

In order to

avoid confusion arising from the use of the term reliability
in a different context from the engineering application,

the

central objective of internal accounting control is
described as system stability in the sections below.

The

concept of system stability nicely captures the accountant's
meaning of the term reliability.
Thus,

the next section of this chapter is basically con¬

cerned with defining stability and identifying factors that
affect a system's stability.

First, however,

systems concepts must be introduced.

some general
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Systems,

Stability,

and Control

Systems theory was originally a response to the limita¬
tions of thermodynamics.

Instead of the "closed" assump¬

tions of thermodynamics, systems theory is based on the con¬
cept of an "open" system, which reacts to or interacts with
its environment.^ A system may be loosely defined as a
bounded collection of inter-related parts which,
tion,

form a unitary whole

[Nanni

(1978, p.

7)].

in combina¬
Churchman

has noted that every system is embedded in a larger system.
Thus,

a payroll system.is embedded in an information system,

which is embedded in an organizational system, which is part
of an industrial system, and so on

[Churchman (1968)].

One of a system's defining traits is its goal directedness

[Churchman (1968, p.

29-34)].

A system's components

may oe discussed in terms of structures and processes
[Miller (1971, p.
ever,

84)].

These components are defined, how¬

in terms of the goal-oriented tasks they perform

[Churchman (1968, p.

40)].

Thus,

the identification of a

system's goals and the ways in which the components contrib¬
ute to the achievement of those goals is the core of any
evaluation of a system's effectiveness.

‘“Since systems theory
the accounting literature,
to descriptions of systems
work in this area was done

has not been frequently cited in
I will provide basic references
and systems terms.
The seminal
by Von Bertalanffy [1951].
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One can easily see how these concepts map onto an
internal accounting control system.

Such a system has the

central goal of keeping the error rate and total dollar
value of errors within a restricted acceptable range.

The

various activities and techniques use to achieve these ends
are the internal accounting control system's components.
Note that,

under this definition,

the components of the

internal accounting control system are not simply a subset
of the components of the accounting and record-keeping sys¬
tem.

A single internal accounting control system component

may be comprised of one or a number of sub-parts and/or par¬
tial operations from several accounting and record-keeping
components.

For example, multiple copies of a pre-numbered

accounting form may flow through several components of the
overall record-keeping system (i.e., data capture, classifi¬
cation,

journalizaing, posting, etc.),

but the use of those

forms and their ultimate cross-verification (neither of
which is a necessary part of the basic record-keeping sys¬
tem) makes up a single internal accounting control system
component.

Conversely, acquiring appropriate authorization

for checks is only a small part of the disbursement routine,
but it is a complete control component in itself.
We will expand our discussion of

internal accounting con¬

trol system components in tne last section of this chapter.
The remainder of this section discusses the concepts of sta-
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bility and control identified by cybernetic systems theory.
The purpose of cybernetic theory is to describe the control
_
3
or systems.

A system is stable if there is some trait about its con¬
tent that is invariant or unchanging.

Stability,

then,

can

be defined as maintaining the state of a system within a
certain range on some critical variable or set of variables.
This is precisely the goal of internal accounting control.
In an information system, stability may be viewed in terms
of the level of error.

For example,

the criterion in an

information system by which stability is defined may be a
frequency of errors in the system of one percent or less of
the entire system's total number of transactions or total
dollar value.

"The presence of stability always implies

some co-ordination of the actions between the parts,"

i.e.,

control of the systems process

Thus,

by definition,

[Ashby

( 1960, p.57)]•

instability in a system indicates the pres¬

ence of error.
A disturbance is any factor that causes a system to move
from one state to another.
upset a system's stability.

That is, disturbances tend to
For example, an oversight that

Indeed, the term "cybernetics," taken from the Greek
term for "the art of steersmanship," was coined by Norbert
Wiener [1948] to describe the science of control in animal
and machine.
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caused the system to move from an error-free state to an
. •
4
error-containing state would be a disturbance.
Since dis¬
turbances are the source of error in a system,
determinant in the maintenance of

a critical

the system's stable

error-free state is the variety of disturbances with which
the system is faced.

We will return to a discussion of

the

implications of this fact later in this section.
Cybernetics emphasizes two concepts related to the goal
of stability

(also called homeostasis).

constraint and regulation.

These concepts are

Constraints may be conceived of

as barriers between outside sources of disturbance and the
system.

Like a turtle's shell,

they prevent disturbances

from reaching the critical system.
hand,

Regulators,

on the other

are active mechanisms that detect or correct the

effects of disturbances.
Constraints represent redundancy,
probabilities of certain events.
sified in any simple way,
which a set,
[Ashby

p.

57)].

They "...

cannot be clas¬

for they include all cases

for any reason,

(1964,

regularity, or the

Thus,

is smaller than it might be"
any regularity in the environ¬

ment that drives down the variety of disturbances,
ing certain of

in

eliminat¬

their sources or reducing the probability

^See Ashby [1964] for a discussion of the relationship
between disturbances and system errors.
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that certain types will reach

the system,

is a constraint.

Regulators protect the system's stability by dealing with
disturbances within the system.
bility,

In order to maintain sta¬

regulators must be designed to monitor a particular

signal and react to some attribute of that signal.
that this means that,

unlike constraints,

against disturbances or their sources,

Note

which operate

regulators work on

the effects of disturbances.
Regulators may be classified into two groups:
quence and closed-sequence
(1967,

p.

[Johnson,

Kast,

open-se¬

and Rosenzweig

75)].

Open-sequence regulators are activated by a particular
signal,

i.e.,

presence.

the signal's critical attribute is

Thus,

independent of
In Ashby's

they are "machines with input"

[1964,

It follows that the usefulness of "...

open-sequence

[regulator]

ties being built
Rosenzweig

open-sequence regulators are

the operating system in which they function.

terms,

chapter 4].

in a sense,

its own

depends upon the correct proper¬

into the controller..."

(1967, p.

an

76)].

That is,

[Johson,

Kast,

and

it must be designed to

respond to the appropriate signal or set of signals.
Because of

their mechanistic qualities,

open-sequence regulators as

we shall refer to

'programmatic'

regulators.

Closed sequence regulators are activated directly by the
results of operations.

Rather than waiting for the presence
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of a particular signal to

'turn them on,'

closed-sequence

regulators respond to critical differences between two sig¬
nals.

Frequently,

the magnitude of

the difference will

determine the response of the closed-sequence regulator.
The central difference between open- and closed-sequence
regulators
[Johnson,

is

the presence of a feedback comparator

Kast,

and Rosenzweig

(1967, p.

76)].

In fact, by

coupling a feedback comparator to an open-sequence regula¬
tor,

one obtains a closed-sequence regulator.

identify two kinds of regulator components:
programmatic regulators.

Thus we can

feedback and

These two kinds of components are

illustrated in Figures 3 and 4.
Figure 3a characterizes a programmatic
regulator.
response.
alpha.'

Each

input signal instigates a particular

In tne simplest case,
Thus,

is received,

for Figure 3a,

action

Of course,

(open-sequence)

'B'

beta is equivalent to

'not

when a signal other than alpha

is taken.

many more input signals may be defined,

increasing the complexity of the scanning procedure and the
action response set.

The control's complexity can also be

expanded by defining different action response sets for dif¬
ferent tasks,

system states, or system goals.

tion is depicted in Figure 3b.
actions

Such a situa¬

The prescribed choice of

in this complex regulator depends upon the system's

state when the

input signal

is received.

Thus,

if signal

a. Simple Regulation

Input

Signal Attribute

Signal Response

alpha

beta

A

B

Output

*->
System Signal

********
b.

Complex Regulation

Input

Signal
Attribute

beta

alpha

beta

1

A

B

C

2

B

C

A

3

C

A

B

System
State

Action Reisponse

XL
System Signal

Figure 3
A Programmatic Regulator

Output
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alpha is received when the system is in state 2, action C is
automatically initiated.
Figure 4 illustrates the acivity of a feedback camparator.^ In such a regulator,

the standard of signal comparison

is not a particular attribute of a single input signal, but,
rather,

a difference between two signals.

In this case,

when the difference between signals X and Y is greater than
1

(the standard of comparison in this example)

tor outputs signal alpha.

Otherwise,

the compara¬

signal beta is output.

Note that the complexity of the feedback comparator can be
increased by establishing a number of range criteria.
example,

For

signal alpha^ can be output for positive differ¬

ences and alpha^ can be output for negative differences.
Obviously, coupling the feedback comparator in Figure 4
to the programmatic regulator in Figure 3a yields a complete
closed-sequence regulator.

The importance of closed-se¬

quence regulation is its versatility.
tion does not
but,

'look for'

This type of regula¬

absolute properties of signals,

instead, checks for relative properties of signals:

those which define instability.

This versatility is a nec¬

essary response to an important fact of life for the system.

^The term feedback is used generically here.
The com¬
parison process may occur at input (feedback) or at output
(feedforward).
The distinction is unimportant here and,
thus. Figure 4 show comparison in the 'middle.'
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Task
Process

Input

Signal X

->
Output

Sig nal Y

Figure 4
A Feedback Comparator
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which is captured in Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety.
Ashby describes this law as the fundamental thesis of the
general theory of regulation
that,

[1964, p.

207].

The law states

in order to have effective regulation, a system must

have a variety of responses at least equal to the variety of
disturbances it faces.

Ashby's colorful phrase is "only

variety can destroy variety"

[1964, p.

207].6

Recall now the fact that regulators operate on the
effects of disturbances.

Despite the face that feedback

comparators can detect a variety of errors due to their
dynamic definition of disturbance,

their operation 'assumes'

that one of the two signals they receive is
Therefore,

'correct.'

closed sequence regulators basically protect the

system from internally-caused errors (i.e., distortion),

not

errors due to outside disturoances entering with input.
This fact is the basis of an important assertion of the sys¬
tems model of internal accounting control, and we shall
return to it later in this chapter.

We have thus far discussed the cybernetics notions of
stability,

constraints,

goal of system control.

and regulation.

Stability is the

The effectiveness of control in

achieving this goal is determined oy the overall result of

^See cnapter 12 of Ashby [1964]
sion of variety and regulation.

for a detailed discus¬
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constraint and regulation.
main cause of difficulty

As Ashby points out "...

[in maintaining stability]

the
is the

variety in the disturbances that must be regulated against"
[1964, p.

244].

Thus,

the likelihood of stability is

enhanced when:
1) The variety of the disturbances facing the system
can be reduced; and
2) The system has the capacity to detect and respond
to disturbances that arise within it.
Figure 5 depicts how constraints and regulators combine
to assure system stability.

This discussion has provided a very general framework in
which to examine the problem of internal accounting control.
However,

before we proceed to develop a model of internal

accounting control,

it is useful to identify some of the

classes of constraints that exist in the business world.
order to do this,

In

it is appropriate that we now review some

concepts employed by organizational systems theorists.

Organizational Systems Theories

A school of thought in organizational theory which has
oeen developing over the last twenty years takes a systems
view of the organization.
to as "contingency theory,"

Under this view, usually referred
7

•
•
the organization is examined

"^This term was first coined by Lawrence and Lorsch
[1969].
Hayes [1977] indicates its general use.
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Figure 5
Factors Contributing to the Maintenance of Stability
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"...

as a unit in interaction with its environment"

(1975, p.

93)].

[Tosi

The central notion of this school of

thought is that such a thing as a "natural" organizational
structure exists.

The claim is that there is no single best

way to structure an organization, but, rather,

that the most

effective structure for an organization is contingent upon a
o

number of situational factors.0 Our focus here is not on the
organization but on one of its subunits:
tem.

Thus,

the accounting sys¬

in the discussion beiow, the notions taken from

contingency theory will be expressed in terms of systems
within the environment of a single organization.
•

Contingency theory is not a single,

unified theory.

It

is a meta-theory, a frameworK in which a family of theories
exists.
traits,
cept.

Contingency theory does have some basic family
though.

One of these is the "natural system" con¬

Another is the idea that the following four dimen¬

sions

(or some variation thereof) hold the keys that unlock

system effectiveness:

9

o

See Tosi [1975] for a discussion of the variety of
points of view within this paradigm.
^These dimensions bear closest resemblance to Perrow's
[1970, p.2], but they have also been influenced by the work
of other theorists cited in this section.
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1) The system's environment;
2) The goals and tasks of the system;
3) The system's structure; and
4) The system's technological core.
The environment is comprised of factors outside of the
system that are related to the system's task(s).

It poses

ooth constraints and what Thompson calls contingencies
[1967, p.

30].

Contingencies are like

'gaps'

in the wall of

constraints which allow particularly salient disturbances to
affect the system.

The system's goals delimit the tasks to

be performed, where tasks are the production of basic out¬
puts.

The system's structure is the collection of inter-re¬

lated parts comprising the system (i.e., its components).
Technology refers to attributes of the procedures involved
in performing the task.

Thus,

the technological core is

usually defined as the amount of routinization possible,

the

area of known cause-effect relationships in the input-output
transformation, or the rational and analyzable portion of
the system's processes.
One of the heavily emphasized ideas in tnis literature is
the notion that naturally adapted systems will build buffers
around the highly routinizable operations
core of the system)
influences.

(the technical

in order to protect them from outside

When such boundaries are in place, governing

the input and output to the technical core,

'classical'
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methods of control (i.e., closed system approaches like
standardization of procedures, formal lines of authority,
and delineated responsibility) can be reasonably employed.^0

Thus far we have introduced a number of notions that, at
oest, we have only vaguely tied to the internal accounting
control situation.

In the next section these ideas are

drawn together into a general cause-effect model of internal
accounting control.

A Systems Model of Internal
Accounting Control

In this section, we will pull together our discussion of
systems, cybernetics, and contingency theory into a model of
the relationships among the basic factors mediating the
effectiveness of the system of internal accounting control.
Note that, at this point, our focus is on describing inter¬
nal accounting control cause and effect reationships, not on
the auditor's evaluation process.

We will return to the

topic of internal accounting control evaluation in the chap¬
ter on hypothesis development.
The unit of analysis in the framework below is the

^See Thompson [1967] for a more elaborate summary of
the technical core, buffering by boundaries, and related
control issues, especially on pp. 13-15.
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accounting system and the factors affecting its error-free
stability.

The analysis is targeted on the efficacy of con¬

trols within the system itself.
will be provided.
will be presented.
will be made.

First,

Four kinds of information

the basic assumption of the model

Next, the basic descriptive assertions

Third, the variables in the model (i.e., the

factors affecting system stability) will be identified.
Finally, the model’s dynamic relationships will be
described.

Basic assumption of the model.
The development of the model requires a single basic
assumption.
The objective of internal accounting control
procedures and techniques can be characterized as
a single goal: system stability.
Thus,

the factors identified as mediating system stabil¬

ity by cybernetic system theory should conceptually capture
the factors affecting internal accounting control.

Descriptive framework.
Three statements comprise the basic outline of the model.
These ideas have discussed in some depth in the sections
above,

so they will not be redefined here.

If the assump¬

tion above holds, cybernetics and contingency theory would
indicate that tne following statements are true of account¬
ing systems.

«
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1) The accounting system's environment contains con¬
straints.
2) These constraints reduce the variety of potential
disturbance sources for the accounting system,
thus establishing a pattern of disturbance proba¬
bilities.
3)

*

Regulators within the accounting system detect
and correct only those errors which they are
designed to anticipate.

We now proceed to map the systems terms in the above

statements into the internal accounting control context.

Factors.
The literature reviewed in Chapter II refers to general
and specific controls.
accounting system.

General controls affect the entire

Specific controls are designed to ben¬

efit only one accounting subsystem.

One can draw a loose

correspondence between the control components identified
below and the traditional concepts of general and specific
controls.

Environmental constraints would often fit the

definition of general controls.
straints,

Most system boundary con¬

feedback regulators, and programmatic regulators

would probably be classified as specific controls.

There is

no point in enumerating the relationships between these two
sets of concepts any further, however,

since the control

types outlined below are meant to be viewed as an alterna¬
tive to the traditional scheme, not an elaboration of it.
The systems-based classification is pursued here specifi-
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cally because it identifies control components by the way in
which they enhance control as well as by where they reside.
We mention general and specific controls here simply for the
sake of comparison and contrast and as a take-off point for
the discussion below.

Environmental constraints.

These are factors in the

environment that affect system stability.

Identified by

ooth cybernetics and contingency theory, these factors
define the variety of potential disturbances that the
accounting system has to deal with.

Probably the major

source of environmental constraints is the set of factors
that tend to elicit predictable behavior by employees.
Thus, social structure,
rewards,

rules of acceptable behavior,

and punishments are all important environmental

constraints.

System boundary constraints.

Both cybernetics and con¬

tingency theory identify constraints or buffers at the crit¬
ical system's boundaries.

System boundary constraints limit

the access that external variables have into the system.
They reduce interaction (via personnel,

for instance)

between subsystems or oetween functions within subsystems.
They also constrain inputs by establishing criteria for
input acceptability.

The major such constraint found in

classical manual accounting systems is provided by the seg-
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regation of duties, but other procedures that limit access
to the system,

such as approval routines or authorization

standards, are also important system boundary constraints.

System internal regulators.

These factors are monitor¬

ing/correcting techniques employed within the accounting
system.

As discussed in the section above on cybernetic

theory, regulators may be classified into one of two groups:
1)

,

2)

Feedback regulators utilize comparison as their
cue to effects of disturbances.
They are com¬
prised of testing, checking, or verification procedures like physical inventories, bank reconcil¬
iations, and other tests of account balances.
Programmatic regulators trace the effects of dis¬
turbances and correct them through officially .
established standard procedures.
The regularity
of these controls reduces error due to variety in
the execution of this task.
For example, an
employee unfamiliar with a correction task, or a
group of employees who share the responsibility
for such a task, could maxe erroneous or incon¬
sistent changes in accounting records without
programmatic regulation.
Such controls include
standard operating procedures and formal excep¬
tion routines.
Note that, as opposed to the case
of shared responsibility, segregation of duties
affords a certain measure of programmatic regula¬
tion, due to the existence of human memory.

In order to discriminate feedback regulators that rely on
human judgment for tracing errors to their sources and cor¬
recting them from those that rely on standard operating pro¬
cedures for tracing and correction,

we will include only the

former type under the heading of feedback regulators.

We

snail describe the latter type as feedback regulators cou-
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pled to programmatic regulators.
Table 3 lists the four internal accounting control fac¬
tors and gives examples of each.

Dynamic relationships.
Below, four basic relationships between the variables in
the model and their effects on system stability are devel¬
oped from the previous discussions.

These relationships are

tendencies, not absolute isomorphisms.
true only of logically designed systems.

They are basically
Thus,

it will be

assumed below that accounting systems are constructed with
at least the intention of placing a higher priority on con¬
trolling high expected cost errors tnan on controlling low
expected cost errors.

According to contingency theory, the accounting system,
as a highly routinizable,

analyzable process, will tend to

be best established through buffering.
lation from outside disturbances.

Buffering means iso¬

Reduction in the variety

or probability of outside disturbances is accomplished by
constraining the environment and establishing constrained
system boundaries.

Thus,

the model predicts that:

1) Constraints are more important than regulators in
securing system stability.
Furthermore,

system boundary constraints are embedded

within the system of environmental constraints.

That is,
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Factor

Environmental
Constraints

Direct Effect in
Enhancing Stability

Examples

Reduce Variety of
Potential Error
Sources

State of Economy
Nature of Firm
and Industry
Firm's Social
Structure
Management
Policies

System Boundary
Constraints

Reduce Probability of
Certain Errors
Getting into System

Segregation of
Duties
Physical Barriers
Authorization of
Transactions
Required Approval

System Internal
Regulators:
Feedback Type

Detect Errors by
Comparison

Reconciliations
Transaction
Verification
Physical
Inventories

Programmatic
Type

Reduce Effect of
Errors by Resetting
System Using a
Regular Routine

Standard Operating
Procedures
Formalized
Exception
Routines

Table 3
Factors Affecting Accounting System Stability
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they are serially related.
constraints are strong,

Thus, when environmental

system boundary constraints have a

reduced set of potential disturbances to deal with.
Since constraints reduce the probability of error,

they

can be viewed in the mathematical terms of reliability engi¬
neering.

As serially coupled components, constraints will

have overall effects of an error rate equal to the product
of their individual error rates..

However,

as discussed in

the section in this chapter on reliability, this

'knowledge'

is not particularly useful when unit reliabilities
rates) are unknown.

Nonetheless,

(or error

from its own perspective,

the model predicts that:
2) The overall effect of environmental plus system
boundary constraints is less than the sum of
their individual effects.
In non-technical terms, tnis statement means that an
environmental constraint
relatively more

(systems boundary constraint)

'responsibility'

has

for preventing disturbances

from affecting the system when no supporting systems bound¬
ary constraint (environmental constraint) exists.

A 'lone'

constraint is more critical than one one among many.
Regulators are designed to search for particular classes
of disturbances.

That is,

they can only detect and correct

errors with certain characteristics.
section above on cyDernetic theory,

As discussed in the
internal regulators

basically deal witn errors arising within the system.

Con-
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straints, however, prevent external errors from reaching the
system.

Thus,

constraints and regulators are essentially

complementary in function rather than overlapping.
these two types of controls deal with,

Since

in effect, different

'pools' of disturbances, the model predicts that:
3)

Internal regulators and constraints have indepen¬
dent effects in securing system stability.

Some feedbacK ana programmatic regulation exists in
accounting systems even when no formal procedures exist.
This is due to that fact that human beings, possessing mem¬
ory,

judgment, and intuition, perform these tasks as a cor¬

ollary to their record keeping chores.
alluded to earlier.

In terms of the mathematical reliabil¬

ity engineering model,
are not,

This fact was

feedback and programmatic regulators

then, atomic units

duced in the section above).

(under the definitions intro¬
Their nature allows them to

cornuine to become atomic units, however,
'detects' errors and the other 'corrects'

since one component
them.

A numerical

example helps to demonstrate this relationship.
Assume that

'casual human observation' will detect the

presence of a particular error in a particular transaction
processing tasx 10 percent of the time.

Assume further that

informal human procedures will then determine the source of
such an error and properly correct it 50 percent of the
time.

Now let us assume tnat formal methods improve these
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rates to 95 percent and 93 percent, respectively.

Under

such circumstances, the following overall regulation effects
(for the particular transaction) would obtain.

In the case

of no formal procedures, the prooaoiiity of detection and
correction would oe 5 percent (.1 x .5).

In the case of

formal feedback regulation only, this figure would rise to
47.5 percent (.95 x .5).

For formal programmatic regulation

only, 9.3 percent (.1 x .98) of the errors would be detected
and corrected.

But in the case of both formal regulators,

the result ^ould oe 93.1 oercent detection and correct:ion.
Thus,

the cc.mir.ea effect of feedback regulation and pro¬

grammatic regulation is significantly stronger than either
individual effect or even the sum of these effects.

This is

exactly the opposite of tne situation in the area of con¬
straints.
Again, nowever, the model is designed to oe applied
oefore re^iaoility estimates are Known,

so the most the

moce^ predicts, a priori is:
4/ The overall effect of regulators when both feedoac/c and programmatic regulators are in place is
greater than the sum of their individual effects.

The purpose of this cnapter nas oeen to develop a general
node~ of internal accounting control based on the perspec¬
tives of several systems theories.

The model was pursued in

oroer to present an alternative to descriptions of internal
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accounting control found in the accounting literature.

That

literature has failed to produce a taxonomy of internal
accounting control factors which is both general and able to
classify factors by their effect on control.
The notions of reliability and stability were discussed
above as internal accounting control systems goals.

Cyber¬

netics and contingency theory were reviewed for insights
into the internal accounting control situation.

Based on

this discussion and review, a simple systems model of inter¬
nal accounting control was described.

Four general control

components were identified as factors that mediate the
effectiveness of an internal accounting control system.
Finally, the relationships among those factors in terms of
their effects on systems stability were identified.
In Chaper V,

the model outlined above and the information

from the review of the accounting literature and prior
empirical research given in Chapters II and III will be used
to derive five basic propositions about the auditor's evalu¬
ation of internal accounting control.

The hypotheses tested

in this thesis are ceveloped from these propositions.

CHAPTER

V

HYPOTHESES

The basic thrust of this research study is to investigate
the auditor's evaluation of internal accounting control.
The general researcn questions are:
1) Can auditors oe characterized as experts in the
area of internal accounting control evaluation as
defined dv the consistency, consensus, and lack
of bias in their judgments? and
2) Can a systems model of internal accounting con¬
trol capture the evaluation behavior of auditors
in a carefully varied set of hypothetical situa¬
tions?
3) Which oackground and experience variaoles mediate
auditors internal accounting control judgments?
Up to this point, we have not discussed the specific
issues that are involved in these questions.

Normative

auditing theory provides a perspective from which to view
the first researcn question.

The systems model presented in

Chapter IV can be tested to investigate the second research
question.

However, we have no particular model to employ in

examining the third research question.

Prior research pro¬

vides us with an inkling of which variables to investigate,
but such 'leads'
hypotheses.

are not the proper sources of research

Thus we will address research question three

through some post hoc explorations which are described in
Chapter X.
In tne sections oelow, we discuss each of the first two
81
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major research questions and identify the issues involved in
resolving each of them.

Following this, propositions relat¬

ing to each issue are developed and a set of hypotheses is
developed from each proposition.
It should be noted here that,
will not really be hypotheses,

strictly speaking,

these

since they will not be in an

immediately testable, operationalised form.

The selection

and operationalization of specific variables will be covered
in Chapter VI on the experimental design and procedures.

The First Research Question
In order to assess the expertise of a group of individu¬
als, one must first nave a set of criteria to judge exper¬
tise against.

The following four criterial dimensions are

frequently cited in both the psychological and accounting
judgment literature as capturing the notion of expertise:'*'
1)

Judgment accuracy - the degree to which the judg¬
ment matches empirical fact.

2)

Judgment consistency - the degree to which a
judge will produce the same judgment given
repeated administrations of a single case.
This
is also known as intra-judge or test-retest reli¬
ability.

3)

Judgment consensus - the degree to which differ¬
ent judges will produce the same judgment on the
same case.
This is also called inter-judge reli¬
ability.

4) Judgment bias - the degree to which a judge

See, for example, Ashton [1974a, 1974b, & 1979], Einnorn [1974], Goldberg [1968], Hoffman, Slovic, and Rorer
[1968], Joyce [1976], and Mock and Turner [1978].
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demonstrates a consistent variation from accuracy
or from the consensus of his peers.
Obviously,

for a group to be considered experts on a task,

they must exhibit high scores on the first three dimensions
and low scores on the last.
The normative literature seems to assume that auditors
are internal accounting control evaluation experts, since it
frequently refers to the use of

'professional judgment.'

Empirical investigations have found high consistency levels,
various consensus levels, and possible biases.

No multi¬

case study involving accuracy has been performed.
Let us deal with the accuracy issue first.

The following

list of reasons probably accounts for the dearth of accuracy
studies.
1) Actual data on the strength of internal account¬
ing control is nearly impossible to gather.
First of all,

few firms would be willing to publicize the

fact that they have (or have had)

poor accounting control.

Thus, data on that end of the internal accounting control
quality scale is unlikely to be directly accessible.
ond,

Sec¬

such situations uncovered in audits would, at present,

be considered confidential information.
reluctant to make such data available.

CPA firms would be
Beyond this, only

those situations in which tne quality of controls had been
assessed empirically

(as opposed to assessment simply

through auditor evaluation) would qualify as hard data.
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2)

Judgment testing requires a variety of situations
as well as a variety of control quality.

The need for repeated measures and a reasonable cross-sec¬
tion of situational features

(cue configurations) compounds

the problems identified above.
3) Simulation, the only reasonable alternative to
gathering actual data, is extremely expensive,
time consuming, and circular in its definition of
'accuracy.1
Weber

[1978], who used simulation to generate an error level

rate for a single case in a single subsystem for only the
top four products out of a total of 2000 in the modeled
firm,

reported that it took him several weeks to adapt and

debug the programs.

Futhermore,

simulation-based informa¬

tion on judgment accuracy is suspect due to the fact that
such a definition of accuracy assumes precision in the simu¬
lation's model of behavior, a heroic assumption at best.
Given the Herculean nature of testing for accuracy,
not hard to see why such studies have not oeen done.

it is
The

research reported in this thesis joins that tradition and
does not attempt to incorporate any direct measures of judg¬
ment accuracy.

Although we cannot make any claims about

auditors' objective judgment accuracy,

the three other cri-

terial dimensions of expertise still remain.

It is with

these that we will deal.
We will now address the implicit assumption in the pro¬
fessional literature that auditors are internal accounting
control evaluation experts.

No strong evidence exists to
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the contrary.

As discussed in Chapter III, Ashton's

results tend to support this
Mock's and Turner's
Thus,

[1978]

idea.

Both Joyce's

[1974]

[1976]

and

studies have mixed results.

we state our first proposition:
Auditors will demonstrate expertise in the area
of internal accounting control evaluation.

This proposition will be
to consistency,

consensus,

tested via hypotheses relating
and bias.

Consistency, or test-retest reliability,

is the likeli¬

hood with which an auditor will give the same rating to the
same case on two separate evaluations.

The ideal level of

consistency would be a correlation of 1.

However,

it would

be unlikely to expect such performance on any but the most
simple tasks.

Therefore,

we will use a necessarily arbi¬

trary criterion here.
Ashton

[1974]

correlations of

and Joyce
.81 and

are described oy Ashton

[1976]

.863,

report mean consistency

respectively.

[1979]

as "...

These figures

high relative to the

consensus found in studies of other types of expert judges"
[1979, p.

63].

It appears

then that an appropriate hurdle

for assessing expertise from a
minimum correlation of
H^:

.8.

test-retest perspective

Thus,

our first hypothesis

is a
is:

Auditor subjects will produce judgments with a
mean intra-judge correlation not significantly
less than .8.

Consensus

is a concept of

agreement among individuals.

In this study it will be assessed through correlation of
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ratings

across judges.

correlations

Obviously,

the ceiling for such

is the measure of consistency obtained to test

the hypothesis above.

We cannot expect two different judges

to agree with each other more than they agree with them¬
selves.

However,

expertise does

interchangeability.

imply a high degree of

Thus, our criterion here

is embodied in

the second hypothesis.
Auditor subjects will produce judgments with a
mean inter-judge correlation not significantly
less than their average intra-judge correla¬
tion.
Another aspect of

the notion of

interchangeability of

expert judges mentioned above is a lack of bias across those
judges.
rating

Bias

is defined here as consistent over- or under¬

(leniency bias),

or as consistent over- or under-re-

action to situational changes or other consistent differ¬
ences

in interpreting the meaning of

sensitivity bias).
in the next chapter.

individual cues

(cue

This definition will be operationalized
At this point,

we will simply posit

the following:
:

Auditor subjects will produce judgments with
insignificant bias effects.

Note that the above hypotheses do not spring from a par¬
ticular behavioral theory.

Rather,

they test a set of

assumptions underlying normative theory
these assumptions do not hold,
the auditor's evaluation of
be

ill-advised.

in auditing.

If

then placing more emphasis on

internal accounting control may
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Regardless of the outcome of the tests of the above
hypotheses, however,
auditors'
sensus'

it is possible to establish,

judgment data, a description of any

among the auditors.

from the

'implicit con¬

This description can be exam¬

ined to address the second research question.

The Second Research Question

Early in this thesis it was pointed out that, although
the importance of internal accounting control evaluation is
generally recognized,

we still lack an integrated model of

internal accounting control quality measurement.
possible to utilize a complete
experiment,

the environmental

'lens model'

If

it were

approach in this

(left side) model could pro¬

vide us with such a measurement approach.

However, we can¬

not derive such an environmental model in this study since
we do not nave any

'actual'

events.

We do have the opportu¬

nity to construct a general decision (right side) model
here,

though.

Since the auditor's decision is already being

used in the field as a measurement tool, a uniform auditor
decision model may oe an appropriate surrogate for the envi¬
ronmental model.

In fact,

accuracy is not available,
response)

is.

Ijiri

[1975]

although an empirical measure of
an extracted consensus
and Ijiri & Jaedicke

(the mean
[1966]

argue that objectivity may de defined as consensus of opin¬
ion, where the degree of ODjectivity is indicated by the
dispersion of

that opinion.

We will discuss this issue fur-
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ther in Chapters VIII and IX.
Our central objective here is basic data gathering.

We

have little guidance on what weighting schemata to expect in
the auditors'

judgments.

On the one hand,

the normative

literature on internal accounting control evaluation gives
us a basic idea about where the cues having impact will come
from,

but little more.

On the other hand,

the empirical

research on internal accounting control evaluation has had a
different focus than the study proposed here.

The single

ma}or expectation those studies provide is that the most
important specific level cues in the auditors'

judgments

would be related to segregation of duties.
However,

the systems model outlined in Chapter IV makes

several predictions about the relationships between classes
of variables in determining the effectiveness of internal
controls in an accounting system.

Thus, we will employ

these predictions as a positive model of what kinds of cue
utilization will be captured in the auditors' judgments.

The propositions below are basically drawn directly from
the model presented in the last section of Chapter IV.

Lit¬

tle discussion will be offered beyond the identification of
the descriptive statements or dynamic relationships employed
in deriving each proposition.

Before presenting these prop¬

ositions, however, one last caveat must be given.

While

support for the hypotheses stated below may be interpreta-
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ble,

failure of those hypotheses in capturing the auditors'

judgments cannot be taken as an indication of anything in
particular.

Such failure may be the fault of the operation¬

alization of the model,

the fault of the model itself in

describing control relationships, or the fault of the audi¬
tors in assessing them.

This topic will be addressed again

in Chapter VIII of this thesis.

Recall that we initiated our outline of the systems model
of internal accounting control with a central assumption.
We now offer that assumption as our second proposition.
P^:

The objective of internal accounting control
procedures and techniques can be characterized
as a single goal: system stability.

In the experiment described in this thesis, auditors will
judge internal controls against three objectives identified
in the professional literature.
true,

If the above proposition is

the ratings produced by the auditors should be able to

be nicely captured by the transformation of the ratings onto
a single dimension.
H.:

Thus, we set out our fourth hypothesis:

Auditor's ratings on the three dependent vari¬
ables will be captured by a single underlying
dependent factor.

The systems model identifies four major types of con¬
trols.

If all of these classes of controls are,

indeed,

important in tne determination of the quality of internal
accounting control,

then the auditors' judgments should
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reflect it.
?-:

Thus, we expect that:

All constraints and regulators will have signif¬
icant individual effects on auditors' judg¬
ments.

Four hypotheses can oe derived from tnis proposition.
H_:

Environmental constraints will have a signifi¬
cant main effect in tne analysis of auditors'
judgments.

rv :

System boundary constraints will have a signif¬
icant main effect in the analysis of auditors'
judgments.

H-:

Feedback regulators will have a significant
main effect in the analysis of auditors' judg¬
ments.
Programmatic regulators will have a significant
main effect in the analysis of auditors' judg¬
ments.

We new come to the four dynamic relationships discussed
at the end of Chapter IV.

Three of these relationships can

be tested in the experiment described in this thesis.
other cannot.

The

Below, the issues involved in testacility are

discussed for each relationship.

Then, where applicable,

resulting propositions are stated and hypotheses are derived
from them.

Our first dynamic relationship stated that constraints
are mere important than regulators in securing system sta¬
bility.

This claim was intended to emphasize the value of

the prevention of aisturoances as the mainstay of an inter¬
nal accounting control system.

Note, however,

that tne
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intent of this statement relates to complete classes of
controls, not individual control procedures.

Thus, this

prediction of the model does not indicate that,

for example,

a particular programmatic control cannot contribute more to
stability than any single environmental constraint.
In our examination of auditors'

judgment, we would expect

to find, based on the above relationship, that the total
contribution of all constraints to the auditors'
would be greater than that of all regulators.

judgments

More techni¬

cally, we would expect constraints as a class to account for
more variance in the auditor rankings than regulators as a
class.
Unfortunately, the classes of constraints and regulators,
even in a simple accounting system,

include many more indi¬

vidual instances than the number that can be effectively
manipulated in an experiment of the kind described nere.

In

this study, only one control of each type is manipulated in
order to prevent the factorial design from producing too
many cases.

The great majority of constraints and regula¬

tors are fixed in the background common to all rating situa¬
tions.

Thus, decision model weights cannot be compared nere

for all constraints versus all regulators.

We cannot there¬

fore test dynamic relationship 1.
Dynamic relationships 2 through 4 nave to do with what
can be called combined,

interactive, or contingent effects

92

of control types.

Relationship number two addresses the

interaction of environmental constraints and systems bound¬
ary constraints.

Since one control of each type is manipu¬

lated in this study, we can state the relationship as a
test-oriented proposition.
P^:

Auditor judgments will display an interaction
effect between environmental constraints and
system boundary constraints that is less than
the sum of their individual effects.

This proposition implies two hypotheses.
Hg:

Auditor judgments will display a significant
interaction effect between environmental con¬
straints and systems boundary constraints.
: The mean judgment rating for environmental con¬
straints crossed with system boundary con¬
straints will be less than the sum of their
mean main effects.

Dynamic relationship 3 states that internal regulators
and constraints have independent effects in securing system
stability.

Thus, we should never find contingent effects

between constraints and regulators in the quality of inter¬
nal accounting control.
P :

This leads to another proposition.

Auditor judgments will not display any signifi¬
cant interactive effects between constraints
and regulators.

Four hypotheses are inherent in this proposition.
Hu* Auditor judgments will not display any signifi¬
cant interaction effects between environmental
constraints and feedbacK regulators.
H

: Auditor judgments will not display any signifi¬
cant interaction effects between environmental
constraints and programmatic regulators.

K^: Auditor judgments will not display any signifi¬
cant interaction effects between system bound¬
ary constraints and feedback regulators.
: Auditor judgments will not display any signifi¬
cant interaction effects between system bound¬
ary constraints and programmatic regulators.

Finally, the last dynamic relationship in the model indi¬
cates that feedback regulators and programmatic regulators
enhance each other's effect in obtaining system stability.
Thus, we derive our last proposition.
:

Auditor judgments will display an interactive
effect between feedback regulators and program¬
matic regulators that is greater than the sum
of their individual effects.

Proposition 6 yields our last two hypotheses.
H,_: Auditor judgments will display a significant
interaction effect between feedback regulators
and programmatic regulators.
H,,: The mean judgment rating for feedback regula¬
tors crossed with programmatic regulators will
be greater than the sum of their mean main
effects.

We have now posited six propositions, yielding three
hypotheses on auditor expertise (the first research ques¬
tion) and thirteen hypotheses on auditor judgment behavior
(the second research question).

These propositions and

their sources are recapitulated in Taole 4.

Note that among

the latter propositions there are several indications of
expected configural cue use (i.e.,
the judgments).

interactive effects in

Altnough it is true that the previous
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Proposition

Source

Is

Auditors will demonstrate ex¬
pertise in the area of internal
accounting control evaluation.

Normative Theory
(Assumption)

2:

The objective of internal
accounting control procedures
and techniques can be character¬
ized as a single goal:
system stability.
t

Systems Model
(Assumption)

3:

All constraints and regulators
will have significant individual
effects on auditors* judgments.

Systems Model
(Descriptive
Framework)

4:

Auditor judgments will display
an interaction effect between
environmental constraints and
that is less than the sum of
their individual effects.

Systems Model
(Dynamic
Relationship 2)

5:

Auditor judgments will not
display any significant inter¬
active effects oetween con¬
straints and regulators.

Systems Model
(Dynamic
Relationship 3)

6:

Auditor judgments will display
an interactive effect between
feedback regulators and pro¬
grammatic regulators that is
greater than the sum of their
individual effects.

Systems Model
(Dynamic
Relationship 4)

Table 4
List of Propositions and Their Sources
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research on internal accounting control evaluation has found
little configural use of cues,
cated for chis study.

such use is not contra-indi¬

Both the systems model and several

sources in the normative literature suggest that such
effects should be found.

It should be noted that each of

the posited configural uses are expected in areas that were
not examined in the previous internal accounting control
evaluation research studies.

In fact,

feedbacK regulators

and programmatic regulators were not investigated separately
in the previous studies at all.

At this point, we turn to a

description of the experimental design and methodology.

CHAPTER

VI

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE

This chapter describes the organization and methodology
of the experiment administered for this study.

Included in

the following sections are discussions of design,
selection,

subject

task and administration, experimental materials,

variable selection and definition, and experimental con¬
trols.

Design

This study utilized a version of the fixed-effects facto¬
rial approach employed in many judgment studies,
Ashton

[1974]

and Joyce

a fully-crossed 2

4

[1976].

including

The specific framework was

factorial design with orthogonal manipu¬

lation of the four dichotomously classified independent
variables.

Each resulting cell

(hereafter, case)

judgment on each of three dependent variables.
were within subjects, and,

required a

Replications

in addition to the single repli¬

cation of the 16 primary cases, repeat presentations of four
cases were included in order to allow the assessment of each
subject's intra-judge reliability.

Thus, each subject pro¬

vided three ratings on each of twenty cases, yielding 60
judgments per subject.
The repeat cases were not identified as such in the
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experimental materials.

Rather, they were randomly

interspersed among the last ten cases.

This, of course,

does not guarantee that none of the subjects were aware of
the presence of repeat cases.

In fact, a few subjects

reported such awareness in the debriefing section of the
experimental booklet.

This subject is covered in the first

section of the next chapter.

Further details on case

arrangement are presented in the section on controls at the
end of this chapter.

Subjects

Auditors with at least three years of experience were
sought as subjects.
vincing firms to,

Due to the practical problems in con¬

in essence, donate many valuable man-hours

to a doctoral research project, random selection of auditors
from a large pool of potential subjects was not feasible.
Instead,

subjects were solicited through partners in four

national

('Big Eight')

firms.

In order to gain some repre¬

sentativeness, the experimenter requested subjects from a
broad range of backgrounds and office locations.
Each individual in the resulting pool of potential sub¬
jects was contacted and sent the package of experimental
materials described below.
were offered.

No special monetary incentives

Nonetheless, of the 35 subjects initially
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sent materials, 89 percent (31)

returned complete responses.

Demographics of the subject group are presented in the third
section of Chapter VII:

Preliminary Data Review.

Task and Administration

The experimental data was gathered through the mailed
administration of a series of related internal accounting
control evaluation tasks using simulated evidence.

These

judgment cases were presented in a booklet of written mater¬
ials which included a brief introduction to the task as well
as detailed instructions on determining and recording the
ratings.

The instructions asked each subject to proceed

through the booklet at his own pace.

Each case required

decisions on the effectiveness of the controls in the
described hypothetical situation in terms of their ability
to meet three different control objectives.

The booklet is

described below.

The Experimental Instrument

The experimental instrument was the case booklet referred
to above.

The booklet was composed of five sections, each

of which is covered in the following paragraphs.
the booklet itself is contained in Appendix A.
finalization,

A copy of
Before

the format and contents of the booklet were

pilot-tested on five CPAs with a variety of experience and
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backgrounds.

After debriefing the pilot subjects, certain

minor changes in the materials were instituted to clarify
the instructions and simulation data.

The first section of the booklet was designed to gather
demographic data from the auditor subjects.
information,
Turner

in part adapted from Joyce

[1978], were requested.

Nine pieces of

[1976]

and Mock and

All of the information

related to experiential factors which were suspected of
mediating auditors'
behavior.
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)

internal accounting control evaluation

The items requested were:

Firm
Rank
Office location
Number of years audit experience
Number of years commercial experience
Client size experience
Client mix experience
Types of specialized training
Internal accounting control evaluation experience

All of the above information was collected on a single
sheet, as shown in Appendix A.

The second section of the booklet contained a summary of
the study's objectives and instructions for completing the
ratings.

It also contained an example case to familiarize

the subjects with the type of processing and responses
expected from them.

The third section described the background common to all
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the cases.

It covered the state of the economy,

the nature

of the company and its industry, the history and organiza¬
tion of the company, and other general characteristics of
the situation designed to fix the background variables and
provide a reasonably realistic setting for the required
judgments.

Finally,

accounting system,

it included a description of the

the accounts receivable subsystem, and a

detailed flowchart of accounts receivable operations.

The fourth section of the booklet provided the twenty
cases.

Each case was comprised of two parts.

part was four item questionnaire,
answers.

The first

filled out with yes and no

It was designed to be similar in appearance to the

typical kind of internal control questionnaire used by audi¬
tors during the evaluation stage of an audit.

Two random

case orders were used, allowing a test of case order effect
(discussed in Chapter VII).

The second part provided places

for the subject to record his responses.

Both parts

appeared on a single page for each case.

An example of such

a page is given in Exhibit 1.

The last section of the booklet contained a short
debriefing questionnaire.

Subjects were asked for informa¬

tion relating to:
1) Comfort in performing the task
2) Interest in the task
3) Opinion of the realism and clarity of the cases
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SITUATION

01

The following four items complete the description of the accounts
receivable subsystem at Craftmate, Inc.
ITEM

1.

2.

3.

•4.

YES

Have the client's personnel been in¬
formed of their employer's ethical
standards and are formal statements
of these standards posted in visible
locations?
Are credit sales approvals checked and
initialed by the department manager?
Are invoices reconciled numerically
at least once a month and are missing
numbers investigated and their dis¬
position documented as a part of each
reconciliation?

NO

_
_Z

_/

_

/

Do formalised procedures exist for
handling the non-routine activities
of investigating and correcting
mismatching pairs of sales invoices,
shipping documents, billing amounts,
and payment receipts?

Please rate the accounts receivable subsystem described in
this situation on its reliability in assuring appropriate :
Authorization-=-1-i-5-5-1-5-1-5-=-

Unreliable

123456789

10

Reliable

10

Reliable

Accounting¬
's-*-sr

Unre liable

123456789

SafeguardingUnreliable

i-X-£--£-X-£-£-1-£-£123456789
10

Exhibit 1
Sample Rating Page

Reliable
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4) Previous experience in experiments
5) Opinion of experiments
6) Time taken by the study
The purpose of this section was to provide some indica¬
tion of response bias, discussed under the section on con¬
trols .

Selection of Variables

Independent variables.
The systems model described in Chapter IV was the basis
of the measurement model used in this study.

Thus,

there

were four independent variables in this experiment.

These

were operationalizations of the four causal factors identi¬
fied by the systems model in Chapter IV.

Each one was

manipulated through two levels or categories.
The environmental constraints factor was defined as the
presence or absence of formal company ethical standards.
Although many kinds of environmental constraints surround
the typical company's accounting system, our objective in
defining this variable was to find a control that was both
objectively measurable and emphasized in the normative lit¬
erature growing out of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977.

This operationalization met both requirements.

The system boundary constraints factor was defined as the
presence or absence of an approval requirement for credit
sales.

Such approval specifically mediates access to the
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system and,

thus,

is clearly (and only)

a system boundary

constraint.
Feedback regulation was represented by the presence or
absence of a monthly numerical reconciliation of invoices.
The two signals undergoing feedback comparison in this case
were the sequence numbers on invoices generated by sales and
the file copies for completed shipments.
The definition of programmatic regulation was the pres¬
ence or absence of formalized procedures for investigating
and correcting mismatching pairs of internal documents.

In

order to emphasize the programmatic nature of these proce¬
dures, the word

'formalized' was underlined in the question

relating to this variable on the case rating page.
Each of these variables was finally operationalized as a
question and answer on the case rating page, as depicted in
Exhibit 1.

Table 5 summarizes the relationships between the

conceptual and operational forms of the independent vari¬
ables .
Other factors which can affect the quality of internal
control were held fixed in the experiment.

Chief among

these is segregation of duties, a control which incorporates
features of all three of the control factors that exist at
the subsystem level.

Segregation of duties is basically a

systems boundary constraint variable, since it controls
access to the internal activity of the accounting system.
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Variable

Operational Form

Level

Environmental
Constraints

Standards for Employees
Ethical Behavior

Present Absent

System Boundary
Constraints

Transaction Approval

Present Absent

Feedback
Regulators

Numerical Reconciliation
of Invoices

Present Absent

Programmatic
Regulators

Formalized Exception
Routines

Present Absent

Table 5
List of Independent Variables
and Their Operational Forms

105

However, duties are segregated through individual employees.
Through their memory,

these individuals provide a measure of

feedback regulation.

Furthermore,

their own personal behav-

ioral habits also tend to produce some programmatic regula¬
tion.

This may explain why Ashton

[1974]

and Joyce

[1976]

found segregation of duties variables to weigh so heavily in
auditors'

judgments.

It is unclear just how much of each

kind of factor is captured by segregation of duties.

It is

probably most dependent upon the particular individuals
involved.

Thus,

the effect of such a variable in this

experiment would not have been easy to attribute to the var¬
ious factors.
of the results,

In order to avoid muddling the implications
then, segregation of duties was held fixed

in this experiment.
Table 6 presents the complete list of factors that were
explicitly dealt with in the experiment and shows whether
each was held fixed or varied.

Dependent variable.
The dependent variable was the judged relative reliabil¬
ity of the described accounting system in assuring that each
of the three objectives of internal accounting control were
being met.

These three objectives, accounting, authoriza¬

tion, and the safeguarding of assets, have been identified
both by the Special Advisory Committee on Internal Account-
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Factors Having Potential Impact
on Subsystem Stability

Fixed

Economy

X

Industry

X

Firm's Position in Industry

X

Firm's Size/Growth

X

Management's Characteristics

X

Firm's Informal Social Structure

X

Firm Objectives and Plans

X

Reward Structure

X

Internal Audit Function

X
X

Formal Ethical Standards
Accounting System Design

X

Accounting Subsystem Investigated

X

Segregation of Duties

X

Authorization

X
X

Transaction Approval
Document Matching

X
X

Numerical Reconciliation of Invoices
Standard Operating Procedures

Varied

X

Formalized Exception Routines

Table 6
Status of Factors in Experiment

X
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ing Control of the AICPA and by the SEC as the broad
objectives of internal accounting control.
addressed in Chapter II.

This fact was

A single measure of stability was

not used as the dependent variable for two primary reasons.
First,

the term stability (or its equivalent) would not be

familiar to the subjects, and thus it could have affected
the variability of their responses.

Second,

the recent nor¬

mative literature and the current trends in internal
accounting control evaluation determined in our interviews
with auditors demonstrate a definite emphasis on evaluation
against a set of discrete specific objectives.
the use of multiple rating criteria,

Furthermore,

then, allowed investi¬

gation of the systems model's central assumption.

Judgments were measured using three ten point scales num¬
bered from 1

(indicating no overt control)

complete overt control).
labeled

'unreliable'

and

to 10

(indicating

The end points of the scale were
'reliable'

and referred to state¬

ments which were worded in such a way as to be as familiar
as possible to the auditor subjects.

As stated above, the

rating scales appeared on the same page as the other casespecific information (see Exhibit 1).

On the rating sheets,

the scales were labeled rather than actually defined.

The

specific definitions of the three scale dimensions appeared
only once, earlier in the booklet.

Exhibit 2 reproduces the
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11.

Task. Instructions.
This section describes the output desired from you in this study.

In

the next section of this booklet (Section III), the general description of
a single firm and its accounting system is presented.

A more detailed out¬

line of the firm's accounts receivable subsystem, and its relationship to
the rest of the revenue cycle system, is then given.

In Section IV, a number

of different situations within this accounts receivable subsystem are set
forth.

In each of these possible situations you will be asked to review the

accounts receivable subsystem as documented and assess its reliability.
You will be asked to assess the subsystem's reliability in relation to
each of the three broad objectives on internal accounting control outlined
by AICPA in the Report of the Special Advisory Committee on Internal Accounting
Control.

These objectives are classified as authorization, accounting, and

asset safeguarding.

The task in this experiment is a preliminary evaluation

of the reliability of each of 20 variations of an accounts receivable subsystem
in terms of its ability to achieve each of these objectives.

For the purposes

of this study, then, you should employ the following criteria in each evaluation:
Authorization.
The subsystem's procedures and techniques should
assure that transactions occur only in compliance with policies
and criteria established by management such that, for example,
kinds of customers serviced, prices, credit, terms of sales, cus¬
tomer acceptance, sales-related adjustments, and billing and
collection practices are appropriate as determined under some general
or specific form of authorization.
Accounting.
The subsystem's procedures and techniques should assure
that transactions are recorded as executed such that, for example,
all and only bona fide transactions are recorded, that they are
correctly classified, and that their recording Is timely.
Asset Safeguarding.
The subsystem's procedures and techniques should
assure that assets are protected from loss, abuse, mishandling, or
misappropriation such that, for example, access to assets, records,
critical forms, and processing is restricted to responsible parties
and that records are inspected for accuracy in representing asset
values at regular intervals.

Exhibit 2
Rating Instructions
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booklet section that defined and explained the rating task.

The dependent variable employed was like Ashton's

[1974]

to the extent that it was a single-stage scaled judgment.
It was unlike Ashton's in that the decision was on the three
'broad objectives'

rather than control strength.

This

should have been a more familiar evaluation notion for the
subjects.

These three criteria have found acceptance as a

general statement of the objectives of internal accounting
control.'*' It was also unlike Ashton's in that it was a ten
point unlabeled scale rather than one with six labeled
points.

The decision to use this approach was motivated by

the functional measurement work done by Anderson
1977]

and his associates.

[1974,

The primary reasons for this

decision are:
1) As fine a discrimination as practical was
desired.
2) Anderson [1974] indicates that scales of a size
less than ten points are suspect in judgement
scales due to end-points elimination, distribu¬
tional flattening, and related contextual effects
(pp. 2-10).
3) Scales with over twenty points tend to elicit
lumped responses yielding effective lengths of
about twenty, anyway (e.g., most tests using 100
percentage points tend to get responses at only
the 5 and 10 percent graduations).
4) Anderson [1974] states that about 15 to 20 years

One of the firms providing subjects employs a single
strength-of-control concept in its internal accounting con¬
trol evaluation process.
However, Chapter II indicates the
popularity of the 'three broad objectives'.
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of research in measurement theory and judgment/
perception research has indicated to him that a
ten to twenty point response scale is about opti¬
mal for judgment studies.
In fact, his research
indicates that such a scale, with labels at the
'end anchors' only, often yields interval scale
properties in the responses, (p. 1,2).
5) Initial reactions from auditors was that a scale
with more than ten points would be too discrimi¬
nating for the purposes of internal accounting
control evaluation.
The final decision on the scale was made after an analy¬
sis of the results of the pilot study showed the ten point
scale to be both sensitive and selective in the rating task.
The single scaled judgement approach has been criticized
for its so-called lack of relevance.

Joyce

[1976]

first

tried to avoid this criticism by using judgments on man¬
hours in the audit program.

Mock and Turner

[1978]

used

planned sample sizes as their dependent variables for the
same reason.

However, a number of problems are inherent in

such a dependent variable, which is why such an approach was
not used here.

There are two reasons to believe that the

audit program variables used in earlier studies may have
diluted the internal validity of those experiments.

First,

evidence cited in Chapters II and III indicates that non¬
control factors exert a significant influence on the design
of the final audit plan.

Thus it is unclear how well pro¬

gram planning acts as a surrogate for judged quality of
internal accounting control.
sion process

Second, any multi-stage deci¬

(as the program planning decision must be cat-

Ill

egorized)

has an inherent 'spreading effect' on individual

judgments due to the natural properties of cascaded judg¬
ment.

Such an effect would have reduced the visible measure

of consensus, yielding lower correlations.

It may have

affected the investigation of significant effects in the
analysis of variance, as well.

Appendix B demonstrates the

effect of cascaded judgment through an example.
There is another reason for using the

'unrealistic'

scaled response.
Even though no such decision is separately required as
part of the regular audit, the AICPA now allows that such a
decision be made and discussed formally in a special state¬
ment.

This fact emphasizes the value of information about

the auditor's ability to make such a separate judgment.
Since we were interested in the evaluation of internal
accounting control and not the development of the audit pro¬
gram,

it was deemed appropriate to seek decisions on con-

trols, themselves.

2

Thus,

the multiple criteria defined by

the SEC (and invoked in the auditor's statement prescribed
by Paragraph 39 of SAS 30) was chosen as the appropriate
dependent variable set.

2

In fact, individual judgments may not be terribly ger¬
mane to the problem of audit program planning.
Interviews
with CPAs indicated that such decisions often made in
groups, or at least after informal communication with peers.
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Controls

The primary source of the control of extraneous factors
in this study was the use of a detailed simulated decision
setting.

Within this setting, we:

1)

Fixed the background information and interactions
of subjects with others so that effects due to
variation there would not intrude upon the
results; and
2) Utilized a design which allowed within subjects
comparisons.

Unfortunately, completely random selection of subjects, as
explained above, was not possible.
Further efforts were made to avoid task artifacts

(i.e.,

effects due to the experiment's formalism as opposed to the
underlying conceptual relations under scrutiny).

Among

these efforts was the use of the single-stage scaled judg¬
ment described above.

Besides cascading effects,

this

approach eliminated the potentially confounding effects of
audit risk and compliance test outcomes/costs that would be
associated with an audit program-oriented dependent vari¬
able.

Mock and Turner

[1978]

identified such confounding

effects in their study.
A type of confounding effect of particular importance
here is that due to the operationalization of the design.
It is conceivable that subject behavior could be influenced
by the cases chosen as repeats or by the overall order of
case presentation.

Ashton & Brown

[1980]

found such
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effects.

Order effects could be due to some carryover of

context across cases.

In order to assess such effects,

the

experiment was operationalized into four sets of final
materials.

Two case presentation orders were used

(orders* A

& B), and two sets of repeat cases were used (sets I & II).
Both orders and repeat sets were chosen at random, with the
restriction that no repeat case could fall within three tri¬
als of the duplicated original.

Their crossing resulted in

the four final versions (AI, All, BI, & BII).
Another set of confounding variables not directly con¬
trollable involves what is generally called experimental
demand.

The subjects' perceptions of the study's goals and

their attitudes towards the experimenter,

the task, and

those perceived goals, may effect the experimental outcomes.
We chose here to be straightforward with the subjects about
the general objectives of the study.

Knowledge about the

experiment's goals should not have adversly influenced sub¬
jects, per se.
motivator,

In fact,

such knowledge may have served as a

since the general internal accounting control

evaluation problem has become highly visible lately.

The

method used to assess the probability of any strong impact
from this source on the results was an analysis of the
series of questions eliciting the subjects'

attitudes toward

the study and performance on it which appeared in the
debriefing section of the test instrument.

The results of
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that analysis are discussed in the next chapter.

Summary
The sections above have described the experiment and its
administration.

However,

they have not provided any details

about the subjects that participated in the final study.
They have not discussed the results of the preliminary scan¬
ning of the data for outliers and confounding effects,
either.

Both of these topics are covered in the first sec¬

tion of the next chapter, which then proceeds to present the
general results of the experiment and the analyses of those
results.

CHAPTER

VII

PRELIMINARY DATA REVIEW

This chapter reviews the basic results obtained from the
administration of the experiment described in Chapter VI.
The purpose of this review is to "set the stage" for the
tests of the hypotheses presented in Chapter V.

Those tests

will be conducted in Chapters VIII and IX.
It is appropriate that, prior to testing this study's
hypotheses,

the data be cleansed of possible biases and

artifactual effects.

Accordingly, this chapter examines

both attributes of the data and of the subject sample that
provided it.
First,

The objectives of this review are twofold.

it is desired that a "clean" subset of the data (that

is, one free of effects not under study) may be selected for
the purpose of the ultimate tests of hypotheses.

Second,

it

is felt that such a preliminary review of the data and its
source will provide an appropriate perspective from which to
evaluate the results of the statistical analysis of the
hypothesized relationships.
A general objective of empirical research is that its
data be representative of typical target behavior in natural
settings.

In a simulation study such as the current one,

there are several potential sources of distortion in the
observed behavior.

Generally, these sources are referred to
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as the "demand characteristics of an experiment"
(1962)].

[Orne

Subjects react to experimental stimuli in the con¬

text of their perceptions of the experimental task.
perceptions are,

These

in turn, mediated by the attitudes they

bring to the experiment, their impressions of the experi¬
ment's importance and the quality of its execution, and the
structure of the task,

itself.

In order to detect the presence of demand characteristics
effects in the data obtained for this study, the first sec¬
tion of this chapter assesses the likelihood of such effects
through the analysis of the subjects'

responses to the

debriefing questions from the end of the experimental book¬
let.

Based on this examination, one subject's responses are

deleted from the data and those of another two are omitted
from the tests of hypothesis 1.
The second section of this chapter presents an investiga¬
tion of effects in the data due to question order and the
choice of repeat cases.
The third section of this chapter presents another facet
of the quality of the data.

Obviously,

the generalizability

of the patterns of rating behavior elicited by the current
study is dependent upon the representativeness of the sub¬
ject sample in relation to the population of auditors making
such decisions.

Thus,

the third section of this chapter

reviews the demographics of the subject group.
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Finally,

this chapter ends with a summary of the

preliminary analysis of the data and an assessment of the
data's quality.

Review of Debriefing Questions

The last section of the experimental booklet contained
five debriefing questions designed to determine potential
bias in the subjects'

responses to the rating task.

In the

analysis below, responses to each question will first be
investigated individually.
tion,

At the conclusion of this sec¬

the implications of the overall pattern of responses

will be discussed.
The first question in the debriefing section asked sub¬
jects to rate four aspects of the experiment.
of these ratings are summarized in Table 7.
ject rated all four aspects consistently low;

The results
No single sub¬
individual

average ratings over the four aspects ranged from 3.75 to 8.
Note that the only mean aspect rating below the scale mid¬
point (5.5) was the one for interest,

indicating that the

subjects found the task somewhat dull, overall.
Nonetheless, based on these ratings alone,

there appears

to be no reason to suspect any significant level of response
bias.
The second and third questions in the debriefing section
asked subjects if they had participated in an auditing
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ASPECT OF EXPERIMENT

RATINGS
RANGE

MEAN

Interest in task

1 to 8

4.5

Clarity of instructions

4 to 10

7.3

Realism of situations

1 to 9

6.4

Comfort in making ratings

3 to 10

5.9

Notes: -Possible range of ratings was 1 to 10
-Increasing values indicate more interest,
clarity, etc.
TABLE 7
Debriefing Ratings

research study before and what their opinions of such activ¬
ity were.

Five subjects reported that they had participated

in a previous audit study.

Three of those expressed beliefs

that such experiments were quite valuable.

One said only

that they should let subjects know about the results;how did
he compare to others?
referred to as S-16)

The remaining subject (hereafter
thought that audit experiments were

"...generally nonsensical.

Performed only to write thesis

or other degree requirements.
fuel shortages."

Generally useful in case of

This subject rated his interest in the

rating task at 1.
Of the 26 subjects who had not taken part in prior audit¬
ing studies,

thirteen had positive comments about the value
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or importance of such studies and nine made no comment.

The

remaining four made statements reflecting feelings that such
studies were generally too restrictive or lacking in reality
to yield much insight into auditing problems.

Nonetheless,

these four subjects each rated their interest in the current
experiment at 4 or above.

Thus, although their opinions of

audit experiments may have been low, these subjects appear
to have been interested enough in the internal accounting
control evaluation problem to provide acceptable responses.
Question 4 asked subjects to estimate the total time they
devoted to the experiment as well as the time they spent on
the ratings, alone.

The mean reported times were 87.5 min¬

utes total time and 40 minutes rating time.
times ranged from 25 minutes
utes, with quartiles at 60,

(reported by S-16)

30,

to 240 min¬

85, and 112.5 minutes.

rating times ranged from 10 minutes (S-16)
with quartiles at 20,

Reported total

Reported

to 120 minutes,

and 45 minutes.

The last question was an open-ended one included to allow
subjects to comment on their experience in the experiment.
No particular pattern was evident in the responses.
subjects made no comment.
approaches.
been boring.

Eleven

Eight described their analytical

Three expressed an opinion that the task had
One said the experiment had not lived up to

his expectations.

Three subjects reported that they had

found the task difficult.

One subject said that he would
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have been more comfortable rating on a single scale, while
another claimed that he had found the three-scale rating
system commendable.

Finally, six of the subjects specifi¬

cally mentioned that they had noticed or determined the
existence of repeat cases.
Further investigation revealed that three of these last
individuals did not attempt to justify their two sets of
responses since their repeats showed somewhat different pat¬
terns from the original appearances of the same cases.

One

subject actually reported changing his earlier responses to
the duplicated cases because he felt that he should give the
same ratings to two instances of a single case.

However,

since the original ratings had merely been crossed out, they
were recoverable.
The two remaining individuals had identical responses for
their original and repeat cases, as did one other subject
who had not reported an awareness of the repeats.

If these

subjects artificially produced identical ratings for origi¬
nal and repeat cases,

their inclusion in the test of intra¬

auditor reliability would result in an upwardly biased mean
correlation.

Therefore, the data from these three subjects

was examined for an indication of the
identical pattern.

’naturalness'

of their

The ratings of the subject who did not

report an awareness of the repetition of cases were highly
systematic
0

(i.e., regular)

across all cases.

That subject
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also reported significantly more internal accounting control
evaluation experience than the other two.

Based on this

information, a decison was made to include his ratings in
the test of hypothesis 1.

Since the comments of the other

two had indicated an awareness of the repeats, it was
assumed that their identical patterns were due to an
explicit attempt to find the repeat cases and duplicate the
original responses.

Thus,

the original and repeat ratings

for these two subjects were not included in the data used to
test hypothesis 1

(intra-judge consistency).'*'

The fact that only six of the thirty-one subjects
reported an awareness of the inclusion of repeat cases can
be taken as an indication that most of the subjects were
more involved in the

'facts' of the cases than in the

details of the experiment,

itself.

The design of the test

required that subjects be exposed to many highly similar
cases,

thus the lack of recognition of repeats in more cases

is not surprising.

In fact, half of the subjects who did

report an awareness of repeat cases indicated that their
discovery was based on the fact that four cues at two levels
could only produce 16 unique instances.

At least three of

those subjects that reported an awareness did not modify

^As it turned out, the decision to include or exclude
the ratings of these three individuals did not affect the
final acceptance of hypothesis 1.
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their ratings.

This probably implies that they were either

also overtly aware of the instructions to "... not re-exam¬
ine or change a rating once you have moved to a new rating
situation"

[booklet, p.

17]

or not curious or motivated

enough to search back through the booklet to find the match¬
ing rating page.

In general,

there does not seem to be

enough evidence to conclude that the presence of repeats in
itself had any direct effect on the ratings except in the
two instances noted above.
After reviewing all of the debriefing data,

it was

decided that the only significant response bias was exhib¬
ited by S-16.

Although several subjects reported some nega¬

tive attitudes toward the task,
by those subjects'

these seemed to be mitigated

other responses and comments or by the

amount of time they reported spending on the rating task.
Only S-16 expressed an opinion that audit-related experi¬
ments were of absolutely no value.

The fact that he also

reported the lowest times for both total dedicated time and
rating time added to the sense that his responses may have
been affected by a significant bias or, at the very least,
little consideration.

As a result of the analysis presented in this section,
then,

two major modifications were made in the data.

First,

S-16's responses were omitted from all analyses, due to the
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conclusion that they were probably affected by a significant
bias against the experiment.

Second,

two repeat sets were

omitted from the intra-judge consistency test data since it
was concluded that they would have biased the correlation
figures upward by providing other-than-naturally-achieved
matches between original and repeat ratings.
In the next section, effects of the design of the test
instrument,

itself, are investigated.

Analysis of Order and Repeat Effects

In Chapter VI,

the potential for the operationalization

of the experimental materials to produce artifactual effects
was discussed.

One particular concern in this study was the

fact that the order of case presentation or the selection of
cases to be used as repeats could,
rating behavior of subjects.
Kramer

[1980]

Chapter VI,

in themselves, affect the

Ashton

reported such effects.

[1974]

and Ashton &

Thus, as explained in

two case orders and two repeat sets were crossed

to produce four basic versions of the test instrument.

This

section examines the final data set to determine if the case
order,

the choice of repeats, or their interaction had any

effect on the rating behavior.

The findings of that exami¬

nation are then discussed.
The statistical approach used to determine if any regular
effects due to booklet version were captured in the rating
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data was a two-way multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA).

Tested treatment effects were case order, repeat

set, and the interaction of the two.
The results of the analyses of booklet version effects
are summarized in Table 8, below.
These results show that there apparently were version
effects.

Equality of group centroids did not seem to be

significantly affected by the choice of case order or repeat
sets in themselves.

However,

the interaction of these two

choices seems to have had such effects.
Although one might be able to offer possible explanations
for order or repeat effects, effects for interactions only
seem to defy interpretability.

Nonetheless,

it must be con¬

cluded that the overall pattern of cases did affect response
behavior.

The question remains as to whether the observed

effects indicate more about the test booklet or the way in
which auditors'

judgments are determined.

How do the observed effects redound upon the interpreta¬
tion of the hypotheses tests in the next chapters?

The pat¬

terns of cases do seem to have some effect on the evalua¬
tions.

However,

the very variety of the booklet formats

that allowed the detection of such effects also affords some
level of control over them.

In a sense,

the four booklet

versions become four replications of the experiment.
in order to ensure that the hypothesis tests are not

Thus,
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Test for Equality of Group Centroids

Source

Lambda

F-value

d.f.

P > F

Order

.989

1.72

3,474

.1593

Repeat set .993

1.15

3,474

. 3266

Interact.

19.28

3,474

.0001

.891

Table 8
Test of Version Effects

affected by booklet version effects,- S's are grouped by
booklet version exposure for the tests in Chapter IX.

Subject Demographics

As discussed in Chapter VI, the experimental instrument
requested nine pieces of information from each subject about
his background.

This information was collected in order to

determine whether the subject group's profile contained any
indication that it was not representative of the general
population of auditors that routinely make internal account¬
ing control evaluation decisions.
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Subj ect1s firm.
The first item of information requested was the subject's
firm.

Since different firms employ different methods in

both training and standard procedures for internal account¬
ing control evaluation,

it was felt that a variety of such

backgrounds should be represented in the subject group.
Accordingly, subjects were sought from four different 'Big
Eight'

firms.

2

These firms represent a good cross-section of

the internal accounting control evaluation approaches dis¬
cussed

in Chapter II.

jects, employs a

Firm A, which provided three sub¬

'classical'

evaluation approach that rates

internal accounting control on an overall
trol'

criterion.

'strength of con¬

Firm B, which provided 15 auditor-sub¬

jects, uses an approach that identifies four types of con¬
trol objectives and a series of subsumed control criteria.
Nine subjects were taken from Firm C, which evaluates inter¬
nal accounting control using a hierarchical model of control
objectives broken down into specific systems and cycles.
Within these areas, a heuristic approach to evaluation is
used.

Firm D employs a detailed formal evaluation model

which is probably the most elaborate formal internal

2

National firms were chosen because of their leadership
in developing new evaluation techniques and approaches and
their ability to provide auditors from a variety of geo¬
graphic locations.
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accounting control evaluation methodology in use today.
This firm provided three subjects.

Thus, the composition of

the subject group included small numbers of subjects with
backgrounds in the most simple (heavily judgmental) method
of evaluation and the most complex (heavily algorithmic)
method and larger numbers of subjects from firms using the
increasingly popular multiple-criteria methods.

Pragmati¬

cally speaking, the representativeness of the subject sample
appears to be acceptable in terms of firm/evaluation techni¬
que background.

Subject1 s position/years of experience.
Auditors of different position levels are responsible for
the evaluation of internal accounting control.

It is not

inconceivable that the point of view concomitant with the
auditor's position and responsibilities or simply the extent
of his audit experience may affect his evaluation decisions.
Thus,

it was desired that a variety of position levels and a

breadth of experience be represented in the subject sample.
The final sample contained auditors reporting three dif¬
ferent ranks.

Fourteen subjects were audit managers.

Nine

subjects reported titles of audit supervisor or advanced
senior.

The remaining eight subjects were audit seniors.

Since different firms employ slightly different terminol¬
ogy for ranks and position titles,

the reported number of
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years of audit experience may help to clarify the meaning of
the above information.

Subjects reported a range of three

to seventeen years of audit experience.

Managers ranged

from 5.5 to 17 years, with a mean of 7.61 years.
sors and advanced seniors (hereafter, supervisors)

Supervi¬
averaged

5.61 years of audit experience in a range of 5 to 7 years.
Seniors reported 3 to 5 years experience and averaged 3.94
years.

The grand mean for the subject sample was 6.08 years

of audit experience.

Thus an appropriate range of ranks and

years of audit experience were apparently represented by the
subject group.
%

Subject1s location.
It is conceivable that the office an auditor works in may
be associated with some systematic influence over his evalu¬
ation behavior.

Such effects could be due to geographic

location as well as the influence of local social organiza¬
tion or leadership.

Thus, subjects were sought from a vari¬

ety of office locations.

The final subject group came from

six different office locations: Boston, New York City, Phil¬
adelphia, Chicago, Seattle, and Australia.

The profile out¬

lined in Table 9 indicates that the subjects did,
represent a diverse set of geographic locations.

indeed,
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Firm

Bos

Office Location
NYC
Phi
Chi

Sea

Aus

0
0
0

A
B
C
D

0
0.

0

3

0

0

5

0

5

5

4
0

0

5

2

0

0
0

0
0

Total

4

7

8

5

5

1
1

Table 9
Office Location of Subjects by Firm

Subject1s experience and training.
It is unlikely that many would argue with the notion that
an auditor's judgment is tempered by his experience and
training.

Thus,

it was desired that the subject group rep¬

resent a variety of experience and training.

The general

composition of each subject's experience was elicited
through three questions on general work experience and one
question on training.
Five subjects reported non-auditing commercial experi¬
ence.

Of that five, only one claimed experience in an

accounting-related position.

The mean number of years of

commercial experience for this group was 3.7 years.

They

had been away from those positions for an average 5.3 years.
In the audit experience area, subjects were asked about
the size of the clients they had worked with.

Six subjects
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reported primary experience with clients reporting annual
revenues under $30 million.

Twelve subjects reported that

they had primarily worked with clients on the other side of
that criterion.

The remaining twelve reported a fairly even

mix of experience with clients over and under the $30 mil¬
lion annual revenue mark.
Twenty-three of the 30 subjects indicated that they had
worked with clients from a variety of industries.

The other

seven auditors in the study reported primary experience in
specialized industry work.
Subjects were also asked about specialized training they
had received.

At one end of the spectrum, six subjects

reported no specialized training.

On the other hand,

three

subjects reported specialized training in at least three
areas.

Ten subjects had had more than one type of advanced

training.

Subject1s control evaluation experience.
A particular kind of experience that may affect the way
an auditor evaluates internal accounting control is experi¬
ence in such evaluation itself.

Subjects were asked to

report how often they had had primary responsibility for
making preliminary evaluations of a client's internal
accounting control.
ence.

Every subject claimed some such experi¬

Three subjects indicated that they had made prelimi-
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nary evaluations less than five times (two reported only two
instances and the other,

four).

Eight of the auditors

claimed they had made preliminary evaluations five to ten
times, nine in the eleven to twenty range, and ten subjects
reported over twenty occasions of primary responsibility for
such evaluations.

Representativeness of the subject group.
In terms of the immediate investigation,

the effort to

obtain a variety of backgrounds in the subject group seems
to have been effective.

To the extent that ratings supplied

by these subjects include regular patterns as determined by
the hypothesis tests in the next chapter,

the heterogeneous

composition of the subject group assures us that these pat¬
terns are not due simply to the behavior of a unique, unre¬
presentative sample of auditors.

Summary

This chapter has presented a general review of the data
and the subject sample.

The purpose of this examination has

been to clear the data set of biases and artifactual effects
and to determine whether the attempt to collect a represen¬
tative subject sample was successful.
As a result of the above analyses, two modifications were
made in the data sets to be tested:

1) deletion of S-16's
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ratings from all tests, and 2) deletion of the
original/repeat data for two other subjects from the test of
hypothesis 1.
Analysis of booklet version effects revealed a small but
significant interaction effect for order crossed with repeat
set choice.

However,

it was concluded that this effect

would probably not be deleterious to the analysis of hypoth¬
eses in the next chapter, given that the booklet effect
could be isolated by its inclusion as an across-subjects
factor.
The subject group's demographics seem to support the idea
that the subject sample is heterogeneous and representative
of the general population of auditors currently involved in
internal accounting control evaluation.
Thus, we now turn to the tests of the hypotheses that
were derived in Chapter V with a reasonable amount of confi¬
dence in the veracity of the data.

CHAPTER

VIII

TESTS OF HYPOTHESES INVESTIGATING
AUDITOR EXPERTISE

This chapter presents the results of the tests of hypoth¬
eses related to the first major research question this the¬
sis was designed to investigate:
Can auditors be characterized as experts in the area of
internal accounting control evaluation as defined by the
consistency, consensus, and lack of bias in their judg¬
ments?

Each part of this chapter proceeds according to the fol¬
lowing pattern.

First, the propositions underlying the

hypotheses to be tested are reviewed.

Next, the conceptual

issues involved in those propositions are unpacked and dis¬
cussed.

Each hypothesis is then restated and tested.

As

part of the discussion of each hypothesis test, any new
technical approaches chosen to deal with the relevant issues
are introduced and discussed.

Finally,

the outcome of each

hypothesis test is interpreted and discussed.
The chapter ends with a review of the hypotheses and
their acceptance or lack thereof,

followed by a presentation

of general conclusions about the first research question.
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Proposition 1_

The first proposition presented in Chapter V was:
:

Auditors will demonstrate expertise in the area of
internal accounting control evaluation.

Based on the above statement,

three hypotheses were

developed relating to consistency, consensus, and bias in
the auditor judgments.

Before we examine the tests of those

hypotheses, a short discussion of the philosophy underlying
them is in order.
A review of the hypotheses stemming from proposition 1
reveals a common anomolous characteristic.

While most

research hypotheses typically posit a significant difference
from a neutral position,

these hypotheses predict no signif¬

icant difference from a positive position.
The atypical specifications of the hypotheses here were
chosen purposely.

These hypotheses relate to an assumption

underlying normative auditing theory.

Such assumptions, by

definition, are quite useful and are not to be cast aside
lightly.

Hence the hypotheses examining this assumption

were stated negatively;

the assumption should not be called

into question unless the preponderance of evidence militates
against it.

Nonetheless, we do not wish to

'stack the deck'

too heavily in favor of auditor internal accounting control
evaluation expertise either.

A false conclusion that audi¬

tors have the characteristics of ideal evaluation experts
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could be quite costly too.
Since there is no simple way of assessing the relative
costs of Type I and Type II error, we will employ the tradi¬
tional alpha level criterion of five percent.

Auditor Rating Consistency

One of the criteria for evaluation expertise that was
discussed in Chapter V was rating consistency, or test-retest reliability.

Ceteris paribus, we would expect the

ideal expert judge to produce identical judgments when f^ced
with the same case on separate occasions.

Of course, the

situation captured in the invocation of ceteris paribus sel¬
dom occurs in the real world.

Thus, Hypothesis 1 utilized a

criterial level of test-retest reliability that allowed for
some random error:
:

Auditor subjects will produce judgments with a mean
intra-judge correlation not significantly less than
8

..

Analytical approach.
The data to be analyzed for Hypothesis 1 has two impor¬
tant characteristics — (1) observations are ratings and
thus ordinal,

and

(2) observations are multivariate in that

the ratings were collected on three different variables for
each case.
Since judgments were collected via a rating scale,

the
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traditionally mandated correlation method for analysis here
would be non-parametric

[Siegel

(1956)].

However, we are

interested in assessing the extent to which two population
distributions are identical.

Order statistics may be very

insensitive to departures from identicality [Hays (1963, p.
618)].

Michels and Helson

[1949]

argue that the use of

interval techniques is more appropriate in such situations.
The statistical technique known as canonical correlation
measures the comovement of pairs of vectors of variables
opposed to pairs of individual variables).
be an appropriate approach in this case.

Thus,

(as

it would

Canonical correla¬

tion of the original and repeat data sets would identify the
maximally correlated linear transformations of the two judg¬
ment vectors and give the coefficient of correlation between
them.

Unfortunately, canonical correlations could not be

computed for each auditor-subject due to singularities in
some of the individual 4 by 3 ratings matrices.

Further¬

more, since canonical correlation returns correlations for
each canonical variate, the interpretation of canonical
correlations would be problematical.

Thus, canonical corre¬

lations between original and repeat sets are not reported.
To facilitate comparison to the criterion in Hypothesis
1,

a univariate approach was used for the test.

was considered an independent event, yielding

Each rating
12 observa¬

tions per set for each subject's originals and repeats.

137

Since we are interested in complete replicability across
different administrations of a single case, a strong argu¬
ment can be made for the application of a univariate para¬
metric correlation technique here.

Many auditing firms now

employ multi-dimensional internal accounting control evalua¬
tion procedures.

A central reason behind such approaches is

the notion that ratings or analyses of the individual dimen¬
sions can be translated directly into implications for the
audit plan.

It is thus important that reliability exist at

the individual evaluation dimension level.

We therefore

feel completely justified in using Pearson product-moment
correlation coefficients in the test of Hypothesis 1.

Test of Hypothesis _1.
Correlation coefficients were calculated for each sub¬
ject.

These ranged from -.524 to 1.

value obtained for subject 14

The obvious outlier

(-.524) was omitted, leaving a

range of .066 to 1 with a mean of

.715.

The complete set of

intra-judge correlations appears in Table 10.
The null hypothesis tested here is that the mean intra¬
judge correlation obtained is less than .8.

Since the test

is performed on correlations, a straightforward t-test is
inappropriate.

As the absolute value of a population corre¬

lation increases, the probability density function of meas¬
ured correlations becomes more and more skewed.

Thus, sim-
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For Individual Subjects
Subj ect#

PPM

Subject#

PPM

Subj ect#

PPM

1

.716

11

.898

22

.658

2

.758

12

.798

24

.764

3

.942

13

.963

25

. 688

4

. 659

14

-.524

26

.533

5

.611

15

.564

27

.680

6

.066

17

.771

28

. 524

7

.636

18

.701

29

.869

8

.903

19

.799

31

.130

9

.944

20

.785

10

.938

21

1.000

(Subjects 16,

23, and 30 omitted;

see Chapter VII.)

Summary (computed without Subject 14 ioutlier value)
Range of Correlations:

.066 to 1.00

Mean of Correlations:

.715

Quartiles of Correlations:

.636
I

Table 10
Intra-Judge Correlations

.758
II

•
•

.898
III
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pie t-tests become less and less reliable
530)].

[Kays

(1963, p.

Therefore, we tested Hypothesis 1 using a t-test on

the z transform of the mean correlation as defined by the
Fisher r to z transformation
z = .5

[Hays (1963, p.

530)], where:

[loge (1 + r)(1 - r)-1]

The t-test is then based on the z-value —
_z(r) - z(rho)_
square root ((1/(N1»3))(1/(N2)))
where

is the number of score pairs per comparison and
is the number of comparisons

Thus,

for Hypothesis 1,
z(r)

= z(.715)

z(rho) = z(.800)

= .8973
= 1.0986

z = -3.19, P>z = .0007
90 percent confidence interval:

.661 < r <

.762

N1 = 12 and N2 = 28

Discussion.
The test above indicates that a lower correlation could
only be expected with a .07 percent probability given a true
population correlation value of .8.
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The null hypothesis of no significant difference is
rejected,

thus Hypothesis 1 is rejected.'*'

The obtained mean intra-judge correlation is signifi¬
cantly less than the values reported by Ashton
Joyce

[1976]

(.863), and Ashton and Brown

[1974]

[1980]

(.81),

(.91).

The

test above indicates that the obtained outcome is not con¬
sistent with an underlying auditor test-retest reliability
of at least 80 percent.

Auditor Consensus

Our second criterion of ideal judgment expertise is con¬
sensus.

Experts should tend to agree with one another.

In

our statement of Hypothesis 2, we acknowledged a ceiling for
inter-auditor agreement:
H^:

Auditor subjects will produce judgments with a mean
interjudge correlation not significantly less than
their average intra-judge correlation

Analytical approach.
Once again, canonical correlations were precluded due to
singular matrices.

Pearson product-moment correlation coef¬

ficients are used to test the hypothesis.

^The deletion of the original-repeat data for the two
subjects assumed to have artificially produced identical
ratings did not affect the outcome of the hypothesis test.
Their inclusion would have resulted in only a slightly
higher mean z(r).
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Our interest in this case is in how predictable a judge's
ratings are, based on those of his peers.

Since the corre¬

lation is a standardized covariance term, high correlations
will be obtained as long as the subjects
ple'.

That is,

'agreed in princi¬

if subject A's ratings are x standard devia¬

tions from his mean rating and subject B's ratings are x
standard deviations from his mean rating, over all ratings,
the correlation between scores for the two is 1.

This out¬

come will result regardless of the actual rating values.

.

Test of Hypothesis 2

Pairwise correlations over 48 ratings (16 cases x three
dependent variables) were calculated for all pairs of sub¬
jects.

These correlations ranged from -.020 to .909.

The

means of correlations for each subject versus all other sub¬
jects were also determined.
to .729.

These values ranged from .156

The grand mean inter-judge correlation was

.619.

Table 11 summarizes these results.
Once again,

the hypothesis does not allow for a simple,

straightforward test.

The strict formulation of the null

hypothesis is that the z transform of the grand mean of
inter-judge correlations is less than the z transform for
rho=.715 (the mean correlation obtained for the intra-judge
case).

Using the t-test described above,

the following

results were obtained:
t
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Subject#

Average
Correlation With
Other Subjects

Subject#

Average
Correlation With
Other Subjects

1

.67

17

.64

2

.73

18

.64

3

.60

19

.60

4

. 65

20

. 61

5

.67

21

.50

6

.60

22

.68

7

.69

23

.46

8

.58

24

.35

9

.64

25

.72

10

.71

26

.67

11

.62

27

.64

12

.69

28

.68

13

. 60

29

.73

14

.16

30

. 69

15

. 68

31

.68

(Subject 16 excluded from analysis; see Chapter VII. )
Range of Mean Correlations:

.156 to .729

Grand Mean Correlation:

.619

Quartiles of Mean Correlations:

.605
I

Table 11
Inter-Judge Correlations

.660
II

.695
III
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z(r)

= z( .619)

= .7234

z(rho) = z(.715) = .8973
z = -24.351, P>z = .0001
90 percent confidence interval:

.612 < r <

.626

Nx = 48, N2 = 435

Discussion.
Hypothesis 2 cannot be accepted.

In this case our sample

correlations could only be obtained with a .01 percent prob¬
ability if the true across-rater reliability equalled the
.715 mean intra-judge correlation.
of rho (.715)

The hypothesized value

lies well above the upper bound of the 90 per¬

cent confidence interval.
This result indicates that,

for this study, at least,

predicting ratings across auditors would result in a signif¬
icantly lower success rate than predicting within auditors.
Thus,

the auditor subjects in this study could not be inter¬

changed without affecting the ratings for the cases, even
after 'recalibrating'.

Judgment Bias

The third criterion used to assess ideal evaluation
expertise is the notion of bias.

It must be emphasized that

the term bias is used here in the technical sense.
are defined as systematic

Biases

(as opposed to random) differences
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between an auditor's actual ratings and the expected value
of such ratings, where the expected value of a rating is the
mean of all auditor ratings on the same case.
This rather strict approach is used here to measure and
real

'differences of opinion'

among the auditor-subjects.

To the extent that such differences exist, judges become
less interchangeable.
interchangeable,

To the extent that judges become less

they depart more from our definition of

ideal expertise, which is posited by Hypothesis 3:
H-:

Auditor subjects will produce judgments with insig¬
nificant bias effects.

Biases as defined above can manifest themselves in the
ratings data in two ways.

First, significant differences

among the means of the ratings when the data is grouped by
subject indicate leniency biases.

That is, they indicate a

tendency among the auditors to rate significantly higher or
lower,

in general, than the mean ratings produced by all

auditors.

However,

since the rating scales were 'open,'

auditor-subjects were free to 'choose'

the

their own mid-points.

Thus significant differences among the subjects' mean rat¬
ings do not necessarily indicate any disagreements in prin¬
ciple .

The second kind of difference potentially captured

in the ratings data is what may be termed cue sensitivity
bias.

This bias is the result of a tendency to overempha¬

size, underemphasize or reverse the interpretation of a par-
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ticular cue in comparison to its true relationship to the
criterion variable.

Thus, cue sensitivity biases would

result in significant differences among the means of the
ratings for each subject-cue combination.

Analytical approach.
The biases described above are assessed via the MANOVA
test methodology introduced in Chapter VII for the examina¬
tion of booklet version effects.

Since subjects represent a

random variable, mixed model error hypotheses are used
[Tatsuoka (1971, p.

199)].

In this case, leniency biases are examined through the
null hypothesis of equality of rating centroids for the data
grouped by subject.

Cue biases are examined through the

investigation of subject-cue interaction effects.

Test of Hypothesis 3_*
The results of the above tests are given in Table 12.
The main effect for centroid differences by subject was
significant at the .01 percent level.

A more important

result is that all of the subject-cue interactions were also
significant at a probability of .01 percent.

Discussion.
The 'no bias'

null hypothesis was strongly rejected.

Leniency biases existed in our sample.

However, as stated

146

Test for Equality of Group Centroids

Source*

Lambda

F-value

d.f

P>F

•

S

.1512

9.76

87,

964

.0001

SxEC

. 5499

2.45

87,

964

.0001

SxSBC

.2817

5.84

87,

964

.0001

SxFR

.2914

5.65

87,

964

. 0001

SxPR

. 2949

5.59

87, 964

. 0001

* Note: S indicates subjects
EC indicates environmental constraints
SBC indicates system boundary constraints
FR indicates feedback regulators
PR indicates programmatic regulators
x indicates interaction

Table 12
Test of Hypothesis 3

above, this is of relatively minor consequence.

The

significant subject-cue interactions indicate that the dif¬
ferences in ratings across subjects and across cue levels
did not vary in parallel.

Thus, reactions to cues depended

on the particular auditor involved,
interchangeable, even in principle.

i.e., auditors were not
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Interpretation of the First Research Question Test Results

The hypotheses tested above were based on the implicit
assumption in normative auditing theory that auditors are
internal accounting control evaluation experts.

The cri¬

teria used to measure expertise in these hypotheses were
based on an ideal notion of expert judgment.
All three hypotheses were rejected.

The stability of

ratings by individual auditors across repetitions of the
same case was not consistent with an underlying test-retest
reliability of

.8.

Even so,

the auditor subjects'

ratings

in this exercise were more consistent within auditors across
time than across auditors.

Furthermore,

the overall pattern

of the responses to individual cues differed from subject to
subject.
The results indicate that the auditors'

behavior in the

experimental task could not be characterized as that of
ideal experts.
What does the outcome here indicate about auditor evalua¬
tion of internal accounting control?

First of all,

it does

not mean that we should necessarily reject auditor evalua¬
tion of internal accounting control as a useful part of the
audit process.

The notion of

'ideal expertise'

is probably

beyond reasonable expectations for most situations requiring
judgment.

Our results do not indicate that the behavior of

our auditor subjects was inconsistent with the definition of
what might be called

'practical expertise.'

In fact,

the
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results of the tests above add to the accumulating evidence
in support of the conclusion that auditors compare quite
well to other professional groups in the exercise of
pert'

'ex¬

judgment.

Our results also show that there is substantial room for
improvement in auditor internal accounting control evalua¬
tion, however.

In the absence of a more objective assess¬

ment of internal control quality,

it is important that audi¬

tor evaluations demonstrate a high level of consensus.
improvement in auditor consensus is to be forthcoming,

If
it

will have to build upon a common core of auditor agreement
that already exists.

As indicated by Ijiri and Jaedicke

[1966], auditor consensus implies a uniform understanding of
cause-effect relationships across individuals.

In other

words, consensual control evaluation requires that auditors
share a common model of relationships between classes of
controls and system stability.
The second research question in this study is centrally
concerned with such relationships.

Thus, before we attempt

to integrate our observations about auditor evaluation
expertise with the results of previous studies,

it is appro¬

priate that we first look at the tests of hypotheses based
upon our systems model of internal accounting control.

CHAPTER

IX

TESTS OF HYPOTHESES INVESTIGATING
THE SYSTEMS MODEL

This chapter presents the tests of the hypotheses drawn
from the systems model of internal accounting control out¬
lined in Chapter V.

Recall that the model describes cause-

effect relationships in the internal accounting control
area.

In the generation of the hypotheses tested here it is

used as a positive model of auditor internal accounting con¬
trol evaluation behavior.

The basic logic underlying this

application of the systems model can be summarized as fol¬
lows :
1)

the systems model captures cause and effect rela¬
tionships in the internal accounting control
area;
2) the mean ratings of auditor-subjects can be
interpreted as surrogates for auditor consensus;
3) auditor evaluation consensus is likely to be
based on the identification of and reaction to
basic cause and effect relationships in the
internal accounting control area; and, thus,
4) relationships among the mean ratings of the audi¬
tor subjects should be predicted by the systems
model.

Thus these hypotheses are designed to address the second
major research question underlying this thesis:
Can the systems model of internal accounting control cap¬
ture the evaluation behavior of auditors in a carefully
varied set of hypothetical situations?

Unlike the situation in the previous chapter, most of the
149
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hypotheses to be tested below are phrased in the conven¬
tional manner.

Thus we will employ the standard criterion

for assessing significance in the five propositions investi¬
gated in this chapter (i.e., an alpha = .05).
However,

the tests below represent the first attempt to

investigate or verify the model of internal accounting con¬
trol relationships outlined in Chapter IV.

Since we are

looking for potentially useful relationships to be studied
in greater detail at a later date. Type II error (the error
of incorrectly accepting the null hypothesis)
be more noxious than Type I error.

is deemed to

Thus the ’benefit of the

doubt' will be given to the acceptance of the hypothesis
when the results are marginally significant.
This chapter employs the same basic format as Chapter
VIII.

Each of the five propositions is recapitulated and

discussed and then the concomitant hypotheses are tested.
The outcomes of the tests are then interpreted and dis¬
cussed.

The chapter ends with a summary of the test results

and an integrated set of conclusions.

Proposition 2

The systems model was based on a central assumption which
became proposition 2:
P^:

The object of internal accounting control procedures
and techniques can be characterized as a single
goal: system stability.
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To test this proposition,

the following hypothesis was

devised:
:

Auditors' ratings on the three dependent variables
will be captured by a single underlying dependent
factor *

If the critical parameter of internal accounting control
is some notion of stability,

then systematic variations in

the mean auditor ratings on each dependent variable should
reflect some aspect of stability.

Thus,

systematic varia¬

tions in the mean dependent vector due to manipulation of
the independent variables should associate highly with a
single 'underlying'

stability factor.

Analytical approach.
The logic of the argument above may be misleadingly sim¬
ple.

The rationale implicit in the identification of three

dimensions of internal accounting control by the Commission
on Auditors'

Responsibilities

[CAR, 1978]

and the Special

Advisory Committee on Internal Accounting Control
1979]

may be interpreted,

[SACIAC,

in the systems model's terms, as

the need to view stability from more than one perspective.
As that perspective changes,

the auditor may see the threat

to stability clearly or vaguely and as greater or lesser.
In order to test Hypothesis 4, however, we will examine
the more restricted case where the three dependent variables
are seen as simply three different alternatives for measur-
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ing the same thing, like Farenheit and Celcius measures of
temperature.

If this is the case, then the joint distribu¬

tion defined by the ratings should be degenerate.
A relatively straightforward way to expose a degenerate
joint distribution is principal components analysis (PCA).
PCA uses a variance maximizing process to reassign the vari¬
ance in the distribution to a set of principal axes

(dimen¬

sions) which are transformations of the original variables.
In terms of PCA, Hypothesis 4 may be viewed as a prediction
that all but an insignificant portion of the total variance
accounted for by the three dependent variables will load
onto a single principal axis.

PCA will define three prin¬

cipal axes here, ordered by the amount of variance they
account for in the 3x3 correlation matrix for the 480

(30

subjects x 16 cases) observations on the three dependent
variables.

Test of Hypothesis _4.
The analyses described above were performed on the 480 x
3 data matrix.

The results of that analysis are presented

in Table 13.
The null hypothesis tested here is that more than one
significant underlying factor exists.

The assessment of

significance is a sticky problem in PCA.

One popular method

available for testing our hypothesis under PCA is Kaiser's
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Principal Components Analysis

Correlation Matrix

Authorization

Authorization

1.0
.501

Safeguarding

.610

.501
o
•
1—1

Accounting

Accounting

.769

Safeguarding

.610
.769
1.0

Principal Components

Component

Eigenvalue

Percentage
Accounted for

Cumulative
Percentage

1

2.259

75.3

75.3

2

.525

17.5

92.8

3

.216

7.2

100.0

Table 13
Core Factors in Control Judgments
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rule.

Kaiser's rule is that only components with

eigenvalues equal to or greater than one are significant.
Under this criterion,

the null hypothesis is rejected.

Discussion.
The analysis above constitutes some evidence in support
of Hypothesis 4.

Note that the first principal component

extracted accounts for over 75 percent of the variance in
the correlation matrix.

Given the exploratory nature of our

investigation, we feel justified in accepting Hypothesis 4.
As stated at the beginning of this section, the proposi¬
tion above is more difficult to test than it at first
appears.

It is possible that the test investigated the

wrong question.

The idea that stability is the appropriate

goal of internal control does not necessarily imply that all
stability reduces to the same dimension.

For example,

in

the internal accounting control area stability may be the
goal within accounting, authorization,
assets, not vice versa.

and safeguarding of

If this is indeed the case, any

cross-auditor differences in the definitions of those terms
could have obscured the relationships in the tests above.
Consider the following scenario.

Although the rating

dimensions were defined in the test booklet,

the subjects

would, of course, bring their own interpretations.

It is

quite conceivable that a subject might have an internal def-
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inition of the accounting goal which is broader than the one
given in the booklet (e.g., accurate recording of all events
rather than just bona fide transactions).

If this were the

case, he might view accounting stability as unaffected when
unauthorized transactions took place, given that they were
recorded with accurate numbers in the right classifications.
Of course,

this explanation is purely speculatory.

There

are many limitations to the acceptance of Hypothesis 4, not
the least of which is that the relations posited by the
hypothesis may be wrong.

Nonetheless, the marginal amount

of support indicates that it would be inappropriate to
reject the notion of stability as a universal control goal
at this time.

Propositions 3-6

In Chapter VII, a methodology employing multivariate
analysis of variance (MANOVA) was introduced without much
explanation or discussion.

MANOVA is the basic analytical

technique used in the tests of the hypotheses based on Prop¬
ositions 3-6.

It is appropriate that the rationale behind

that approach now be discussed in some depth.
MANOVA is a statistical technique designed to examine
"...

the

'realness'

of the differences among the population

centroids or mean vectors"
224)]

[Cooley and Lohnes

(1971, p.

based on a set of observations on a dependent vector,
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or group of variables.

Propositions 3-6 involve predictions

about differences in the mean ratings of auditor-subjects
given the presence or absence of certain cues in various
hypothetical settings.

Hence, the analysis of these pre¬

dictions is well matched to the application of MANOVA.
The hypotheses derived from those four propositions
define the following linear model for MANOVA, written in
matrix notation.^"

Y, . = M + H + E
_ki_
where:
Y^ is the vector of dependent variable scores on
case k for subject i.
M is the vector of grand means of the dependent
variables.
H is the vector of hypothesis effects, which is
composed of main effects and interaction effects.
E is the vector of errors.

The analyses below are based on the results of a four
sample, repeated measures, four-way factorial MANOVA with
treatments defined as environmental constraints, system

The model is only outlined here. MANOVA is directly
analogous to ANOVA in its formulation.
For more information
on the computations involved in MANOVA, the interested
reader is referred to Bock [1975] , Cooley & Lohnes [1971],
and Tatsuoka [1971].
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boundary constraints, feedback regulators, programmatic reg¬
ulators, and all first-order interactions.

The four samples

are defined by the different booklet versions.
The expectation expressed by each hypothesis to be tested
below is that the mean vectors at each level of the hypoth¬
esized effect (i.e., the presence or absence of each treat¬
ment) will

(or,

for one proposition's hypotheses, will not)

differ significantly from the grand centroid.

The signifi¬

cance of such differences is determined through the use of
an exact F-ratio

based on Wilks'

Lambda.

Under this

approach, differences in mean vectors are determined by the
relationship between the dispersion in the ratings due to
error and the sum of the dispersions due to the hypothesized
effect and error.

This relationship is calculated through

the ratio of the determinants of the sum-of-squares-andcross-products (SSCP) matrices so defined:
SE
SE + SH.
As the hypothesized effect becomes smaller in relation to
the error effect,

the ratio approaches 1.

Thus, a Lambda of

1 indicates no hypothesis effect and smaller values indicate
larger hypothesis effects.
An important feature of the test,
error.

then,

is the nature of

The one-sample repeated measures MANOVA design may

be viewed as a special case of the mixed model MANOVA
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design.

Subjects are considered the random factor while

treatments are fixed factors within subjects.

Due to the

fact that observations are taken under all treatment combi¬
nations for each subject, a pooled within cells SSCP matrix
based on independent observation cannot be determined.
Thus, the significance of the random effects cannot be
strictly determined.
examined.

However, the fixed effects can be

As in the typical mixed model MANOVA,

priate error matrix for the calculation of Wilks'

the appro¬
Lambda is

the SSCP matrix for the interaction of subjects and the
hypothesis treatments
example,

[Tatsuoka (1971, p. 198)].

Thus,

for

in the test for effects due to the manipulation of

the environmental constraints variable, Lambda equals:
SSCPSE
"sscpse+sscpe~

where SSCP indicates a sum of squares and crossproducts
matrix

[cf.

note 2,

supra]

and the subscript E indicates the

matrix for the environmental constraint main effects while
the subscript SE indicates the matrix for subject-environ¬
mental constraint interaction effects.

The remarks above relate to MANOVA in general.

Two spe¬

cific features of the tests in this chapter are introduced
below.
In Chapter VIII, our interest was in rating behavior dif-
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ferences across auditors.

In this chapter we investigate

differences across rating situations.

Such a perspective

implicitly requires an examination of similarities across
our auditor subjects.

The hypothesis tests in Chapter VIII

indicated that there is a lack of uniformity in the audi¬
tors'

actual ratings.

Since the rating scale was "open,”

the subjects were able to set their own neutral

(zero)

points as well as the sensitivity of the scale (i.e.,
'value' of a one point change in ratings).

the

In order to iso¬

late relative rating similiarities from unique scale inter¬
pretations in the following hypothesis tests, we will employ
ratings which have been standardized within each subject.
Thus, each subject's transformed score is equal to the dif¬
ference between his original rating and his grand mean rat¬
ing, divided by the standard deviation for his set of rat¬
ings.
Since the four booklet versions comprise a between sub¬
jects factor,

the error matrices in each hypothesis test are

pooled across the four versions.

In the previous MANOVA analyses,

the assumptions underly¬

ing the centroids tests were generally ignored.
ever,

Here, how¬

the issue deserves closer attention.

MANOVA involves two general assumptions.

First, the

observed dependent vectors are assumed to be independent
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random samples from a multivariate normal distribution.
Second, it is assumed that the error SSCP matrix is propor¬
tional estimate of a single common population covariance
matrix.
In the MANOVA tests in this chapter, the dependent
hypothesis vectors can be viewed as the mean observation
vectors of 30 independent mean observation vectors.

Thus,

the multivariate central limit theorem would indicate that
the dependent vectors employed in each hypothesis test at
least begin to approximate a multivariate normal distribu¬
tion
Korin

[Bock (1975, p.
[1972]

111-112)].

Furthermore,

Ito

[1969]

and

have each reported that non-normality has lit¬

tle effect on the centroids test.
Since each of the treatments in this study vary through
only two levels and all observations are made on the same
pool of subjects, each error matrix is by definition propor¬
tional to the estimate of a single common covariance matrix.
Indeed, Jerome L. Myers

[personal communication]

has pointed

out that the analysis of a multivariate repeated measures
design with all treatments having only two levels reduces to
a series of simple Hotelling matched pair T

2

analyses.

Under this view, main effects tests are tests of differences
and interaction effects tests are tests of differences
between differences.
Thus, the MANOVA tests for equality of centroids used in
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this chapter are congruent with the underlying assumptions.

In addition to the examination of centroids called for by
the hypotheses,

the rest of this chapter also includes an

examination of variability of ratings across treatments.
Although no hypotheses about variability were presented in
this thesis,

such information is interesting in itself since

it may be interpretable in terms of rater uncertainty and/or
inter-rater consensus.

MANOVA tests on absolute deviations

will be used to examine variation equality in each case.
this chapter. Hotelling's matched T

2

In

analyses will be used

for this purpose since they allow a direct examination of
the source of departures from parallelism.
strictly exploratory.

This process is

No conclusions about the actual dif¬

ferences in variability of ratings can be presented.
theless, this

None¬

'snooping' may be of value in determining the

direction of future research.

Having covered the methodology to be used in the follow¬
ing tests in some depth, we now turn to those analyses,
themselves.

_.

Proposition 3

The third proposition introduced in Chapter V was:
P^:

All constraints and regulators will have significant
individual effects on auditors' judgments.

Four hypotheses were devised to test this proposition.
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Hj.:

-Environmental constraints will have a significant
main effect in the analysis of the auditors' judg¬
ments .

Hg:

System boundary constraints will have a significant
main effect in the analysis of the auditors' judg¬
ments .

H_:

Feedback regulators will have a significant main
effect in the analysis of the auditors' judgments.

Kg:

Programmatic regulators will have a significant main
effect in the analysis of the auditors' judgments.

If the systems model has any validity, the auditor-sub¬
jects'

ratings should reflect sensitivity to manipulation of

the four basic independent variables.
Analytical approach.
The tests of Hypotheses 5-8 employ the MANOVA methodology
discussed above, as the use of the term 'main effect' would
indicate.
Tests of Hypotheses 5-8.
The relevant results from the MANOVA plus results from
the associated variability tests are summarized in Table 14,
below.
Null hypotheses for equality of centroids for all four
main effects were rejected at a significance of p<.0001,
well beyond our criterion of 5 percent.
Discussion.
Based on the above analyses, then, Hypotheses 5-8 are all
accepted without reservation.

The tests indicated that the

manipulation of the main causative variables in the model
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Test for Equality of Centroids

Source*

Lambda

F-value

d. f.

P > F

EC

.4155

11.2520

3,

24

. 0001

SBC

.1064

67.1924

3,

24

. 0001

FR

. 0686

108.5428

3,

24

.0001

PR

.1085

65.7393

,

24

.0001

3

Exploratory Tests for Equality of Mean Deviations

T-squared

F-value

d. f.

EC

3.502

1.4792

3,

237

.2194

29.037

2.6328

3,

237

. 0498

FR

7.726

6.2926

3,

237

. 0005

PR

7.704

2.8664

3/

237

. 0368

SBC

* EC
SBC
FR
PR

:
:
:
:

V

Source

Environmental Constraint
System Boundary Constraint
Feedback Regulator
Programmatic Regulator

Table 14
Tests of Main Effects of Independent Variables
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resulted in significant differences in the ratings.

We thus

conclude that each of these variables (environmental con¬
straints,

system boundary constraints, feedback regulators,

and programmatic regulators) has some consensual validity.
The ratings demonstrate that the auditor subjects behaved as
if they believed that the presence or absence of each vari¬
able would have an effect on the quality of internal
accounting control.
Of course,

it is possible that the subjects reacted to

the manipulation of these variables simply because the
design of the task 'told’

them that they should.

However,

three subjects reported in the debriefing section of the
booklet that the presence or absence of corporate ethical
standards (the operationalization of environmental con¬
straints in this study) had little or no effect on their
ratings.
claim.

Actual review of their ratings verified this
Thus,

in some instances at least, there is evidence

that subject ratings are due to the subject's understanding
of the conceptual situations and not his perceptions of the
expectations of the experimenter.
The environmental constraint effect deserves some addi¬
tional scrutiny.
cant,

Although the effect was highly signifi¬

the size of the effect was relatively small in compar-
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ison to the other main effects.
opposed to .89,

.93, and

(Its eta-squared was

.58 as

.89 for the other main effects.)

2

One possible explanation for this is the fact that the
operationalization of this variable in the experiment (cor¬
porate code of ethics) may have been interpreted by some of
the subjects as a psuedo-constraint.

The use of a code of

ethics in this study was motivated by its frequent emphasis
in CAR and SACIAC.
does not,
of the

However, the existence of such a code

in itself,

foster compliance.

'state of the art'

In fact,

in a study

in internal control published

after the collection of data for the present study, Bernard
J. White

[1980b, p.

389]

concluded that some extant codes

are "... haphazard in design, superficial in content, and
packaged

...

in a fashion which clearly does not encourage

serious reading or facilitate understanding."

He interprets

management's intentions in such cases as simply "...
forma gesture ..."

[p.

389]

a pro

to be used to disavow culpabil¬

ity for the unethical or illegal conduct of any of the com¬
pany's employees.

White believes that employees see through

such charades easily.

It is reasonable to assume that audi¬

tors would be able to make similar judgments.

2

Thus some

Wilks multivariate generalization of Fisher's etasquared multiple correlation coefficient is equal to
1-lambda.
Wilks [1932] originally proposed this statistic
as a summary measure of the amount of variance in the depen¬
dent vector accounted for by the independent variable.
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subjects might have downplayed the importance of the code of
ethics in the absence of more information about its

'packag¬

ing'.

T

2

tests on these treatments revealed interesting results

except in the case of environmental constraints.
ence of the system boundary constraint variable,

The pres¬
the feed¬

back regulator variable, and the programmatic regulator
variable apparently reduced uncertainty (i.e.,
subject consensus)

increased

as indicated in the across-the-board

reduction in rating variances.
Given this information,

it seems that the presence or

absence of these variables had secondary effects on the
variability of the subjects'

ratings as well as the primary

effect on ratings means.

Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 dealt with the contingent effects of con¬
straints :
P.:

Auditor judgments will display an interaction effect
between environmental constraints and system bound¬
ary constraints that is less than the sum of their
individual effects.

Two hypotheses were drawn from this statement.
Hg:

Auditor judgments will display a significant inter¬
action effect between environmental constraints and
system boundary constraints.
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q: The mean judgment ratings for environmental
constraints crossed with system boundary constraints
will be less than the sum of their mean main
effects.
Analytical approach.
Once again the MANOVA methodology discussed above was
used to test Hypothesis 9.

Hypothesis 10 is really a corol¬

lary to Hypothesis 9 and is simply examined by the calcula¬
tion of differences between the present/present group means
and the sum of the differences between the present main
effects mean vectors and the grand mean vector.
Tests of Hypotheses 9-10.
The same factorial MANOVA again supplied the evidence to
test Hypothesis 9.

T

2

tests were also run on the rating

data grouped by the four constraint combinations.

The rele¬

vant results from these tests are summarized in Table 15.
Discussion.
The centroids test indicates that the mean vectors are
not significantly different.

Therefore, although the direc¬

tion of the differences in the test of Hypothesis 10 are in
the expected direction,

the lack of support for Hypothesis 9

does not allow the acceptance of either hypothesis.

We

indicated earlier that the operationalization of environmen¬
tal constraints in this study may have been a weak one.
This may partially account for the absence of a significant
constraints interaction effect.
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Tests On Centroids

A. Equality of Centroids

(Hypothesis 9)

Source

Lambda

F-value

d. f.

P > F

ECxSBC

. 9007

.8819

3,

.4665

B. Direction of Differences
Ef feet

24

(Hypothesis 10)

Dependent Variable
Authorization Accounting
Safeguarding

. 3007
. 7661

.0615
.1686

.0688
.1973

Sum of Mains

1.0668

. 2301

. 2661

Interaction

(.9725)

( .2166)

( .3080)

. 0943

.0135

EC, Main
SBC, Main

Int.

< Sum

-.0419

Exploratory Test for Equality of Mean Dispersions
Source*

T-squared

F-value

d. f.

P > F

SBC/EC

1.5509

. 5083

3,

117

.6814

EC/SBC

1.1966

. 3921

3,

117

. 7620

* Bar notation (/) is used to denote, for A/B,
"A level differences across levels of B"

Table 15
Test of Constraints' Interaction Effects
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The T

2

test implied that variability of ratings was about

equivalent for the four conditions.

That is, mean absolute

deviations were not significantly different for the systems
boundary constraint differences under the presence or
absence of the environmental constraint variable, or vice
versa.

Thus,

the presence or absence of one constraint did

not seem to affect auditor consensus on the meaning of the
other constraint.

Proposition 5.
The fifth proposition in Chapter V defined a negative
expectation:
P;.:

Auditor judgments will not display any significant
interactive effects between constraints and regula¬
tors .

The following four hypotheses were derived from this
proposition.
H,,s Auditor judgments will not display any significant
interaction effects between environmental con¬
straints and feedback regulators.
Auditor judgments will not display any significant
interaction effects betweeen environmental con¬
straints and programmatic regulators.
H,.>: Auditor judgments will not display any significant
interaction effects between system boundary con¬
straints and feedback regulators.
Auditor judgments will not display any significant
interaction effects between system boundary con¬
straints and programmatic regulators.
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Analytical approach.
The now familiar MANOVA approach was used to test for the
lack of effects posited above.

Recall from the discussion

of the approach used in the tests of the first three hypoth¬
eses that testing such negative expectations is less
straightforward than testing for significant differences.
However, we will proceed as if the situations were exactly
the same and simply 'invert'

the outcome of the usual null

hypothesis test.
Tests of Hypotheses 11-14.
The set of first-order interactions defined by the
hypotheses above were tested through the repeated measures
MANOVA discussed earlier.
performed.

The associated T

2

tests were also

The results of these analyses are presented in

Table 16.
Discussion.
The null hypotheses of significant centroids effects for
all the constraints/regulators interactions can clearly be
rejected.

Therefore Hypotheses 11 through 14 are accepted.

These results tell us very little in themselves.

Based

on the results of the judgment experiments reviewed in Chap¬
ter III, we would have to conclude that the prior probabil¬
ity of finding interactions in this study was quite low.
Nonetheless, these interaction tests yielded insignificant
eta-squares of

.01,

.12,

.03, and

.22.

They add to the evi-
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Tests for Equality of Centroids

Source

Lambda

F-value

ECxFR

. 9887

. 0917

3,

24

ECxPR

. 8800

1.0910

3,

24

. 3728

SBCxFR

. 9721

.2300

3,

24

. 8739

SBCxPR

. 7875

3,

24

. 1180

i
i
i
i

V

d. f.

2.15

'

.9590

Exploratory Tests for Equality of Mean Deviations

T-squared

F-value

d. f.

FR/EC

3.7619

1.2329

3,

117

. 3006

EC/FR

1.8206

. 5967

3,

117

. 6224

PR/EC

4.0591

1.3303

3,

117

. 2671

EC/PR

5.4135

1.7742

3

,

117

.1541

SBC/FR

. 8379

. 2746

FR/SBC

3.7596

1.2321

3,

117

. 3009

SBC/PR

3.0361

. 9950

3,

117

. 3990

PR/SBC

2.1069

. 6905

3, 117

. 5632

i

V

Source*

3,

117

. 8444

Table 16
Tests of Constraints-Regulators Interaction Effects
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dence supporting a general congruence between the relation¬
ships prescribed in the systems model and the evaluation
behavior of the auditor subjects.
T

2

tests for all interactions indicate no differences in

consensus.

Proposition 6.
The last proposition stemming from the systems model
posited a contingent relationship between regulator types:
Pg:

Auditor judgments will display an interactive effect
between feedback regulators and programmatic regula¬
tors that is greater than the sum of their individ¬
ual effects.

This prediction was decomposed into two hypotheses.
H.^: Auditor judgments will display a significant inter¬
action effect between feedback regulators and pro¬
grammatic regulators.
H,^: The mean judgment ratings for feedback regulators
crossed with programmatic regulators will be greater
than the sum of their mean main effects.
Analytical approach.
The same method was used to test the hypotheses in this
case as was used in the case of Hypotheses 9 and 10.
Tests of Hypotheses 15-16.
The factorial MANOVA again provided the vehicle to test
the hypothesis of significant interaction effects.

A T

2

test was run on the data grouped by regulator combinations.
Table 17 supplies the particulars for the tests of these
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Tests on Centroids

A. Equality of Centroids

(Hypothesis 15)

Source

Lambda

P-value

d.f.

? > F

FRxPR

.7434

2.7619

3,

.0633

B. Direction of Differences
Effect

24

(Hypothesis 16)

Dependent Variable
Authorization Accounting
Safeguarding

FR, Main
PR, Main

.2065
.2154

. 6423
. 5084

.5017
.4444

Sum of Mains

.4219

1.1506

. 9461

Interaction

. 4203

1.2186

. 9385

. 0679

. 0424

Int.

> Sum

-.0016

Exploratory Test for Equality of Mean Deviations
Source

T-squared

FR/PR

1.7722

PR/FR

7.8438

d.f.

P > F

.5808

3,

117

.6328

2.5707

3,

117

. 0566

F-value

Table 17
Tests of Regulators' Interaction Effects
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hypotheses.
Discussion.
The centroids test indicated a significant interaction
effect just short of the standard criterion alpha of .05.
Furthermore,

the direction of differences agrees with that

predicted by Hypothesis 16

(with a minor exception in the

ratings on the authorization variable).

Since the tests

here are a first attempt at investigating the systems model,
we consider the synergistic effect of the two outcomes suf¬
ficient to allow acceptance of hypotheses 15 and 16.
The finding* of an interaction effect here deserves some
discussion.

As in the case of an interaction in ANOVA,

interaction effects indicate a significant departure from
parallelism, which,

in turn,

indicates that examination of

the associated main effects may be uninterpretable.

This is

due to the fact that a significant interaction means that
the behavior of each variable under scrutiny strictly
depends upon the level of the other variable.
An examination of the lack of parallelism discovered
here, however, reveals that this formal restriction is not
of consequence in this case.
Figure 6 shows that, under all regulator levels and on
all dependent variables,

the slope of the line for the

change in a regulator's presence is positive.

Thus,

the

main effect for each of the regulator factors still holds in
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the broad sense.
Figure 6 also shows that the interaction is due to rat¬
ings on accounting and safeguarding scales.
for the authorization variable,

In both cases

the difference between the

means only increases by a standard score value of .0058 from
one regulator environment to the other.

It also demon¬

strates that the interaction, as hypothesized,

is due to

feedback and programmatic regulators enhancing each others1
effects.

That is, the end points of each pair of lines are

farther apart in the
sent'

environment.

'present'

environment than in the 'ab¬

In each of the accounting and safeguard¬

ing cases, the change in the difference between means in
approximately .25.
This finding fits quite well into the overall pattern of
congruence between the predictions of the systems model and
the rating behavior of the subject sample.

The impact of

this support is probably greater than that supplied by any
other single hypothesis test in this thesis.

The configural

use of cues has often been subjectively reported in judgment
experiments.

However,

it has been quite elusive in the

mathematical analysis of those judgments.

It is logical

that such effects will be found only in instances where they
'make sense'

in the given judgment task.

The systems model's prediction of this interactive effect
was logically deduced from a set of general premises.

Thus,
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the indication of such effects constitutes substantial sup¬
port for the model.

The fact that the analysis used to

detect this effect was based on an implied consensus of a
pool of judges reinforces that support.

The results of the T

2

test indicate that significant dif¬

ferences may exist among the mean absolute deviations of
standardized ratings for programmatic regulation depending
upon the presence or absence of feedback regulation.

Interpretation of the Second Research Question Test Results

The intent of this chapter was an assessment of the abil¬
ity of the predictions of the systems model of internal
accounting control to capture the rating behavior of the
auditor-subjects in this experiment.

The five propositions

derived from that model were tested via 13 hypotheses.

The

results of those tests are summarized in Table 18.
The systems model proved to be a relatively good pre¬
dictor of the rating behavior of the subjects involved in
this study.

Only in the case of Hypothesis 9 were the

results clearly not congruent with the spirit of the propo¬
sitions.

In four cases, analyses of mean absolute devia¬

tions indicated that manipulation of independent variables
had affected the variability of the auditor-subject ratings.
Although no a priori expectations about variability of judg-
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Hypothesis

Status

4:

Auditor's ratings on the three depend¬
ent variables will be captured by a
single underlying dependent factor.

Accepted

5:

Environmental constraints will have a
significant main effect in the analysis
of auditor's judgments.

Accepted

6:

System boundary constraints will have a
significant main effect in the analysis
of auditor's judgments.

Accepted

7:

Feedback regulators will have a signifi¬
cant main effect in the analysis of
auditor's judgments

Accepted

8:

Programmatic regulators will have a
significant main effect in the analysis
of auditor's judgments.

Accepted

9:

Auditor judgments will display a signifi¬
cant interaction effect between environ¬
mental constraints and system boundary
cons traints.

Not Accepted

10:

The mean judgment ratings for environ¬
mental constraints crossed with system
boundary constraints will be less than
the sum of their mean main effects.

Not Accepted

11:

Auditor judgments will not display any
significant interaction effects between
environmental constraints and feedback
regulators.

Accepted

12:

Auditor judgments will not display any
significant interaction effects between
environmental constraints and program¬
matic regulators.

Accepted

Table 18
Summary of Research Findings for the Tests
of Hypotheses Related to the Systems Model
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Hypothesis

Status

13:

Auditor judgments will not display any
significant interaction effects between
system boundary constraints and feedback
regulators.

Accepted

14:

Auditor judgments will not display any
significant interaction effects between
system ooundary constraints and program¬
matic regulators.

Accepted

15:

Auditor judgments will display a signifi¬
cant interaction effect between feedback
regulators and programmatic regulators.

Accepted

16:

The mean judgment rating for feedback
regulators crossed with programmatic
regulators will be greater than the sum
of their mean main effects.

Accepted

Table 18
Summary of Research Findings for the Tests
of Hypotheses Related to the Systems Model
(continued)
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ments were offered in this thesis,

it is intuitively

appealing to account for the detected differences in disper¬
sion in terms of rater uncertainty.
Following a line of reasoning similar to that of Ijiri
and Jaedicke

[1966], we can view the amount of consensus

among auditors on a judgment as an indication of relative
certainty.

Thus, when the dispersion of judgments is

smaller in situation A than in situation B, we can surmise
that there is more certainty or agreement about the meaning
of the cues in situation A than in situation B.
For the main effects, the resulting interpretation is
fairly straightforward.

The only difference between the two

sets of cases was the presence or absence of the system
boundary constraint or one of the regulator variables.
Thus,

the presence of the variable must have reduced uncer¬

tainty about the stability of the internal accounting con¬
trol system in the cases,
'present'

since the mean deviation for the

condition was less than that of the

'absent'

con¬

dition .
A general explanation for the regulator interaction was
offered above.

The problem in the interpretation of that

interaction lies in determining the source of the difference
in uncertainty.

Does the difference parallel a true differ¬

ence in interpretability or is it due simply to a halo
effect?

The question cannot be resolved here, but it is a
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rather important one since it bears directly on the issue of
auditor consensus.

This is a problem worthy of further

investigation.

The discussion above has been concerned with the effects
that features of the evaluation situation have on auditor
consensus.

Another perspective on auditor consensus is

addressed in the next chapter.

In that series of analyses,

the effects of various auditor demographics in mediating
consensus are examined.

CHAPTER

X

POST HOC ANALYSIS OF
BACKGROUND EFFECTS

The purpose of this chapter is to report on certain
after-the-fact explorations of the ratings data.

These

explorations are concerned with the differences across audi¬
tor judgments on identical sets of cases where ratings are
grouped according to the subjects'

demographic attributes.

No models were used to suggest what the sources of those
differences might be.

Rather, the explorations were guided

by the results of prior research on internal accounting con¬
trol evaluation and by deduction.

The hypotheses which were

tested in the preceding chapters were model-driven.

How¬

ever, all of those hypotheses were concerned with the simi¬
larities in the judgments of the auditor subjects (i.e.,
parallels across auditors).

In this chapter, we are inter¬

ested in examining how differences among auditors lead to
differences in their judgments.
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Prior investigations of such differences have generallylacked model-based hypotheses.1 This may be accounted for by
two facts:
1) Normative auditing theory does not address the issue
of individual differences in the application of pro¬
fessional judgment; and
2) Most theories of individual behavior and/or decision
making are either too vague or too limited to be unam¬
biguously applied to the complex task of audit judg¬
ment.
These barriers prevented the development of useful
hypotheses about individual differences in judgment behavior
in the current study as well.

Therefore,

the analyses below

and any explanations offered for the observed results must
be regarded as no more than contemplation and conjecture.
The objective of this activity is to develop some useful
generalizations about factors that mediate internal account¬
ing control evaluation judgment.

This chapter is divided into three sections.

The first

section reviews the earlier research which motivated the
present analyses.

It also outlines the logic of the analyt¬

ical approach used here and distinguishes it from that of
those prior studies.

The second section reports the out-

1The only previous major studies on internal accounting
control evaluation that have tested specific hypotheses have
been Mock and Turner [1979] and Weber [1977].
Even in those
investigations, however, the hypotheses did not spring from
any overt, unifying theory.
They were apparently drawn only
from 'common sense' and the results of other research.
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comes of the demographic effects tests for this study.
Those results which are deemed to be more reliable or to
illustrate potentially useful generalizations are presented
in detail.
review.

The remaining results are only given a cursory

The final section of this chapter summarizes and

integrates the possible explanations and implications of the
more important results.

Examining Demographic Effects

The statement that differences between individuals lead
to differences in their decisions sounds nearly tautologi¬
cal.

Considering the great variety of experiences and psy¬

chological traits that individuals apply to decisions,

it

may be surprising that their decisions are ever similar at
all.
Prior studies on internal accounting control evaluation
have looked into the effects of both demographic and psycho¬
logical variables.

Mixed results have been obtained and no

consistent pattern of effects has yet emerged.

A review of

the major investigations in the area may help to identify
the sources of the conflicting results.

Ashton

[1973J

examined the effects of audit experience

and firm affiliation on summary decision weight estimates
(standardized regression coefficients and R-squared values).
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He found that groups defined by firm affiliation were
"remarkably similar"
ues.

[1973, p.

133]

in terms of mean R

2

val¬

However, he found an indication of some differences

when examining the sum of the average beta weights for the
two most important independent variables (both related to
segregation of duties).

Ashton also found similar results

for grouping by years of audit experience, although the
indication of differences was weak.
The firm differences seemed to cleave along the distinc¬
tion between local and regional/national firms.

Local firm

auditors placed less weight on the two segregation of duties
variables.

Ashton posited that this effect was due to the

typical client profile for each type of firm.

Local audi¬

tors were more likely to see small clients whose size might
force them to collapse control-incompatible tasks into sin¬
gle positions.
'learn'

Thus,

these auditors would have had to

to place more emphasis on other internal control

techniques and procedures.
In terms of experience, Ashton found that his high expe¬
rience group (>_4 years)

relied less on the segregation of

duties variables than the other groups

(1, 2,

and 3 years).

He suggested that this might be due to a better understand¬
ing of the critical control relationships on the part of the
more experienced auditors.

However,

it is important to

note that auditors typically do not have primary resposibil-
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ity for internal accounting control evaluations until their
third year.

Thus, Ashton's examination seems to have

focused on the distinction between little and no evaluation
experience.
Joyce

[1976]

investigated firm affiliation differences.

He reported that firm affiliation seemed to affect decision
weights for one of his five independent variables
52].

[1976, p.

All of his subjects came from Chicago vicinity offices

of national firms.

He offered no explanation for the

observed differences.
Mock and Turner
audit experience,

[1979]

examined years of audit and non¬

the profile of typical clients, and audi¬

tor special/advanced training.

Based on univariate analyses

of mean planned audit sampling sizes for four different
audit tests,

they found suggestions of effects for both

kinds of experience, but not for client profile or auditor
training.
results.

Again,

no explanations were offered for these

Mock and Turner,

like Ashton,

used subjects of

relatively little audit experience (78 percent under 4.5
years),
Weber

[1977]

tested hypotheses relating audit experience,

dogmatism, and risk-taking propensity to the accuracy of
probability distribution estimates for inventory dollar
errors,

the average range of those estimated distributions,

decision time, decision confidence, extent of audit plan,
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and decision flexibility.

He found significant effects for

experience versus raw materials inventory accuracy and
extent of audit plan.

However, both of these were opposite

in direction from the hypothesized effects.

Dogmatism was

related to a significant effect on one of eleven dependent
measures.

Risk-taking propensity paralleled significant

differences in four of six tests, but in each instance the
direction of the effect was the opposite of the one hypoth¬
esized .
Of the studies cited above, only Weber [1977]

posited any

a priori expectations about the effects of individual dif¬
ferences.
intuition.

Even these were drawn, to a large extent, from
2

Furthermore, none of these studies offered any

detailed ex post hypotheses for the effects found except for
Ashton

[1973].

The investigation of individual difference effects
described below was also performed without hypotheses.
fact,

In

these analyses were only secondary objectives in the

design of the current study.

Nonetheless, some interesting

patterns emerged in the investigations which seem to be

2

Weber's hypotheses were apparently based on the
results of prior studies on decision making.
After review¬
ing a broad list of variables studied, he summarized his own
selection of factors to be tested by stating "...[my] intui¬
tion prevaled in the choice of variables investigated"
[1977, p. 35].
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accounted for by useful generalizations.
The analyses here are too rudamentary to be directly con¬
cerned with intervening psychological variables.

Since we

are involved in basic, exploratory analyses we care only to
find out if groups of subjects classified under certain
objectively defined attributes produce different ratings.
Therefore,

the analyses below study only the ratings vectors

produced by the auditor subjects grouped only by demographic
classes.
Nine attribute categories are involved, as given in chap¬
ter VI:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)

Firm
Rank
Office location
Number of years audit experience
Number of years commercial experience
Client size experience
Client mix experience
Types of specialized training
Internal accounting control evaluation experience

Items 1,

4,

cited above.

5,

6,

7, and 8 were adapted from the studies

Items 2,

3,

and 9 were added to provide a

slight reorientation of perspective for examining possible
experience and client exposure effects.
Two aspects of differences in auditor judgments are
explored here.
centroids.
ity.

One kind of analysis is performed on group

The other kind is performed on group variabil¬

The logic behind these analyses is as follows.

The centroids tents ask if the mean ratings vectors dif-
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fer significantly based on the demographic groupings.

These

tests seek to determine whether the various demographic
characteristics mediate the judgment values.

Significant

differences of this kind indicate that the members of each
group make different decisons, on average,

than their count¬

erparts in other groups.
The variability tests ask if the level of agreement among
auditors differs from group to group.

These tests seek to

determine whether the various demographic attributes mediate
the consensus of decisions within groups.
is desirable for two reasons.

Such information

First, our discussions of

ideal expertise suggest that greater auditor judgment con¬
sensus is preferable to less consensus.

High consensus sup¬

ports a conclusion that auditors are reliably interchange¬
able measurement 'instruments.'

Second, auditor consensus

can be viewed as a surrogate for objectiivity, as Ijiri and
Jaedicke

[1966]

have proposed.

This use of the notion of

objectivity is based on the accountant's definition,
verifiability by an independent observer
(1966, p.

476)].

i.e.,

[Ijiri and Jaedicke

Individual judges will give highly similar

evaluations of the same object or event only if they share
an effectively similar "measurement system"
dicke (1966, p.

476)].

[Ijiri and Jae¬

Thus, relatively more consensus

within one demographic group than another may indicate that
the shared attribute within that group has enhanced the
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development of a single and well defined measurement model.
The use of the two tests resulted in at least one signif¬
icant finding on each of three of the demographic dimen¬
sions.

These results are discussed below.

Results of Demographic Analyses

The ex_ post analyses revealed four major findings related
to the nine attribute dimensions explored.

The major find¬

ings, by attribute, were:
1)
2)
3)

Significant centroid differences by firm affiliation;
Significant centroid and variability differences by
rank and years of audit experience; and
Significant variability differences by extent of
internal accounting control evaluation experience.

These results are presented below in detail.

First, how¬

ever, a review of the analytical approach is in order.

Analytical approach.
The centroids tests in this chapter are one way MANOVA
analyses.

The MANOVA model used here is a simple version of

the approach used in Chapter IX.

In each case, only one

effect is tested — the main effect of the demographic vari¬
able under scrutiny.

Also as in Chapter IX, variability of

ratings will be examined in each case.

Since there are no

interaction effects tested, and since more than two groups
are examined in two cases, MANOVA on the absolute deviations
within groups is used for the variability tests instead of
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the T

2

methodology employed in Chapter IX.

Although the analyses are completely exploratory, the
null hypotheses of equal centroids and equal variability
will be considered to be rejected if the outcomes are sig¬
nificant at five percent.

It is felt that such indications

are worthy of further pursuit.
occur,

When 'significant1

results

the potential sources of the observed differences

will be discussed.

Firm affiliation.
In order to determine whether the mix of firm backgrounds
affected the rating responses the above tests were performed
on the rating data grouped by firm.

The results of that

analysis are summarized in Table 19.
These results indicate that firm background does have an
effect on the evaluation of internal accounting control (or,
at least,

it did on the ratings in the current study).

Examination of the mean ratings by firm seems to indicate a
trend of increasing conservatism (i.e., falling ratings)

as

the simplicity of the firm's typical evaluation method
increases

3

(i.e., firm D to firm A).

3

Note, however, that

Recall that the subjects' firms ranged in their stan¬
dard approaches to internal accounting control evaluation
from a highly unstructured, judgmental approach (Firm A) to
a highly structured, algorithmic approach (Firm D).
See
Chapters II and VII for details about these standard proce¬
dures .
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Exploratory Test for Equality of Group Centroids

Source

Lambda

F-value

d. f.

P > F

Firm

.9532

2.5473

9,

. 0077

1153

Mean Ratings by Firm/Type
Evaluation
Firm/ Type

Authorization

Accounting

Safeguarding

A - Judgmental

5.021

5.083

4.398

B - Guided
Judgment

5.688

5.813

5.475

C - Multi-Criteria
Guidance

6.033

5.674

5. 313

D - Multi-Category
Algorithm

5.813

5.771

5.854

Exploratory Tests for Equality of Mean Deviations
Source

Lambda

F-value

d.f.

P > F

Firm

.9887

.6002

9,

. 7988

1153

Table 19
Tests of Firm Affiliation Effects
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this trend is not without exception and that in no case is
there as much as a whole point difference between the high
and low mean ratings.
The multivariate eta-squared for this effect is only
slightly above four percent (.0468).

This indicates that

firm affiliation accounts for slightly less than 5 percent
of the within-firm variation pooled across firms.

Much of

that variation, however, must be due to the variety of eval¬
uation situations each subject faced.
iation effect seems to be ‘real’

Thus, the firm affil¬

as well as statistically

significant.
It is interesting to note that the variabilty differences
by firm fall well outside of our criterion of significance.
This evidence suggests that these firms have been equally
effective in establishing within-firm consensual evaluation
models.

This fact serves to underline the differences

across firms.
The mean differences may be due to something akin to
decision confidence or risk aversion (as a company policy)
rather than operational differences in the firms' models.
Nonetheless,

if these differences translate into different

audit plans,

the implication is that not all of these firms

are equally efficient in their audits.
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Subject rank and years of audit experience.
Prior studies have indicated that some differences in
internal accounting control evaluation behavior may be due
to audit experience.
subjects'

In the current study,

the level of

audit experience was generally higher than in pre¬

vious investigations.

As one would expect,

it was also

closely aligned with subject rank.
Table 20 cross-classifies the subject group by the three
ranks and four audit experience levels used to produce the
test groupings.
For each of these two sets of groupings one-way MANOVAs
were run on the rating data.

Table 21 contains the results

of those tests.
Both sets of groupings yielded significant results on
both kinds of tests.
nificant'

Grouping by rank produced a more 'sig¬

centroids result, a higher multivariate eta-

squared, and a less sharp distinction in terms of absolute
deviations.

A look at the mean ratings by rank and the

associated mean absolute deviations discloses an interesting
pattern.

The seniors and managers were both more conserva¬

tive and less uniform in their ratings than the supervisors.
We may speculate about the causes of these observed results
as follows.
Recall that prior studies have found mild indications of
differences in judgments along the dimension of years of
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^^"\^Rank
Years\^_

Senior

Supervisor

Manager

Total
Number

<5

7

0

0

7

5-6

0

5

2

7

6-7

0

2

5

7

>7

0

2

7

9

Total Number

7

9

14

Range of
Years

Average of
Years

3-4.5

5-7

3.94

5.61

30

5.5-17

3-17

7.61

6.03

Table 20
Cross-Classification of Subjects
by Rank and Years of Audit Experience
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Exploratory Tests for Equality of Group Centroids

Source

Lambda

F-value

d.f.

P > F

Rank

. 9620

3.0995

6, 950

. 0053

Yrs of
Audit
. 9636
Experience

1.9652

9,

.0399

1153

Mean Ratings by Group
Group

Authorization

Accounting

Safeguarding

Senior

5.5625

5.6339

5.2411

Supervisor

5.9236

6.1181

5.8542

Manager

5.7366

5.4509

5.5313

< 4 yrs.

5.5625

5.6339

5.2411

5 yrs.

5.4643

5.6518

5.4196

6 yrs.

6.2321

5.9375

6.0000

_> 7 yrs.

5.7500

5.5833

5.5764

Table 21
Tests of Rank and Years of Audit Experience Effects
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Exploratory Tests for Equality of Mean Deviations

F-value

d.f.

Rank

. 9740

2.1032

6, 950

. 0501

Years of
. 9424
Aud i t
Experience

3.1606

9,

.0010

l

V

Lambda

T)

Source

1153

Mean Absolute Deviations by Group
Group

Authorization

Accounting

Safeguarding

Senior

2.0379

1.8208

1.7047

Supervisor

1.5965

1.5290

1.5177

Manager

1.8884

1.7501

1.6116

< 4 yrs.

2.0379

1.8208

1.7047

5 yrs.

1.7526

1.8203

1.6932

6 yrs.

1.7679

1.7076

1.8036

> 7 yrs.

1.7917

1.6400

1.3574

Table 21
Tests of Rank and Years of Audit Experience Effects
(Continued)
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experience.

Audit experience is assuredly associated with

some learning effects, which might account for increased
consensus with increasing experience levels.

Relatively new

auditors may also tend to be overly conservative in their
evaluations until they become confident in their judgment.
Beyond some threshold, however,
ences should begin to diminish.

such experience differ¬

At that point, experience

may become secondary to responsibilities or evaluation goals
in determining inter-auditor differences.

Since the indi¬

viduals called supervisors in this study are typically oper¬
ational leaders,

their primary concerns are probably short¬

term efficiency and output.

Their responsibilities may lead

them to risk higher reliance on internal controls during the
audit.

Their concentration on immediate goals may mediate

greater consensus.
Managers, however, hold broader responsibilities and
long-term firm goals.
to them.

Audit risk concerns are more salient

These concerns may cause them to become more con¬

servative.

The greater uncertainty they face from their

broader perspectives may reduce consensus.
Therefore, both rank and years of audit experience may be
real mediators of evaluation behavior due to the fact that
they surrogate intervening variables of learning, responsi¬
bility (attention direction), and decision goals.
course,

the scheme above is purely speculative.

Of
However,

it
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seems to be worthy of consideration.

Subjects1

control evaluation experience.

If experience is truly a critical determinant in evalua¬
tion behavior,

then internal control evaluation experience

might be the most appropriate type of experience to examine.
Obviously,

the extent of such experience is positively

correlated with both rank and extent of general audit expe¬
rience.

Thus,

the tests on this demographic variable were

erected around the distinction between slight and extensive
evaluation experience.

A criterion of ten occasions of pri¬

mary evaluation responsibility was chosen to discriminate
between these two classes.

Thus, the analyses below were

conducted on low experience

(£10 times, n=ll)

experience

(£11 times, n=19).

versus high

The results appear in Table

.

22

The centroids test misses the five percent alpha cri¬
terion by only a third of a point, but the multivariate
eta-squared is less than a tenth of a percent.
formal significance aside, no 'real'

Questions of

difference seems to

exist.
There does seem to be a real difference in variability,
though.

A look at the mean absolute deviations indicates

that the basic difference between the two groups is that the
more experienced evaluators agree with each other more.
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Exploratory Test for Equality of Group Centroids
Source

Lambda

Evaluation
Experience .9993

F-value

d.f.

P > F

.1158

3,

.0536

476

Exploratory Test for Equality of Mean Deviations
Source

Lambda

Evaluation
Experience .9630

F-value

d.f.

P > F

6.0939

3,

.0005

476

Mean Absolute Deviations by Group
Group

Authorization

Accounting

Safeguarding

Low

2.1152

1.8547

1.8161

High

1.6859

1.6696

1.5291

Table 22
Tests of Evaluation Experience Effects
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Thus, perhaps evaluation experience simply makes the
auditor more consistent, since with only minor differences
in ratings centroids across the groups, mean accuracy does
not seem to be an issue.

This result fits in well with Web¬

er's conclusion that "... experience contributes only
slightly to decision accuracy"

[1977, p.

175].

Conclusions

The analyses presented above indicate that there are a
variety of background influences that affect an auditor's
evaluation of internal accounting control,
context of the present study.

at least in the

The background variables

investigated here were due to experience and learning as
opposed to personality or intelligence.
The implications of the significant effects detected in
the analyses above cannot be assessed in any simple way.

No

a priori hypotheses about background variable effects were
presented in this thesis.

Nonetheless, some speculations

about the potential sources of detected differences were
included in the discussions above.
Those conjectures extend two basic generalizations:
1) The environment in which evaluations take place (the
auditor's firm and his position or responsibilities in
it) may have a pervasive influence on the evaluation;
and
2) The experience that the auditor brings to the engage¬
ment may determine the consistency with which he eval¬
uates internal accounting control.
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The indication of demographic effects is important since
it implies that,

to a certain extent, audit judgements are

based not on characteristics of the situation, but on the
characteristics of the evaluator.

More rigorous investiga¬

tion of such differences seems warranted for future
research.

Before discussing the kind of future research that this
study suggests,
que the study,

it is appropriate that we review and criti¬
itself.

Thus, we now turn to the last chap¬

ter of this thesis, which attempts to put the total study
into perspective.

CHAPTER

XI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Any reasonable piece of research is flawed.

The limita¬

tions imposed upon empirical investigation by time, cost,
availability of subjects and data, and, of course,

the

researcher's own skill and depth of knowledge present insur¬
mountable restrictions and sticky problems of choice.

None¬

theless, we continue to do research in the hope that the
eventual preponderance of evidence will yield some insights
into the activity in the world around us.
What is taken as that preponderance of evidence changes
as one's perspective changes.

In testing a hypothesis, each

experimental observation is taken as a piece of evidence.
In determining the
results,

the outcome of each hypothesis test now becomes the

evidential unit.
however.

'meaning' of the experiment's overall

This is not the highest level of analysis,

One study is not a complete dissection of the

examined behavior.

Instead,

the results of a single experi¬

ment must be integrated with evidence from other investiga¬
tions before reliable generalizations can be made.
Various interpretations of this study's results, devel¬
oped from the

'local'

point of view only, were presented in

the preceding chapters.

It is now appropriate that these
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results be placed into a broad perspective.

Accordingly,

this chapter presents an overview of the research described
in this thesis.
The chapter begins with a summary of- the research problem
and the approach to that problem taken in this study.

The

second section below discusses the problems inherent in the
experiment that restrict the interpretations of the results.
The next section presents the author's broad conclusions and
conjectures about the research findings,
with the results of prior research.

integrating them

The chapter concludes

with a discussion of the implications of the study for both
practice and research.

Review of the Research Problem and Approach

We began this thesis with an examination of the recent
resurgence in interest in the task of internal accounting
control evaluation.

This renewed interest was concluded to

be the result of both (a)

increased public sensitivity to

and scrutiny of corporate behavior and

(b)

the auditing pro¬

fession's attempts to deal with the increasing complexity
and cost of performing an audit.
A review of the professional literature revealed that
little information was generally available about either cur¬
rent control practices or the conceptual models used by

207

auditors that evaluate such controls.'*' Furthermore,
found that,

it was

although the auditing practice abounds with dis¬

parate descriptive schemes and evaluation approaches, no
general theory describing control cause and effect existed.
As a result of this determination, three basic research
questions were posed:
1) Can auditors be characterized as experts in the area
of internal accounting control evaluation as defined
by the consistency, consensus, and lack of bias in
their judgments?
2) Can a systems model of internal accounting control
capture the evaluation behavior of auditors in a care¬
fully varied set of hypothetical situations?
and
3) Which background and experience variables mediate
auditors' internal accounting control judgments?
These three questions really examine two sides of the
same coin.

That is, they each seek information about the

level of systematic knowledge about internal accounting con¬
trol cause and effect shared by auditors.

In order to examine either question,

some basic measure¬

ment model needed to be chosen or developed.

The measure¬

ment of behavior cannot be achieved without a theory that
describes the behavior and thus tells the researcher what to

1After this study was completed, an extensive "state of
the art" review of internal control practices in U. S. cor¬
porations was published [Mautz, e_t aJL, 1980] .
That study
does provide a comprehensive overview and discussion of
extant internal control practices.
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observe.
Therefore,

the model of internal accounting control rela¬

tionships based on systems theory concepts was developed in
Chapter IV.

This model was used to both (a) make several

predictions about rational behavior in internal accounting
control evaluation,

and

(b)

guide the development of experi¬

mental materials and measurement methods.
The advantages of the model are seen as its generality of
application,

its internal consistency, and its ability to

classify internal accounting control system components from
several perspectives.

While traditional evaluation schemes

identify controls by the activities of which they are com¬
prised, the systems model classifies them by where they
reside in the system and by the effects they are intended to
produce.

It also pinpoints where those effects will be
*

felt.

The study was a mail administered experiment in which 31
experienced auditors from four major audit firms in six
locations were asked to make judgments on the reliability of
internal accounting controls in a series of hypothetical
situations.

These situations, or cases, resulted from the

orthogonal manipulation of four independent variables iden¬
tified by the systems model.

For each case, each auditor

was asked to rate the quality of control on each of three

2C9

different dimensions.

There were twenty cases; thus each

subject made a total of sixty judgments.
The test cases defined a fully crossed 2
repeated measures design.

4

factorial,

Four of the original cases were

repeated for each subject in order to allow the assessment
of his judgment consistency.
The results of the experiment were examined from several
perspectives.

First, the raw data was reviewed in order to

determine whether the experimental controls had been effec¬
tive, whether the subject group appeared to be representa¬
tive of auditors in general, and whether the subjects'
responses could be reasonably interpreted as reactions to
the experimental manipulations rather than reactions to the
particulars of the experiment or its administration.
ond ,

Sec¬

the hypotheses behind the study were tested and dis¬

cussed.

These examinations of the data were concerned with

similarities across auditor judgments.

Finally, the data

was explored to uncover differences among auditor judgments
according to demographic class membership.

Before reviewing the findings of this study and attempt¬
ing to glean their global meaning,

it is important to remind

ourselves of some of the limitations to interpreting those
findings.
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Limitations

Limitations in the kind of empirical research described
in this thesis may be grouped into two areas:
validity and analytical restrictions.

experimental

These two topics are

discussed in the following subsections.

Experimental validity.
The choice of experimental approach is a major determi¬
nant in the balance obtainable between internal and external
validity.

While both kinds of validity are highly desired,

the perspective on the relative costs of invalidity that
guided the design of this study can be summarized as fol¬
lows :
1) The generalizability of the results of a single study
is a moot point if the sources of the observed varia¬
tions in behavior are not identifiable.
2) The overall results of a single experiment are most
appropriately viewed as a single observation in the
validation of a particular theory.
3)

Consequently, the external validity of one study's
results are best assessed by their agreement with
those of other studies investigating similar events or
behavior, not necessarily by the naturalness of the
setting in which the events or behavior are observed.

4) Thus, the design of a single experiment should place
emphasis on internal validity by seeking the greatest
degree of control feasible.
This study's design incorporated proportionately more
energy into the maintenance of internal validity.

Examina¬

tion of the results of this study (especially in Chapter VI)
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led to the conclusion that the rating behavior of the audi¬
tor subjects was basically due to the manipulation of the
independent variables.

Further investigation showed that

other variables may have had an impact in the ratings, but
an attempt was made to identify them and estimate the magni¬
tude of their effects.

One important source of reduced con¬

trol was the use of a mail administration of the experimen¬
tal materials.

The impact of this lost control is not

determinable.
Returning to the external validity question,

then, we of

course accept that there are a plethora of restrictions on
the generalization of our results beyond the subjects and
situations in the current study.

Although the experimental

task was designed to simulate real evaluation situations,
the operationalizations of the independent variables and the
background data may have had little or no correspondence to
the cues auditors normally attend to.
ulation of the cues,

The orthogonal manip¬

the reduced set of information availa¬

ble, and the lack of auditor control over the information
set (in short, the artificiality of the exercise) may have
resulted in behavior that has only a moderate relationship
to real world behavior.
In fact,

the restricted set of dependent variables and

the use of a rating measurement probably bear minimal overt
resemblance to what most auditors actually observe and do in
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their evaluations of internal accounting control.
Nonetheless,

the specific dependent dimensions were cho¬

sen to be as generally familiar to the subjects as possible.
Also,

the use of a ratings approach facilitated the internal

validity of the results, since it did not incorporate cas¬
caded inference.
Another potential restriction on generalizability is the
fact that the subject sample was neither randomly selected
nor strictly stratified.

The review of the demographic

characteristics of the auditors in the sample, however, led
to the conclusion that those subjects provided a fair repre¬
sentation of auditors responsible for internal accounting
control evaluations.
Finally,

the massed cluster of twenty evaluations may

have affected the behavior of the subjects.

The concetrated

repetition of what would normally be a relatively infrequent
procedure could easily have resulted in an abnormal sensi¬
tivity to certain cues.

This effect might have been accen¬

tuated by the restriction of the subjects'

attention to four

specific cues.
The comments above are not an exhaustive list of the
validity limitations inherent in this study, nor are they
meant to be.

The point of this discussion has been simply

to acknowledge that such problems exist and to enumerate
some of the more salient ones.

We now turn to more techni-
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cal and specific problems in interpretation.

Analytical limitations.
Most empirical studies are performed with the intent of
forming some conclusions about relationships between concep¬
tual classes of events or behaviors.

Thus, a consideration

of general importance is whether the analytical technique
used to assess those relationships will be sensitive to
them.

It is critical that the analytical model be an appro¬

priate operationalization of the conceptual model.
In this study, several analytical techniques were
employed.

Although each of these approaches was determined

to be a logical choice to investigate the hypothesized rela¬
tionships,

there is no guarantee that some other approach

would not have provided a better fit to the data while still
capturing the spirit of the hypotheses (or, perhaps, expose
a worse fit to the data while better capturing the inten¬
tions of the hypotheses).
In particular,

three important potential limitations are

recognized here.
First,

the investigation of intra-judge reliability

sought to determine if auditors agreed with themselves in
fact.

The choice of

Pearson product-moment correlations as

the analytical technique thus seemed justified since it pro¬
vided a rather stringent test of that notion.

However,

if.
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as posited by Hypothesis 4, overall system stability is the
appropriate criterion on which to measure internal account¬
ing control effectiveness,

then agreement on summary depen¬

dent vectors, not individual variables, may have been the
more appropriate test approach.

A similar criticism can be

made of the inter-auditor reliability test.

Unfortunately,

the apparent multivariate approach of choice for those tests
(canonical correlation) was precluded due to characteristics
of the data.
Second,

2

the test of Hypothesis 4 examined the degree to

which the subjects'
stability.

ratings loaded on a single dimension:

However, as discussed in Chapter IX,

the princi¬

pal components analysis used may have been too sensitive to
differences of opinion among the auditor subjects.
Third,

the basic MANOVA model employed in this study was

a linear model.
cue usage,

Since some hypotheses predicted configural

the analytical technique should have been sensi¬

tive to such behavior.

However, the power of the linear

model may have overwhelmed all but the grossest configural
use of cues.

As Goldberg

[1968, p.

491]

concludes,

"...

judges can process information in a configural fashion, but
the general linear model is powerful enough to reproduce

2

...
Recall that some subjects produced ratings with singu¬
lar matrices.
This occured in both hypothesis test data
sets.
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most of these judgments with very small error."

This poten¬

tiality actually makes the finding of interactive regulator
effects more compelling and softens the impact of the fail¬
ure to find a significant constraints interaction effect.
However,

it also somewhat undermines the acceptance of

Hypotheses 11-14, which posited the absence of regulator by
constraint interactions.
f

Nonetheless,

the analytical approaches used in this the¬

sis were determined to be the best available under the cir¬
cumstances.

The model match they provided,

though far from

perfect, was deemed acceptable for our purposes.

We have identified a substantial list of real and poten¬
tial limitations in this study.

They have been presented as

a reminder of the fragility of the results of this investi¬
gation.

Nothing has been proved.

Certain facts have merely

been found to be true under the circumstances of this par¬
ticular experiment and the criteria established for its
analysis.

Having posted this caveat, we now proceed to dis¬

cuss the findings of this study in the convenient broad
terms in which the research was framed.

Conclusions

Some of the territory covered in this thesis had been
explored before and some had not.

In terms of the expertise
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issue,

this study adds to an already existing body of

evidence.

The demographic analyses in Chapter X provide new

perspectives from which to view the few bits of information
from previous investigations of such effects.

Finally, the

fairly broad support found for the systems model of internal
accounting control in the subjects'

behavior opens new fron¬

tiers for future research.
This section presents conclusions about the current study
as its results integrate with findings of similar research.
It is organized under the topics listed in the paragraph
above.

Auditor expertise.
Earlier in this chapter, an argument was made that the
results of an experiment are generalizable only to the
extent that they are cross-validated by the outcomes of
other studies.

Substantial evidence has accumulated on the

auditor expertise issue over the last several years.

The

results of this study help to bring the emerging patern of
results into relief.
The 90 percent confidence interval for mean auditor
test-retest reliablitv reported in Chapter VIII was
.762.

.661 to

The growing body of evidence seems to support the

validity of this outcome.

In fact,

the major previous stud¬

ies reported even higher mean correlations than this study.
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The mean value here was .715, while those reported by Ashton
[1974], Joyce
.863, and .91,

[1976], and Ashton and Brown
respectively.

[1980]

were .81,

(Note that these figures are

all above the confidence interval found for this study.)
Although we have no solid criterion against which to evalu¬
ate these findings,

it appears that auditors are relatively

stable in their internal accounting control evaluations.

There is substantially more information available on
auditor consensus in internal accounting control evaluation,
but it does not lead as clearly to a single implication as
the evidence on the consistency issue.

This study found a

grand mean inter-judge correlation of .619 in a 90 percent
confidence interval of .612 to .626.

Other studies using

ratings on internal control quality reported higher mean
correlations.
scales.

However,

those studies utilized six-point

The fact that those scales had fewer rating alter¬

natives than the one in this study might account for the
higher level of correlation.

Joyce

[1976]

reported a

cross-auditor correlation of .373 using a cascaded judgement
as his dependent variable.

Reckers and Taylor

[1979]

received judgments on five cases v/hich produced a mean
inter-judge correlation of .155.
reliability (0 to 100 percent)

The latter study used

as the dependent measure,

the greater number of rating alternatives may account for

so
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some of the lower correlation.
points out,

Also, as Ashton

[1979]

their use of complex, non-extreme cases is

.
.
3
likely to have biased the correlation downward.
Our own
findings of reduced consensus under situations with con¬
flicting cues would support such a conclusion.
The attempt to justify this disparity of results produces
some soft implications.

First,

it appears to be a general

truth that auditors agree with each other less than they
agree with themselves.

Second,

it also appears that cross¬

auditor consensus can be relatively high in instances where
cues provide redundant information (i.e., where cues are
congruent).

Finally,

it appears that consensus is reduced

when cues conflict and when judgments are cascaded.
Relatively little information is available about judgment
biases in the evaluation of internal accounting control.
Mock and Turner
cations)

[1979]

inferred

(from somewhat tenuous indi¬

the presence of halo and anchoring biases in audi¬

tor judgments.
tivity biases

This study found some evidence of cue-sensi¬
(differences of opinion on cause-effect

relationships, perhaps analyzable as differences in halo
effects).

Nonetheless, since bias indicates a systematic

deviation from accuracy and since no accuracy measure has

Reckers and Taylor [1979] did not use any cases with
highly congruent cues.
Many variables differed from case to
case, and there were conflicting cues in each case.
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been employed in these studies,

firm generalizations about

auditor judgment bias are, at this point,

impossible.

Demographic effects.
The results of the tests of demographic effects presented
in Chapter X did not so much add to an existing body of evi¬
dence as provide an alternative perspective from which to
view previous results.
Prior studies have detected judgment differences due to
firm affiliation.

Ashton

[1974]

speculated that the differ¬

ences he observed were due to differences in client expo¬
sure.

Joyce

[1976]

did not offer any explanation for the

differences he found,

although, since all of his firms were

from the same location and were of roughly equal size and
reputation,

it is unlikely that client exposure would

account for the difference.

Both of these outcomes may be

potentially explained by the account posed for the signifi¬
cant effects found in this study:

the firm's standard eval¬

uation approach may foster a particular attention selectiv¬
ity and a particular attitude toward reliance on controls.
Generalizations about the veracity of this explanation can¬
not yet be made, of course.
Prior studies have also found differences due to years of
auditor employment.

This study redefined that variable into

three dimensions: years of audit experience, auditor rank

220

and responsibility,

and extent of internal accounting

control evaluation experience.

Due to differences in the

experience levels studied and in the points of view pursued,
the results of this investigation and those of previous
studies cannot be easily reconciled.

However, none of our

results are inconsistent with those others.

Since other

studies have indicated that experience in itself has a mini¬
mal effect on accuracy,

the notion offered in Chapter X

appears to be as promising a path to follow as any.

The systems model.
The behavior of the subjects in this study genrally sup¬
ported the predictions of the systems model.

Although the

results of previous studies may be reinterpreted from the
perspective of the systems model,

their designs and the lack

of available raw data would make such an exercise pointless.
Until further study of the model is made, no strong state¬
ments about its validity can be made.

In the meantime,

the

systems model may be useful simply as a descriptive scheme.

Implications

This study has implications for both practice and
research.

The first subsection below presents a discussion

of the practical implications.

The second subsection dis¬

cusses potentially fertile areas for research as indicated
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by the results of this study.

Significance for professional groups.
This study has implications for at least four groups.
Managers,

systems designers, auditors, and regulative or

legislative bodies each have a vested interest in informa¬
tion about internal accounting control and its evaluation.
A review of the significance of this research from each of
their respective viewpoints is given below.
Managers should be interested in internal control and the
auditor's evaluation in order to assure basic information
reliability and in order to comply with the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act and SEC regulations.

Specifically,

interest should center on two applications.

this

First, the

development of some criteria and guidelines for internal
accounting control evaluation is necessary to allow manage¬
ment to assess the quality of its controls quickly, accu¬
rately, and efficiently.

An understanding of the auditor's

concerns in this area would assist management in 'cleaning
up'

its control system.

Second, manitaining controls on

which auditors would be more likely to rely would have imme¬
diate rewards in the reduction of audit time and cost.

The

model developed in this thesis and the fact that the auditor
subjects appear to validate it in their judgments can pro¬
vide management with the foundation on which to erect a set
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of general guidelines for evaluating and manitaining the
internal accounting control system.
Systems designers need similar guidance.

The traditional

design goals of effectiveness and efficiency require knowl¬
edge about the match between a system's goals and its proce¬
dures and about the marginal effects of additional controls.
The systems model addresses such issues.
Thus,

for both of the groups referred to above, the major

impact of this study is provided by the general support for
the systems model.

This model, even in its presently primi¬

tive form, can provide managers and systems designers with a
heuristic approach to the examination of internal control
problems.
Of particular interest to these groups should be the
indications in this study that programmed responses to feed¬
back signals seem to provide an extra measure of control
that neither control technique provides by itself.

Both the internal auditor and the independent auditor
need to 'objectivize'
ing control.

their evaluation of internal account¬

The guidelines in SAS 30 have expanded the

auditor's role and responsibility in the evaluation of
internal control.

Due to this responsibility change,

the

auditor needs a more complete and more general set of guide¬
lines for the evaluation task.

They also need to know more

223

about the potential sources of evaluation problems.
Those bodies that regulate the auditing profession need
to know how the policies they establish will affect auditors
and their behavior.

This study has particular salience to

their decisions on the various proposals relating to the
auditor's responsibilities in internal accounting control
evaluation.

Only the general audit-related responsibilities

seem to be well matched to the auditor's level of evaluation
expertise.

Given the

'fail-safed'

nature of the current

evaluation process, dysfunctional judgment will reduce the
efficiency of an audit, but not its accuracy.
The outcome of the experiment described in this thesis
has several implications here.
The analysis in Chapter X indicated that the auditor's
responsibilities or decision goals may affect his evaluation
of internal accounting control.

If this is so, changing the

auditor's internal accounting control evaluation responsi¬
bility will probably change the judgment he produces.
such a change may,
the new goals,

Since

in fact, be entirely appropriate given

it may make sense for the auditor to make

separate evaluations for different purposes.

To some

extent, this implication is reflected in the prescriptions
of SAS 30.
Our results show that the firm's evaluation approach or
philosophy may affect final evaluation output.

Thus, since
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such evaluations may now result in audit opinions in them¬
selves, cross-firm differences should be recognized or mini¬
mized.

The notion that such an

'opinion'

can be impartially

provided under current techniques is apparently based on an
overestimation of the auditor's expertise and an underesti¬
mation of the effects of non-situational variables in con¬
trol evaluation.

The solution may require the adoption of a

uniform evaluation approach.

Thus far, no such suggestion

has been considered.
In the process of refining evaluation procedures,
systems model may be a useful tool.

the

One implication for

such evaluation approach development comes from the fact
that subjects'

ratings were more disperse in the absense of

systems boundary constraints,

feedback regulators, and pro¬

grammatic regulators than they were in the presence of such
control features.

A prescriptive evaluation model would

benefit from the requirement of more detailed examination of
environmental constraints when overt boundary control proce¬
dures are missing, and of structured, but informal, regula¬
tion approaches when formal ones are absent.

The discussion above has listed some immediate implica¬
tions that this study of internal accounting control evalua¬
tion has for at least four professional groups.

This study

also has produced several results and conjectures that may
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provide a point of departure for more elaborate studies and
model-building.

In closing, we address these issues.

Significance to future research.
Research is a continuing incremental process.

True to

that notion, the research reported in this thesis builds on
previous work, offers new perspectives, and,
analysis,

in the final

raises more questions than it answers;

us confused at a higher level.

it leaves

The potential is for this

study to provide a take-off point for at least two major
programs of future research.
In the area of auditor judgment,

it is expected that fur¬

ther study of the impact of environmental constraints on
control quality (and control evaluation) will follow.

It is

expected that some of the issues identified but not dealt
with through a priori hypotheses in this work will be sub¬
jects for further study.

Prominent among these issues are

the following:
1)

Investigation of the effect of cue combinations on
auditor consensus may indicate the situations in which
internal accounting control evaluations have reduced
reliability.

2)

Investigation of the sources of differences across
auditors (in terms of mean decision values) may help
isolate sources of evaluation bias.

3)

Investigation of the non-situational sources of dif¬
ferences in auditor consensus may indicate ways of
enhancing consensus.
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We hope that the research here will also stimulate more
research on and development of macro-level models of control
cause-effect relationships.

The systems model developed in

this thesis seems to hold some potential in such future
endeavors.

Regardless of whether this particular model can

stand up to more rigorous testing, however, such a
down'

analysis model is worthy of pursuit.

'top-

While micro¬

level simulation of control systems may help us learn more
about the efficacy of individual techniques or clusters of
specific techniques, we will always require a global view¬
point in internal accounting control evaluation.

The devel¬

opment of a general, empirically substantiated top-down
model is a goal of the first order for auditing research.
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APPENDIX A

The Case Booklet

AUDITOR JUDGMENTS ON INTERNAL ACCOUNTING CONTROL

The study in which you are about to participate involves the
evaluation of specified aspects of internal control.

This audit task

relies on the professional judgment of experienced auditors.

The objective

of this study is to examine the range of auditors’ judgments brought about
by a limited variety of hypothetical auditing situations.
The results of this study will be examined in a group and, thus, your
specific responses will neither be known nor sought.

Nonetheless, the

value of this research and its potential contribution to our knowledge of
professional judgment and internal accounting control evaluation depends
on your complete cooperation and serious consideration in the task at hand.
Do not put your name anywhere in this booklet.
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I. Biographical Data.
1.

Your Firm's name:

2.

Your position title: __

3.

Your office location: __

4.

Number of years audit experience: _

5.

If you have ever worked in commercial industry, please complete the
following:
Type of position:

_

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

Internal auditor
Accounting/information systems, non-audit
Other (please specify):

Type of industry: _
Number of years experience: _
Years since leaving above industry: _
6.

Place an "X" in the box next to the category that best describes your
auditing experience in terms of client size.
[ ]

Primarily firms with sales over $30 million.

[

Primarily firms with sales under $30 million.

]

[ ]
7.

3.

.

9

Fairly even mix of over and under $30 million.

Place an "X" in the box next to the category that best describes your
auditing experience in terms of client mix.
[ ]

Primarily specialized industry (e.g., banks, insurance) please
specify: _

[ ]

Primarily a general mix of industries.

Place an "X" in the box next to each kind of advanced or specialized
audit training you have received.
[ ]

Advanced statistical techniques

( ]

Advanced computer auditing

[ ]

Other (please specify): __

Have you ever had primary responsibility for making preliminary
evaluations on the quality of a client's internal accounting control?
[ ]

No

[ ]

Yes

How often? __
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Task Instructions.
This section describes the output desired from you in this study.

the next section of

this booklet

(Section III),

In

the general description of

a single firm and its accounting system is presented.

A more detailed out¬

line of the firm's accounts receivable subsystem, and its relationship
the rest of the revenue cycle system, is then given.

to

In Section IV, a number

of different situations within this accounts receivable subsystem are set
forth.

In each of these possible situations you will be asked

to review the

accounts receivable subsystem as documented and assess its reliability.
You will be asked to assess the subsystem's reliability in relation to
each of the three broad objectives on internal accounting control outlined
by AICFA in the Reoort of the Special Advisory Committee on Internal Accounting
Control.

These objectives are classified as authorization,

asset safeguarding.

The

accounting, and

task in this experiment is a preliminary evaluation

of the reliability of each of 20 variations of an accounts receivable subsystem
in terms of its ability to achieve each of these objectives.
of this study,

For the purposes

then, you should employ the following criteria in each evaluation:

Authorization.
The subsystem's procedures and techniques should
assure that transactions occur only in compliance with policies
and criteria established by management such that, for example,
kinds of customers serviced, prices, credit, terms of sales, cus¬
tomer acceptance, sales-related adjustments, and billing and
collection practices are appropriate as determined under some general
or specific form of authorization.
Accounting.
The subsystem’s procedures and techniques should assure
that transactions are recorded as executed such that, for example,
all and only bona fide transactions are recorded, that they are
correctly classified, and that their recording is timely.
Asset Safeguarding.
The subsystem's procedures and techniques should
assure that assets are protected from loss, abuse, mishandling, or
misappropriation such that, for example, access to assets, records,
critical forms, and processing is restricted to responsible parties
and that records are inspected for accuracy in representing asset
values at regular intervals.
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In your own auditing experience, you nay or nay noc have been required
to make the kind of separate ar.d formal evaluations of reliability within a
particular subsystem as you will be asked to make here.

Since approaches and

terminology vary somewhat from firm to firm, a method of recording your response
has been chosen which allows you a good deal of freedom in framing your evalua¬
tion.

This method employs the familiar "scale of 1 to 10" rating that has

become so commonplace in our world.

In this case,

the scale represents

the

range of system reliability.
The scale is composed of a line broken into separate spaces by capital I’s.
The ends of the scale are labeled "unreliable" and "reliable" to indicate that
spaces to the right represent judgments of greater system reliability than spaces
to the left.

Each space is labeled with a number from 1 to 10.

task is to rate the reliability of

Thus, your

the subsystem in each situation from 1 to 10

by placing an "X" in the space that corresponds to your evaluation of
effectiveness of

the controls described in that situation.

your "Xrs" in the spaces and not on the dividers.

6

8

-r ,

not like this

-r

To give you some reference points,

the

Be sure to put

They should look like this

6
the end points of the scale are defined

as follows:
a.

A rating of 1 indicates a situation in which the combination
of controls is so poor that errors in authorization, accounting,
or safeguarding would be prevented or detected and corrected
only by chance.

b.

A rating of 10 indicates a situation in which the combination of
controls is so strong that no errors in authorization, accounting,
or safeguarding would go unprevented or undetected and uncorrected.

You should record your evaluations as they relate to these reference points.
You may use as many or few of the different ratings scores during the course of
the experiment as you see fit.
"fill up"

the rating scale.

The situations have not been designed

to

The rating scale has simply been chosen to allow

you as much freedom as possible in making your responses.
In order to give you a preview of the rating situation format, a structurally
similar evaluation page is presented on the next page.

Note that this example
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SITUATION
The

following

four

00

items complete the description
subsystem at Craftmate, Inc.

of

the

ITEM

1.

2.

3.

4.

payroll

YES

Have the client's personnel been informed of
their employer's ethical standards and are
formal statements of these standards posted
in visible locations?

NO

/

Are payroll disbursements authorized by indiv¬
iduals acting within the scope of their duties
and performed in accordance with appropriate
authorization guidelines?

/

Are individual earnings records verified against
the applicable payroll accounts in the general
ledger(including adequate investigation of
reconciling items) at reasonable intervals?

/

Are non-routine payroll disbursements (e.g.,
severance pay, retroactive pay, mispayment
corrections) handled according to formalized
operating procedures?

/

Please rate the payroll subsystem described in this
situation on its reliability in assuring appropriate:

AuthorizationReliable
Unreliable

AccountingReliable
Unreliable

Safeguarding-

5-5-±Unreliable

12

3

10

Reliable
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concerns a payroll subsystem.

6
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As you can see,

the case specific information

is given in the form of a series of questions with yes or no answers, similar
to a part of an internal control questionnaire.
The situations you will face provide similar information, which completes
the general description of the accounts receivable subsystem given in a set of
flowcharts at the end of the next section of this booklet.
Your task is to rate each situation by placing an "X" on each of the three
rating scales at the bottom of the page.

Recall that the only constraints on

your rating decision are the definitions of

the endpoints given above.

The

results of the experiment will be standardized before they are analyzed, so
you may define the "values" of a 3 or an 8, for example, as you see fit.
Other factors beside internal control may affect the plan of

the audit

program, but this study is not concerned with them or with the audit program
plan,

itself.

However,

Your ratings should reflect control quality/reliability only.

if it helps you in your consideration of each situation, you may

assume that:

III.

a.

Accounts receivable has been defined as a significant audit area;

b.

It has been identified as an area where reliance on internal controls
has potential in the audit program, and

c.

Such reliance would appear to be cost efficient, if warranted.

Common Background Data.
This section contains background information that does not vary from

one rating situation to another.

An effort has been made to provide you with

background information thac is as realistic as possible.
here is modeled on an actual firm.

The company described

However, both experiments and audits are

subject to time constraints.

Thus, you may be working with less information

that you would like to have.

Nonetheless, please give your best effort and

rate each situation as your training and experience dictate.

Also, please

attempt to base your decisions solely on the information given in this booklet.
Avoid making any extra assumptions.
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A.

SETTING
Assume that you have been assigned as accountant in charge of the

12/31/79 audit of Craftmate, Inc., a home power tools manufacturer.

You are

In the early stages of the audit and are performing the preliminary evaluation
of internal accounting control before embarking on the planning of the detailed
audit program.
This is your first year on this audit, but your firm has worked with
this client for the last five years.
unqualified opinion.

Each previous audit has resulted in an

You have worked with each of your assistants previously

and are quite satisfied as to their competence and conscientiousness.
Before making your preliminary evaluation of internal accounting
control in the accounts receivable subsystem, you expect to receive a few
more pieces of data.

Thus far, however, you have accumulated the information

summarized below.

B.

THE ECONOMY
The general consensus among economists is that the United States will

experience a recession in 1980.

There is some disagreement about the severity

of that recession and the time of its heaviest impact, however.

This is due

to some conflicting economic indicators, uncertainty about the energy situation,
and the possible role of government intervention into the economy during an
election year.
Inflation is currently running at a 13% annual rate.
third quarter was up 2.4% on an annual-adjusted basis.

GN? in the

This was a significant

change from the 2.3% drop in GNP on an annual basis reported for the second
quarter.

The Federal Reserve Board's chairman, Paul Volcker, has vowed to

hold down the money supply via direct monitoring.

The prime lending rate is

hovering around 15%.
Petroleum costs continue to rise, although the oil supply seems to
be sufficient for the short run.
reduce production at any time.
increase.

However, the OPEC nations may decide to
In any event, energy costs seem certain to
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The fact chat 1930 is a major election year, when the President, the
House, and one-third of the Senate will be chosen, may also have an impact on
the economy.

In order to forestall an economic slide on the way to the polls.

Congress and the President may yet choose to "pump up" the economy in 19S0.

C.

INDUSTRY AND CONDITIONS
The home power tool manufacturing industry is fairly mature and stable.

It has experienced a slight growth over the last few years, subsequent to a
period of rapid demand growth during the previous decade.

Recently, however,

any large increase in sales by a large company has been at the expense of one
or more of its competitors.

The industry is composed of approximately a dozen

large manufacturers and a number of smaller firms.

Most of the more familiar

brands market their goods through national hardware wholesalers and retailers,
while others either operate regionally or market their goods under house brand
names.
Product lines are quite stable and generally undergo only cosmetic
changes from year to year.

Some innovation in product design occurs, but

almost no new kinds of tools have appeared since the early 1960's.

Thus, little

inventory fluctuation occurs and repeat purchasing is the general rule.
Most manufacturers are not vertically integrated and thus purchase
most input materials in component form (i.e., few firms wind their own armatures
or produce their own tool bodies).

No shortage of supplies is expected, but

increases in costs have been partially responsible for a shift from steel to
alloys and plastic parts.
The outlook for the industry is relatively good.

Although current

economic conditions increase the uncertainty in any prediction, strong sales
were experienced after an early stall during the recession in the early mid-1970's.
Most industry analysts expect a stall in growth, but sales nearly equal to
last year.

D.

FIRM STATUS AND HISTORY
Craftmate was founded in 1951 as Frenier Electric by James Frenier,

a self-educated electrical engineer.

The company was originally established
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as a producer of large motor assemblies to be sold as components for tool
manufacturers or as replacement motors.
the company presidency at age 40.

In 1957, his son, Charles, assumed

Charles, a college graduate, revamped the

company (then Craftmade, Inc.) by expanding into the home tool product lines
and pioneering the market outlets that are the core of Craftmate's current
marketing system.
Many management positions are held by members of the rrenier family,
their in-laws, and family friends.
to the Sales V. P.

Charles' son, Jim, an MBA, is assistant

All the key management personnel are college educated and

appear to be quite able in their business activities.

The V. P.'s for Sales

and for Production each hold 3BA's and have been promoted from inside the firm
after a number of years of service.
for at least eight years.
for 12 years.

They have held their current positions

The controller is an M3A who has been with the firm

He was responsible for instituting all the EDP applications the

firm employs.
Craftnate currently manufacturers 16 different basic models of large
home power tools (e.g., table saws, drill presses, radial arm saws) and 12
different basic models of hand power tools (e.g., drills, circular saws,
routers).

A variety of different shells and cosmetic changes allow these

basic models to be sold under several house brands as well as under the
Craftmate name.

Craftmate's largest single purchaser is a national department

3tore and mailorder retailer, but the majority of the company's output is sold
to a large number of small purchasers.
Sales this year are expected to be about $18 million.

The company

experienced its greatest growth in the late 1960fs and early 1970's by
expanding its market during an industry growth period.

Since then, its market

share has remained fairly stable and its profits have grown steadily, if
unspectacularly.

This is in accordance with management's current plans,

which are to solidify its market position and seek additional profits through
increased efficiency in production and distribution.
All of Craftmate's facilities are located on a single site in central
New York which has ready access to major trucking and rail routes.
are maintained on the premises.

All records
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E. OWNERSHIP
Craftmate went public in 1972, when sales reached $10 million.
The Frenier family still owns about 45% of the company’s outstanding shares,
with Charles (now Chairman as well as President) holding 20% himself.
family employees own a total of 20% of the firm.

Non¬

The company's stock is

sporadically traded over the counter.

F.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE
Due to the "neighborhood" nature of Craftmate, administrative

personnel tend to associate with each other outside of the office.

Further¬

more, the atmosphere in each of the offices is decidedly informal, although
slight social distinctions seem to be made along family and seniority lines.
Hourly production workers, on the other hand, do not tend to mix beyond their
own job shop and shift.

G.

ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
The company has two Philips minicomputers on which it maintains

payroll and the general ledger accounts.

Monthly summaries, reports, billings,

and financial statements are also prepared on these machines.
all of Craftmate’s accounting system was manual.

Until recently,

The transition to automation

of the above activities has taken place gradually over the last five years.
Standard operating procedures exist for all daily record keeping
activities.

Each accounting department employee has been issued a copy of

the manual describing such procedures in his department.

Accounting duties

are not rotated.
No formal internal auditors position exists at Craftmate.

This

function is performed by the Controller's assistant, who makes spot-checks
in the various departments at unannounced times.
In the revenue cycle areas, segregation of duties and restricted
access exists among sales, accounts receivable, cash receipts, inventory
records/cost of sales, shipping, and central processing (EDP).

Only department

employees have access to the blank forms used for documents originating in
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Thus, billing forms are kept in central-processing; invoices

and dunning forms are kept in accounts receivable; shipping document blanks are
kept in shipping; customer purchase order forms are kept in sales; and cash
receipt blanks are kept in the cashier's office.

H.

ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE SUBSYSTEM
Accounts receivable is a five person department which handles this

function only.

Although there is some segregation of duties within the depart¬

ment, each employee must perform a variety of jobs.
Accounts receivable balances have averaged 20% of total assets and
43% of current assets over the last two years.

The proportions on the third

quarter balance sheet are 21% and 42%.
A summary flowchart of accounts receivable operations is given on the
following pages.
cycle operations.

This flowchart includes interfaces with surrounding revenue
There are five boxes in the flowchart which refer to an

item number on the rating situation sheets.
None refers to item 1.

One on each page refers to item 4.
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Client:
System:
Audit:
Dept.
Cleric
Clerk
Clerk
Clerk

Craftmate, Inc.
Accounts Receivable
12/31/79

Manager (DM)- 3. Frer.ier
AT. Watson
3M. 0'3rien
CC. DeLiso
0M. Xreski

12

-

Legend:
Double lines indicate restricted access
departmental boundaries.
C?0 = Customer Purchase Order
I » Sales Invoice
SD =» Shipping Document
3 ■ Receipt Voucher
3 = Customer Billing Statement

1. Salesman transcribes customer's phone or mail order onto C?0.
2. Clerk A or 3 (first available) checks customer's credit acceptability against
list prepared monthly by DM.
Initials CPO and notes credit limit on same.
3. See item 4 on rating situation sheets to find out if DM checks and initials
credit sales approvals.
4. Clerk A or 3 (first available) writes order on 4-part, prenumbered sales invoice,
cross-referenced and attached to CPO.
5. Documents distributed.
CPO, II, 12 to numerical suspense file;
14 to customer as acknowledgement (via salesman).

13 to inventory;
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Client:

Craitmate,

Inc.

avstem:

.-.ccounts P.eceivaote

Pace AR-2
Audit:12/31/79

6.

Warehouseman writes 3-part shipping document (cross-referenced to I#) as order
is assembled.
13, 301, and SD2 are returned to the dispatcher, who checks
and initials them against the merchandise.
3D3 is packed with the merchandise.

7.

Dispatcher checks and distributes documents.
13 to A?.; SCI to his file; SD2
affixed to outside of shipment as packing slip.

3.

Clerk A or 3

9.

See item 4 cn rating situation sheets to find out if formal procedures for
investigating and correcting mismatches exist.

(first available)

matches 13 to II, 12, C?0 from suspense file.

10.

Same clerk as step 3 prices and extends all invoice espies using standard price
lists.

11.

Documents distributed.
II to numerical file; 12 to alphabetical file;
day file ?; C?0 to salesman, indicating shipment en route.

12 to
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Cl lent:

. rarcmace,

nc.

vstan:

Accounts P.eceivacie

rtuai:

Pace AR-3
12/31/ 79

12.

See item 3 on ratine situation sheets to find out if invoices are reconciled
numerically at least once a month with investigation and documentation of
missing numbers.

13.

Cleric 0 prepares the daily total on invoices, affixes the adding machine
tape to the day file, and sends the package to central processing.

14.

SEP keypunch operator transcibes invoices to magnetic tape while visually
verifying input on CPT screen.

15.

13's are filed in C? documents.
Preliminary edit check is run on tape file
prior to actual input to update routine.
Edit checks include
verification
of total from AP. adding machine tape, machine check digits, master file
comparison, and reasonableness checks.

IS.

If edit check failure not due to keying error, day file returned to AP. with
note of edit rejection.

17.

See item 4 on rating situation sheets to find out if formal procedures for
investigating and correcting errors exist.

18.

Clerk C matches billing statements against 12's.
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1 3 re

Client:

Craftmate,

Inc.

vstsn:

Accounts Receivable

Audit:

12/31/79

20.

DM receives aged accounts receivable trial balance monthly from central processing
and prepares the list of overdue accounts.
Cased on this, he prepares the
credit status/limit list (see step 2 on page AR-1), dunning3, and bad debt
write-offs (reviewed by controller)

21.

Cash receipts are recorded on 4-part, prenumbered receipt vouchers.
Rl is
sent back to the customer; R2 is placed in the CR file, and R3,4 axe 3ent to
accounts receivable.

22.

Clerk D matches R3,4 to 33 from the alphabetic billing file, initialing
reconciling items, marking 33 "paid" and filing the documents.

23.

See item 4 on rating situation sheets to find out if formal procedures
for investigating and correcting mismatches exist.
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Client;
24.

Craftr.ace,

Inc.

| S'/sten:

16

-

Accounts Receivable

-LlSi
edit:

L2/31/~>9

Clerk C prepares the daily total or. receipts, affixes the adding machine
tape to the receipts day file (file U), and sends the package to central
processing.

AC/LOUhJTS

£cC&\/ABC?
PA<£rfr 42.-4

?p^e

4e-3

1 0-5
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IV

Evaluation Situations
On each of the next twenty pages is a set of four questions and answers

which, in association with the information in the previous section, complete
the description of the accounts receivable subsystem by supplying the infor¬
mation to fill the "empty boxes" in the subsystem’s flowchart.

Recall that

each of these situations is to be considered a separate and independent case.
Your task is to rate the reliability of the accounts receivable subsystem
against three stated objectives based on the procedures and techniques employed
in that subsystem only.

Assume that reliabilities for other subsystems are

determined separately.
For each situation, then, you should:
a.

Examine the yes-no answers to the questions at the top of the page;

b.

Mentally "fill in" the empty boxes in the flowchart with the appropriate
information, and;

c.

Once you have evaluated the resulting subsystem configuration,
indicate your ratings by placing an "X" in the appropriate space
on each scale at the bottom of the page.

You may refer back to Section III as often as you wish, but please do not
re-examine or change a rating once you have moved to a new rating situation.
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SITUATION

01

The following four items complete the description of the accounts
receivable subsystem at Craftmate, Inc.
ITEM

YES

NO

1. Have the client’s personnel been in¬
formed of their employer’s ethical
standards and are formal statements
of these standards posted in visible
locations?
2.

Are credit sales approvals checked and
initialed by the department manager?

3.

Are invoices reconciled numerically
at least once a month and are missing
numbers investigated and their dis¬
position documented as a part of each
reconciliation?

4.

_z _
/

Do formalized procedures exist for
handling the non-routine activities
of investigating and correcting
mismatching pairs of sales invoices,
shipping documents, billing amounts,
and payment receipts?

Please rate the accounts receivable subsystem described in
this situation on its reliability in assuring appropriate:
AuthorizationReliable

Unreliable

AccountingReliable

Unreliable

SafeguardingUnreliable
NOTE:

123456739

10

TWENTY "CASE'1 DESCRIPTIONS SIMILAR TO THIS
ONE WERE INCLUDED IN THE ORIGINAL BOOKLET,
OCCUPYING PAGES 13 THROUGH 37.

Reliable
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V.

Debriefing Questions
This section exists to allow you to give us some feedback on your

experience in this experiment.

Please feel free to add any comments at

the end of this section.

1. Please rate the following aspects of the experimental task you have
just completed:

The rating task, itself:

DULL

—L-1-1-1-1-1-1-1_I_I_I_

123456789

INTERESTING

10

The clarity of the instructions:

obscure

—i—i—i—i—i—i—i—:—i—i—1_
123456789 10

clear

The realism of the situations described:

UNREAL

-I-1_I_I_I-1-1-1-1-1-1—
123456739 10

REAL

Your feel for performing the ratings:

UNCOMFORTABLE —t-1-1-1-?-±-1-1-=-i-1—
123456789 10
2.

Rave you ever participated in an auditing research study before?
( ]

3.

COMFORTABLE

Yes

{ ]

No

What is your opinion of such activity, in general?
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4.

How much time has elapsed since you started reading this booklet?

How much time did you spend on the rating task, itself?

5.

Please use the space below to elaborate on your answers above, add any
comments on your experience with the experiment, or discuss any of your
thought processes during the rating task.

Thank you for your time and cooperation.
A copy of the results of this experiment will be
made available to your firm through:

APPENDIX B

A Note on Cascaded Inference
In Categorical Judgment

Most of the cascaded inference literature deals with the
assessment of probaoilities
1977).

(cf. Slovic and Lichtenstein,

This study and its immediate predecessors, however,

dealt with categorical judgment.

The following simple

example is intended to demonstrate some possible effects of
cascading in such a situation.
matical proof.

This example is not a mathe¬

It is only intended to be an illustration.

Assume the following:
1) The judges are experts. Any errors in their judg¬
ments are due solely to random error.
Thus, the
judgments given by the hypothetical panel will be
distributed about the 'true' classification in
approximately random-normal fashion.
2) The judges employ a 'best-guess' strategy of the
kind identified in the literature when they are
making cascaded judgments.
That is, the judges
behave as if they assume that any intermediate
judgment made during a related series correctly
reflects the truth.
Thus that judgment can be
fed directly into the next decision step.
3)

Some 'true' isomorphic relationship exists
between the intermediate and final steps in the
judgment task.
Our expert judges know this rela¬
tionship intuitively (hence the judgment aspect
of the task) and the only error they make in
going from one step to the next is random.
In
terms of the audit plan, the relationship of
importance is the one between control system
reliability and audit man-hours.
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100 judges are asked to derive a time budget for the
audit of a particular accounting subsystem.

The

'true'

quality of internal accounting control in the situation is
70 percent reliability.

In the first judgment step, how¬

ever, some of the judges are affected by random error.
Thus, the following frequency distribution is obtained for
reliability judgments:
Rating—
90 percent
80
70 (true)
60
50
<50

Frequency—
2 judges
16
65
16
1
0

Assume the following relationship is appropriate for the
audit being planned:
Rating—
100 percent
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10

Man-hours—
40 hours
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
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Each judge is aware of only his own evaluation.

He is

also affected by random disturbance in translating his rel iability judgment into a time budget figure.

Thus, the

resulting distribution of t'imes would be:
Man-hour plan—

Frequency—

>100 hours
100
90
80
70
60
50
40

0 judges
1
4
22
46
22

3
2

Despite the fact that the differences at each stage in
the decision process were due only to random error, there is
less apparent consensus in the plan decisions than in the
reliability judgments.

This phenomenon is due to the fact

that the first decision stage had essentially a single set
f

of input cues while the second stage had a variety of
inputs.

The lower level of consensus is strictly due to

entropy, not differences of opinion!
The implication here is that conclusions about consensus
under a situation where judgments are cascaded are likely to
underestimate the agreement between the judges.

Thus,

in a

situation where the judges make non-random errors, consensus
in a multistage decision is likely to be quite low indeed.

